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
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A handwritten signature in black ink, featuring a large, stylized 'Z' or 'W' shape followed by a vertical line and a small flourish.

THE STUDY OF OMANI-CHINA RELATIONS

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阿曼与中国关系研究

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摘要

世界上所有文明，包括伊斯兰文明和中华文明，都具有共性，即珍惜友谊、公平和宽容。这些价值观是世界各国的共同原则，而且作为人类社会的文化遗产应该得到重视并世代流传下去，唯有如此，不同文明间的对话交流才成为可能。

阿曼和中国都是伟大的文明古国，其各自文明史均可追溯到数千年前，当时陆上和海上丝绸之路在促进这两个地区国家的双边贸易方面扮演了非常重要角色。因此，本文旨在详细阐述这两大文明和两个国家的互动关系，探讨和研究的问题包括：在前伊斯兰时期，这两种文明频繁互动的背后动因是什么？阿曼与中国关系在不同历史阶段的特征是什么？中阿两国贸易与文化交流的重要意义体现在何处？本文还将详细阐述阿曼学者在政府和商业部门中扮演的独一无二的角色，尤其是其与中国开展交流时，其高瞻远瞩、放眼未来的胸怀与视野对双边关系的促进作用。同时，他们还意识到引导不同文明之间进行对话、坚持对外开放政策的重要性。本论文还将讨论中阿关系发展的其他方面，以及两国在双边贸易和在经济、科技、艺术、文化等领域的深入合作。

本论文首先概述了从伊斯兰教出现后到当代，阿曼苏丹国和古代中国以及中华人民共和国的关系发展；解读中阿关系在不同历史时期的特征以及阿曼与中国建立贸易合作关系的重要性；其次，本文详述了中阿自古以来的地缘联系；考察了两国人民有史以来第一次航行的历史背景；最后，本文回顾了阿曼和中华人民共和国当前的合作交流关系以及两国关系的发展前景。通过向中东问题专家咨询和收集历史资料，本文以历史事件和合作领域为两大主线，探讨两国在双边政治、贸易、文化和外交事务中频繁互动、密切联系的动因及其特征。

本文通过学术研究，试图回答以下学术和现实问题：第一，从前伊斯兰时期到今天，阿曼和中国的关系是如何逐步发展的，贯穿其中的主线是什么；第二，阿曼和中国关系中的地缘因素是什么；第三，阿曼与中国人民历史上第一次航海的背景及其影响如何；第四，阿曼船队向中国购买的第一批商品是什么，反过来，中国船队从阿曼购买的第一批商品是什么；第五，两国历史上在各领域的合作达到了什么程度；第六，阿曼和中华人民共和国在双边贸易、经济、科技、文化、艺术领域的合作取得了哪些成绩，存在哪些主要问题；伊斯兰教在阿拉伯半岛传播前后中国与阿曼双边贸易与文化交流的形式和内容有何共同点与差异；第七，当前中阿关系取得了哪些成就，存在

哪些亟待解决的问题。

本文的结论是，阿拉伯人和中国人的经济联系与航海密切相关，阿拉伯半岛尤其是阿曼港口的东海岸是历史上最活跃的地区。中国早在唐朝时期就通过奢华而又强大的海船引领世界进入航海时代，促进了东亚与中东海上技术的发展。与此同时，阿曼以造船闻名，阿曼人长期垄断的技术帮助阿曼航海者进行了环球航行。出于在印度洋的航行和中国与伊斯兰世界经济互动的需要，阿曼许多港口当时获得了良好的发展机遇，瓷器碎片、尤其是在婆哈发现的中国明朝流行的白色和蓝色瓷器。阿曼和中国人民通过深入的纽带联系起来，双边贸易模式为两国人民的发展、进步和繁荣以及文化和知识的交流都起了非常重要的作用。

本文的创新之处在于：从新现实主义理论出发，以阿曼与中国关系发展的历史与合作的领域为主线，提出影响阿曼与中国关系发展的五个主要因素——地缘政治、地区秩序、意识形态、领导层与政治结构、国际体系转型，认为阿曼与中国之所以长期保持友好合作关系，在于双方文明的互动性、经贸上的互补性和政治上的互需性。

关键词：阿曼；中国外交；阿拉伯世界；中国与海湾；中阿关系

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第一章 导言

第一节 论文选题与研究重点

本博士论文重点关注阿曼与中国的关系。无论是在现今国际体系还是在海湾阿拉伯半岛地区，阿曼与中国都是极为重要、极具影响力的国家。本文具体分析和考察自中国汉朝以来两国间的重要交往，这对理解两国间的历史交往至关重要，尤其是通过历史上中国对阿曼乃至整个海湾和阿拉伯半岛地区的外交政策及政策制定者的分析来解释和预测当今中国在中东地区的行为。此外，该论文也弥补了阿曼与中国关系研究的不足，因为当前大多数论文都将重点集中在阿曼与中国关系作为中国与阿拉伯世界及以及中东国家关系的一部分，缺少对阿曼与中国关系的全面研究。因此，本文首次尝试从多层次、全方位的角度分析了阿曼和中国两国间的政治、经济和社会关系。本文旨在克服阿曼与中国关系研究隶属于中国与中东国家关系的现实困难，重点研究中国与阿曼的关系。例如，奥贝迪的研究^①主要集中在中国与伊朗的关系上，只部分论述了中国与其他海湾国家的关系。其他学者如Yitzhak Shichor^②和Lillian Craig Harris^③的研究都涉及到中国与海湾地区其它中东国家对外关系，将中埃关系、中国在巴勒斯坦问题上的政策以及中国与美苏之间的关系等作为中国对海湾国家和阿拉伯半岛国家外交政策形成的重要因素。而本文首次尝试全面分析中国与阿曼从古至今的关系。

第二节 理论价值与政策意义

为什么要研究阿曼与中国的关系呢？这是因为该选题具有重要理论价值和政策意义。一方面，从理论意义上来看，本文运用国际理论（现实理论与建构主义）、史学理论（跨文化理论与传播理论）来探索阿曼与中国的关系。另一方面，本文亦具有政策意义。因为中国和阿曼在世界历史中都是非常重要的国家，两国在世界舞台上都扮演着至关重要的角色。对该问题进行全面彻底的研究有助于保持两国间的良好关系。

^① A.H.H.Abidi, *China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf*, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982.

^② John Calabrese, *China's Changing Relations with the Middle East*, New York: Pinter, 1991.

^③ Lillian Craig Harris, *China Considers the Middle East*, New York: I.B.Tauris, 1993.

无论是在全球层面还是在地域层面上,中国的经济权重和战略影响力都是当今国际政治最显著的要素之一。中国的重要性体现在以下两个方面:第一,自1979年以来,中国经济的可持续发展显示出中国具有长远经济和战略能力;第二,中国具有持续增长的政治力量和军事实力,同时还具有将先进的军事技术发展到世界其他地区的能力。

1979年以来,中国开展了世界上最为成功的经济现代化规划之一。从1979年到1993年间,中国的GDP年平均增长9.3%,1994年增长11.8%,而1996年则为9.8%。在世界其他国家GDP年增长率只有2.6%的情况下,中国已成为全世界经济增长最快的国家之一。中国的GDP在短短15年内增长了3.76倍^①。据世界银行预计,到二十一世纪中期,中国的经济产量将达100万亿美元。如今,除美国外,中国比其他国家吸引了更多的外国投资。中国这一强大经济体对于地区安全也有着重要的作用。Gary Klintworth^②认为,中国这一强大的经济体将会为其在维护地区稳定上带来丰厚的利益,这可以说明中国对解决柬埔寨内战问题的贡献^③。Stuart Harris^④认为,世界希望出现一个强大的中国来防止地区不稳定的危险,同时加强中国对世界经济的参与度在很大程度上能够加快中国成为一个更加负责任的国际参与者和有利可图的经济伙伴。然而Harris认为,强大的经济能力也成为中国巨大政治力量的基础。中国政府有可能利用这个能力将自身利益强加于邻国^⑤。无论哪种情况,在中国经济持续惊人增长的情况下,中国的地区和国际影响力将不断提高。

但是,将中国推上当今国际舞台的不仅是因为中国的经济现代化,还因为中国军事能力的提升以及中国与世界众多国家不断发展的政治与军事合作。中国不仅是一个核大国,而且还掌握了世界最先进的军事技术,与其他亚洲邻国相比拥有军事上的优势。中国正通过发展现代空军技术以及更为精确的弹道导弹和巡航导弹来加强和提升军事能力。中国军事能力的提升使中国军事技术出口至包括中东国家在内的世界其他国家的机会大大增加。中国已成为世界军事装备最主要的供应国之一。据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究机构(SIPRI)年鉴显示,中国在二十世纪90年代已成为世界第六大常规武器供应国。1992年至1996年期间,中国军事出口总额约为43.75亿美元。中国认

^① Fei-Ling Wang 'To incorporate China: A Policy for a new era', *The Global and Mail* 21(1) (Winter).68, 1998:68.

^② Gary Klintworth, 'China's evolving relationship with APEC,' *International Journal* 50(3) (Summer), 488, 1995.

^③ Gary Klintworth, 'China's evolving relationship with APEC,' *International Journal* 50(3) (Summer), 488, 1995, p.488.

^④ Stuart Harris, 'The economic aspects of security in the Asia-Pacific region', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18 (3) (September),37,1995.

^⑤ Stuart Harris, 'The economic aspects of security in the Asia-Pacific region', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18(3)(September),37,1995,p.37.

为其与沙特阿拉伯、伊朗等国家的军事合作(中国已为部分中东国家提供军事技术)不仅能够为其提供硬通货,还能为中国政府获取政治和战略要点提供契机。

中国的地理、人口及其在国际舞台上的政治影响力也提升了中国在国际体系中的作用。中国拥有960万平方公里的国土面积,仅次于俄罗斯与加拿大。中国边界线长2.28万公里,与15个国家接壤,并与韩国、日本、菲律宾、文莱、马来西亚和印尼隔海相望。中国也是世界人口第一大国,拥有14亿人口,占全球人口的23%。据预计,到2030年,中国的人口将达16.3亿。^①

阿曼也有着深厚的文化背景,是海湾阿拉伯半岛地区乃至全世界伟大的国家之一。自古以来,阿曼就与其他文明国家来往密切,曾是东西丝绸之路的重要一站。至十九世纪末,阿曼已成为蓬勃发展的印度洋商业与海洋中心。纵观历史,阿曼与世界几个主要大国关系密切,在促进世界其他民族和文明的交往上发挥了至关重要的作用,这使阿曼在海湾地区、阿拉伯世界及世界其他地区发挥了积极的作用。

1970年开展的现代复兴运动为阿曼提供了繁荣发展所需的各类重要背景和要素。阿曼领导层了解并熟悉周边世界,一个愿意并有能力依靠自己双手和重要地理位置描绘命运蓝图的民族使其能够对国际格局产生重要且持久的影响。

阿曼有着数世纪悠久的历史,对人类文明做出过重要贡献。阿曼已经成为具有影响力的海上政治力量,与遥远的中国、美国、英国和法国保持着联系。几个世纪前,阿曼的大使们就已经进入上述国家的首都并受到接见。

阿曼现代复兴往日繁荣的能力、建立民族团结和凝聚力的领导能力、在安全与稳定的基础建立一个强大的经济体及其富有能力和经验的政治管理能力是贯穿阿曼历史不同时期、连接当代复兴运动与过去繁荣的共同主线。

历史研究表明阿曼与古老的东方文明之间有着广泛的联系,包括中国、印度、美索不达米亚以及东地中海、尼罗河谷地和北非。

如同其他具有独特历史和文明的国家和民族一样,阿曼经历过各种不同的历史时期。至中世纪,阿曼已经发展成为一个繁荣的航海国家,航船从苏哈尔港出发,与来自远方国家的商人进行贸易。然而,这种成功也招致来自外部世界的敌意。这种敌意的出现恰逢阿曼国内的部落动荡时期,从1154年以来的四个半世纪,巴尼·纳卜汉陆续统治了该国中部地区。

在过去250年间,伊玛目艾哈迈德·本·赛义德于1744年建立了布赛义德国家,在其

^① L.R.Brown, *Who Will Feed China?* New York: W.W.Norton, 1995.

后代苏丹卡布斯·本·赛义德的统治下，阿曼终于成为众所周知的强大且具有影响力的国家。然而，繁荣的道路并非总是一帆风顺。阿曼也曾经历过衰弱、与世隔绝、国内冲突等各种时期。由于各种国内、区域和国际原因，这些时期阿曼曾闭关自守、与外界隔离。幸运的是，这种情况在1970年终于走到了尽头，为二十一世纪的当代阿曼奠定了基石。

阿曼与世界140多个国家保持着良好关系，并成为超过105个区域和国际组织的成员。阿曼还在世界舞台上发挥着积极作用。阿曼和中国在世界历史和国际体系中都至关重要。因此，对阿曼和中国关系及两国历史交往和现实交往的研究注定具有重要意义。本博士学位论文着重研究阿曼与中国关系及相互影响和对国际体系和国际关系的影响。

第三节 国内外研究成果综述

一、国外研究成果综述

迄今为止，考察和分析阿曼与中国关系各个方面的文献范围并不广泛。关于中国与阿曼关系研究的文献大多倾向于研究中国与中东国家的关系，在分析中国与超级大国的关系中也涉及中国对中东国家外交政策的起源和演变。中国和两个超级大国的对抗构成了研究中国与中东国家关系的文献基础背景。到目前为止，学术界并没有关于阿曼与中国今昔关系的文献。

杜鲁门研究所执行主任、希伯来大学东亚研究院讲师施克（Yitzhak Shichor）^①是深入研究中国与中东国家（包括阿曼）关系的第一人。

他的研究论述了38年来中国对中东外交政策的演变。施克的基本假设是：作为影响世界历史发展和中国利益的一部分，中东国家对中国一直有着重要的意义。他声称，中国对中东国家的政策反映了中国对其与美苏两大超级大国的关系以及对美苏关系的看法。他将自己的著作分为五个部分，分别阐述了自1949年到1977年间中国对中东国家的政策，反映了中国与两个大国的关系。他在第一章阐述了共产主义中国的中东政策始于二十世纪40年代初，远远早于万隆会议或中华人民共和国成立。

在他看来，中国共产党领导人早在二十世纪40年代初就已意识到中东对中国未来的战略重要性。中国领导人认为，如果像德国这样的敌对势力统治中东将导致英国人对中东统治的瓦解，这将为新势力寻求统治亚洲乃至中国扫清道路。因此，中国在政

^① See Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979.

治上与该地区保持距离。尽管以色列早在十九世纪50年代就承认了中华人民共和国，但两国的外交关系并没有立即建立起来。

施克将中以外交关系的空缺归因于当时以色列政府拒绝推动与中国的外交关系。不过，他并没有对新建立的共产主义政权作出过明确解释。他唯一的解释是针对以色列的官方答复：“政府已原则上决定与中华人民共和国建立外交关系，但在远东地区的局势变得明朗之前，不应该有任何举动。”^①

然而，从二十世纪50年代中期开始，中国与阿拉伯国家的关系有了更多积极的成果。尽管没有建立外交关系，但与中东国家的经济与文化关系成为了中国与中东国家关系的第一个策略。中国还间接促进了1955年莫斯科与开罗之间的第一桩大宗武器交易。^②1956年5月，埃及成为第一个与中国建立外交关系的中东国家。埃及与中国建交的决定据说是因为纳赛尔坚信，中国可以成为独立的武器供应国。叙利亚和也门随后也在1956年的7月和8月分别与中国建立了外交关系。施克认为，二十世纪50年代末中国的中东政策是为了反对西方帝国主义，并破坏其在该地区的存在，当时中国的外交政策较为激进。但是，由于中国的意识形态在阿拉伯世界很难被接受，中国转为支持中东大多数革命地区的“人民战争”^③。

二十世纪60年代，中国与苏联的关系开始严重恶化，中国利用中东发动对美帝国主义和苏联修正主义的斗争。施克认为，中国在二十世纪60年代的上半叶用尽一切办法来取悦阿拉伯各国政府，以消除美国和苏联在该地区的影响力，可惜并未成功。自1966年起，中国的外交政策更加侧重支持反对帝国主义的民族解放运动，并暗示反对苏联修正主义。根据施克的观点，二十世纪70年代后，中国与华盛顿和莫斯科关系的改变带动了中国对中东地区看法的改变。中国与中东国家的关系变得更加务实，支持这些国家的政策，取消了其带有革命色彩的宣传。^④

与施克一样，约翰·卡拉布雷斯^⑤也撰写了一本富有见地的著作。在《中国与中东关系的变化》一书中，他描绘了40年来中国与中东国家（包括阿曼）关系的变化和连续性。卡拉布雷斯认为，中国中东政策的变化反映了中国外交政策的整体转变。卡拉布雷斯论述呼应了施克的中心论点，即中国的中东政策应理解中国为对超级大国所控制的全球事件的反应，而不是对该地区本土冲突的理解。该书分析了中国不断变化的

^① See Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979, p.23.

^② See Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979, pp.41-42.

^③ Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979, p.79.

^④ Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979, pp.145-188.

^⑤ John Calabrese, *China's Changing Relations with the Middle East*, New York: pinter, 1991.

观念，以及中国和埃及、伊朗、叙利亚、沙特阿拉伯、科威特、阿曼、以色列及巴解组织的关系。卡拉布雷斯按时间顺序对这些关系进行了考察和叙述，并将中国的中东外交政策分为七个不同的发展阶段。

在第一阶段（1950-1957年），中国采取了“一边倒”的政策。卡拉布雷斯认为，中国在该阶段的中东政策是由中国反美亲苏的战略决定的。因此，中国对中东国家（包括阿曼）采取了“在战术上灵活的做法”。这种做法最显著的特点是更加灵活与务实，而不是像万隆会议时那样表现更多的意识形态。^①

在第二阶段（1958-1965年），中国开始意识到其在中东政策上的军事成本。卡拉布雷斯认为，中国对西方干预中东地区（即黎巴嫩和约旦）的“软弱回应”使其与苏联之间产生争议，进而导致中苏两国在此期间对中东地区的政策产生分歧。当与埃及的关系发展出现困难时，中国转向伊拉克新政权，发展同卡西姆更加密切的关系。但两国的这种关系并未持续多久，由于中国在该地区提倡反对帝国主义的斗争，除了与巴勒斯坦的关系外，中国发现自己再一次被孤立。卡拉布雷斯的结论是，中国在此期间并没有实现其在该地区试图减少西方优势的目标。

在第三阶段（1966-1968年），中国在这一地区的外交政策主张从提倡统一战线转变为支持地区解放和革命运动，主要是巴勒斯坦解放组织（巴解组织）和Dhofari叛军。卡拉布雷斯得出的结论是，中国在他们之间成功建立起信用；但是另一方面，中国未能对巴解组织产生持续影响，同时进一步恶化了与该地区各国政府的关系。

在第四阶段（1969-1971年），卡拉布雷斯认为，苏联对该地区的威胁促使中国开始在该地区采取更加务实的外交政策。

在第五阶段（1972-1977年），新的务实外交政策达到了顶峰。在此期间，中国将苏联列为中国的主要敌人。中国认为，华盛顿和莫斯科之间的权力天平是倒向莫斯科的。因此，中国推进与华盛顿和该地区各国政府发展更加密切的联系。

在第六阶段（1978-1981年），现代化成为中国中东外交政策的中心目标，国际局势稳定成为其追求成功必不可少的先决条件。由于石油和市场，中东成为中国的现代化努力的一部分。

在最后一个阶段（1982-1989年），卡拉布雷斯表明，中国的中东外交政策开始走向独立自主，这意味着中国只需要密切关注超级大国，而不必与超级大国结盟。在该阶段，中国在中东地区的主要目标是与苏联争夺中东市场和政治影响。中国的外交

^① John Calabrese, *China's Changing Relations with the Middle East*, New York: pinter, 1991, pp.7-14.

政策体现在努力促进和维护与本地区各国的政治和经济关系上。卡拉布雷斯的著作分析了中国与中东前40年的外交互动，对研究阿曼与中国关系有着非常重要的意义。

但卡拉布雷斯的的研究缺少中国中东外交政策的许多细节。例如，中国支持阿尔及利亚民族解放阵线对法国进行解放斗争。与苏联不同的是，中国在1958年9月承认了阿尔及利亚共和国临时政府，并指责莫斯科为实现阿尔及利亚的停火而支持法国的立场。据统计，到1960年，中国向阿尔及利亚提供了价值1000万美元的军事装备和其他物资（Ogunsanwo 1974:52-3）。1956年至1977年期间，中国还通过捐款、贷款以及小型和大型工业、社会建设项目为阿尔及利亚提供了价值2690万美元的经济援助（Bartke 1989:37）。这表明，对阿尔及利亚的外交政策是一个中国中东政策的重要组成部分。然而，无论是施克和卡拉布雷斯的著作都没有提到中国对阿尔及利亚援助的具体内容。

另一方面，卡拉布雷斯划分的最后阶段也可以用来解释中国与中东地区在后冷战时代的关系。中国后冷战时代的中东政策不再与中国与超级大国的对抗相挂钩，而是受中国努力加强与中东的经济联系和建立政治影响力的愿望所驱使。中东地区是中国民用和军用商品的潜在市场。中东地区也是中国能过获得先进军事的技术的一条渠道，譬如与以色列这样的中东国家进行合作。

哈希姆（Hashim S. H. Behbehani）在著作《中国对阿拉伯世界的外交政策：1955年-1975年》（1981）^①中提出了中国对巴勒斯坦抵抗运动（PRM）、阿曼人民解放阵线（PFLO）和科威特外交政策的三个案例分析。同施克和卡拉布雷斯的著作一样，哈希姆的著作阐述了二十世纪50年代、60年代和70年代中国对阿拉伯世界外交政策的变化。通过这些案例研究，哈希姆认为，中国对阿拉伯世界外交政策的变化是由中国对世界的整体看法、各阶段的民族利益所决定，并非由一些具体的条件所决定。

哈希姆的研究是唯一具体论述中国对巴勒斯坦和其他海湾地区（主要是在阿曼）革命运动支持的演进与发展的著作，并分析了中国发展同科威特的关系所涉及的不同变量。

在这三个案例的基础上，哈希姆提出，1955年至1977年期间，中国对阿拉伯世界（外交）政策发生变化的原因在于中国希望能够填补空白，实现第三世界的领导地位。整个二十世纪50年代，中国对阿拉伯世界的外交政策一直追随苏联在该地区的政策。二十世纪60年代，中国开始与苏联争夺在第三世界的影响力。中国对于第三世界国家

^① Hashim S. H. Behbehani's *China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975*, London: KIP, 1981.

的补救方法就是使用武装斗争，这也是中国自己遵循以实现独立的方法。巴勒斯坦抵抗运动（PRM）和阿曼人民解放阵线（PFLO）为中国在该地区实现其政治和战略目标提供了一个绝佳的机会。

哈希姆（1980）认为，中国为这两个运动提供军事援助，并鼓励“人民战争”。但中国在二十世纪70年代初的政策变化使得中国取消了对阿曼人民解放阵线（PFLO）的支持并直接导致了该运动的减弱。他强调，在中国和阿曼人民解放阵线（PFLO）关系的变化并不是因为后者在地面上的失败。阿曼人民解放阵线（PFLO）一贯坚持中国的政治路线和思想路线，但中国改变了政策，通过处理与现有国家的关系来使自己在海湾地区站稳脚跟，取消对阿曼人民解放阵线（PFLO）的支持有利于中国与伊朗和科威特建立关系。

另一方面，中国支持巴勒斯坦抵抗运动（PRM），并为巴勒斯坦民族解放运动（法塔赫）提供军事援助。然而，哈希姆认为，中国在二十世纪70年代的政策变化并没有导致其减少对法塔赫支持。他解释道，苏联与法塔赫关系的改善使得中国一旦减少对法塔赫的支持势必会使自己的利益受损。他指出，中国对阿曼人民解放阵线（PFLO）与法塔赫政策的变化以及努力改善同科威特的关系个中原因在于中国对两个超级大国外交政策的变化，尤其是中国采取了反苏政策。

莉莲·克雷格·哈里斯（Lillian Crag Harris）的著作《中国眼中的中东》^①讨论了中国与中东的传统和现代关系，并将重点放在这种关系的历史渊源上。根据哈里斯的观点，中国与中东在历史上的交往可以追溯到两千年前。中东既是中国连接欧洲的桥梁，也是阻碍中国与欧洲联系的屏障。双方通过丝绸之路进行商业联系，获取商业利益。丝绸之路还增强了中国与中东的文化关系。不过，哈里斯认为，蒙古人打破了中国和欧洲之间的屏障，导致欧洲入侵中东，使得中国与中东的联系逐渐减少。在民国时期（1912-1949年），中国与中东的联系非常有限。由于丝绸之路已不再发挥作用，双方贸易关系降至最低水平。然而，伊斯兰教却成为中国与中东交流的唯一重要媒介。于是，哈里斯转而讨论中国在1949年以后与中东的外交关系。

根据哈里斯的观点，中国与美国和苏联的关系促进了中国在中东外交政策上的利益。哈里斯认为，万隆会议为重建中国与中东之间的桥梁提供了契机。在这次会议上，中国确实取得了一定的政治利益，但总体上来说，中国没能成为中东国家革命运动的典范。于是，中国开始支持在阿尔及利亚、南也门、厄立特里亚、佐法尔和巴勒斯坦

^① Lillian Craig Harris, *China Considers the Middle East*, New York: L.B.Tauris, 1993.

的武装斗争。在二十世纪70年代中苏两国关系继续恶化后，中国比其他任何时候都更接近中东国家。中国运用伊斯兰教和贸易关系来促进与中东国家建立更密切的关系。哈里斯（1993）认为，在二十世纪80年代，中东已经成为中国经济现代化的主要组成部分。据哈里斯的观点，中国担心在后冷战时期中东地区和中亚地区会愈发不稳定。伊拉克入侵科威特使得中国在该地区的经济关系遇到风险。因此，中国采取了新的外交策略来与该地区建立更加密切的关系。加强与伊朗和巴基斯坦的关系、向中东国家出售武器、与以色列建立新的关系都是中国的新策略。

哈里斯（1993:266）认为：“在后冷战时代，中国已经在中东战胜了苏联。”她认为，由于苏联解体，中国在中东和中亚的影响力有了很大的提高。但是这种说法尚无明确定论。苏联解体的确提升了中国在中亚的作用。中国努力与新的中亚国家建立关系是希望填补苏联解体后的权力真空，但苏联解体并没有提高中国在中东地区的作用。例如，在二十世纪90年代，俄罗斯与中东国家的军事合作和武器销售都要比中国高出很多，甚至俄罗斯对中东和平进程的参与都要比中国显著。因此，目前尚不清楚苏联解体如何影响中国在中东的地位

奥贝迪的《中国、伊朗与波斯湾地区》^①是唯一一本将重点放在中国与海湾和阿拉伯半岛国家关系上的著作。虽然奥贝迪将重点放在分析中伊关系，但也涉及到了中国与海湾其他国家的关系。奥贝迪的研究从历史、国际、国内等角度分析了中国和伊朗合乎逻辑的伙伴关系。

该著作内容翔实，包括伊朗在二十世纪70年代初承认了中华人民共和国、伊朗革命前后伊朗与中国的关系以及中国力求保持与伊朗伊斯兰共和国关系的方式。虽然并不全面，但该书也论述了中国与伊拉克、也门、科威特、阿曼、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋、卡塔尔和巴林的关系。作者认为，他将重点放在伊朗的原因是因为伊朗曾要求比任何其他海湾沿岸国家得到中国更多的关注。除此之外，国土面积、地缘战略位置、资源和体制倾向使得伊朗在海湾具有特殊地位，对中国外交政策有着重要的作用。

根据奥贝迪的研究，直到二十世纪60年代，中国才真正有机会来评估其在该地区的政策。伊朗开始重新评估其对中国的态度，与此同时，科威特也获得了独立。但在二十世纪60年代，中国和该地区各国之间的关系并没有实现突破，这主要是由于中国对中东革命运动的支持。但在二十世纪60年代末和70年代初，中国对超级大国态度的改变使得中国加强了同科威特、伊朗和阿曼的政治、经济和社会关系。为了维护地区

^① A.H.H,Abidi, *China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf*, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982.

稳定和防止苏联入侵，中国单方面承认了巴林、卡塔尔和阿联酋。

上述研究中国中东政策的著作都是为研究中国与两个超级大国的关系服务的。然而，库马拉斯瓦米的著作^①（1999）谈到，中国发展与中东地区一些国家的关系并不是为了挑战这两个超级大国，而是为了追求其在中东的影响力。库马拉斯瓦米在书中还提到，中国领导人将中国 1992 年承认以色列的举动视为得到西方技术的一块敲门砖。他还认为，中国希望中国与以色列及其敌对国家的防务合作能够为中国今后在中东政治中发挥积极作用给予必要的政治影响力。与此同时，威廉·哈达德和玛丽进一步表明，二十世纪 90 年代，中国与巴勒斯坦的关系与以往的支持政策相比出现了新的转机。中国希望与中东各方成为商业合作伙伴，包括以色列迫使中国调整与巴勒斯坦和以色列的关系预期。因此，中国采取了较为中立的立场，而不是支持或偏向某一方。约翰·卡拉布雷斯关于中国同伊拉克关系的文章简要回顾了中国与伊拉克关系的发展。他的结论是中国对伊拉克政策反映了其整体外交政策的目标。与两个超级大国的争夺可能为中国前 30 年的对伊政策定下了基调，但二十世纪 80 年代和 90 年代的中国对伊政策则是其现代化计划的反映（卡拉布雷斯 1999:52-67）。

显然，从上面的论述可以看出，研究中国中东外交政策的文献数量越来越多，但这些文献中并没有对阿曼和中国关系进行详细研究和动态分析。除奥贝迪外，其他所有人对中国与海湾和阿拉伯半岛地区的关系只作了引用，将中国中东政策作为一个整体来讨论。本文希望能改善对阿曼和中国关系的分析研究现状。

二、中国研究成果综述

在中国，研究阿曼与中国关系的学术著作并不丰富，以下列出部分相关文献：

西北大学彭树智教授主编的《中东国家通史·海湾五国卷》第12章“海湾五国与中国的关系”^②中提到了自西汉以来阿曼和中国之间的联系、海上丝绸之路，两国自明、清以来的联系以及阿曼在中国和阿拉伯世界交往中的巨大贡献。该著作认为，阿曼是阿拉伯半岛东南沿海重要的、对中国最熟悉的国家这一。由于地理位置优越，阿曼是东西方贸易的货物集散地，同时也是东西方船只往来的交通要道。该书还描述了阿曼和中国在政治、经济和文化方面的交流。作者认为，在阿曼与中国建交前，发展两国双边关系存在一些障碍。在二十世纪60年代，阿曼人民解放阵线曾得到部分阿拉伯国

^① P. R. Kumaraswamy, *China and the Middle East: the quest for influence*, Sage Publications, 1999.

^② 钟志成著：《中东国家通史·海湾五国卷》，商务印书馆，2007年版。

家的支持，该阵线在佐法尔建立时，以进行反帝反封建的武装斗争为目标。出于国际政治的考虑，中国对该组织在一定程度上提供过支持。因此，阿曼政府采取了敌视中国的政策。1971年10月中国重返联合国后，中国在外交上对不断变化的国际局势的回应，尤其是当阿曼人民解放阵线提出“左倾观点”、希望解放整个波斯湾时，使得中国决定于1972年停止对阿曼人民解放阵线的支持。1973年，阿曼领导人希望通过第三国与中国建立外交关系。当时，由于国内形势的不断发展，阿曼政府向伊朗寻求帮助，联合打击阿曼人民解放阵线，引起了阿拉伯国家的不满。出于对大局的考虑，中国认为与阿曼建立外交关系为时尚早。在阿曼国内形势有所好转、同时伊朗也宣布从阿曼撤军后，阿曼和阿拉伯国家之间的关系得到了改善。1978年5月，中国和阿曼双方正式建立了外交关系。

西北大学博士王猛基于行为科学和分析层次撰写的博士论文：《中国参与中东：行为体视域的理论与实践》^①注重历史与现实、理论与实践、局部与整体、个案剖析与综合概括、普遍性与综合性相结合的思路，以层次分析视角将论文的着眼点主要集中于四个方面：首先，在理论应用上赞同建构主义观点，认为政治结构造就行为体，行为体也建构政治结构；其次，在主体选择上，将二十世纪的中国作为整体加以考虑；第三，在客体选择上，将西亚、北非和巴基斯坦等伊斯兰国家视作一个整体；第四，在文章结构上，试图以穷尽行为体参与行为的方式对中国与中东国家的外交互动进行分析。

论文的第一部分以恢复中国在联合国合法席位为聚焦点，重点论述中国与中东国家之间的斗争与合作情况。在此基础上总结了中国参与中东事务的优势与限度，即中阿政治支持的结构性与议题性、经济联系的结构性矛盾与优势互补并存以及文化与宗教联系的两重性，并对这种状况从动力学、关联度、决策机制与实施策略四方面进行剖析。

第二部分则从微观领域将中国参与中东事务的众多行为体细分为9个大类，即国家、政府间国际组织、国际非政府组织、跨国公司、政党、个人、民族、国际政治运动、宗教运动与组织，试图以归纳的方式探究各类行为体在20世纪参与中东地区事务的得失，研判行为体在下一个类似情境的反应，同时注重了丰富多彩外交斗争情况的趣味性。

第三部分则重点分析两例个案。以苏丹达尔富尔危机为切入点，分析伊战后中国

^① 王猛：《中国参与中东：行为体视域的理论与实践》（博士论文），西北大学，2006年版。

对中东国家外交所面临的挑战与契机;比照20世纪中国与伊朗在国家转型和现代化建设方面的异同,希望能勾画出中国参与中东地区事务演变轨迹。

文章最后得出了四点结论:首先,参与是一个从量变到质变的渐进过程,不同时期的特点和状况具有继承性,不能漠视和人为割裂这种继承性。第二,参与是一个互动过程,主客体之间的利益交汇决定了双边互动的深度和广度,中国对中东事务的参与在碰撞中走向成熟。第三,中国有越来越多的国际关系行为体开始全方位参与中东事务,行为体之间逐渐形成了既相互联系又相互制约复杂关系。最后,文明间的冲突并不必然地导致国际关系的冲突或对抗,文明间的关系是在交往中共存。

阿曼是海湾地区一个国家,但相关的学术研究却并不多。《列国志:阿曼》^①一书系统地提供了阿曼国家基本情况全景式的介绍,如地理、历史、政治、经济、文化、教育、社会生活、外交。该书的第7章论述了阿曼和中国的关系,由三部分组成:第一,阿曼与中国的关系源远流长,介绍了在汉、唐、元、明和清时期,阿曼和中国之间的往来(还指出,阿曼和中国之间的贸易在十世纪中期到十二世纪前半叶达到高峰);第二,阿曼和中国外交关系的建立;第三,阿曼与中国多层次的往来,以及两国从1978年至今在政治、经济和文化领域的交流。

张俊彦的论文《中古时期中国和阿拉伯的往来——兼论中国和阿曼的关系》^②是早期研究阿曼和中国关系的论文之一。该论文涉及的是公元前二世纪到公元十七世纪,即中国的汉朝到明代期间,中国与阿拉伯人民的友好往来情况。由于对阿拉伯国家方面掌握的资料有限,作者主要是基于中文资料对阿拉伯国家进行简单的介绍。这篇文章分成五个阶段:第一阶段是公元七世纪即唐朝之前阿曼和中国的友好往来;第二阶段是公元七至九世纪唐代与大食之间的友好往来,包括来华经商的阿拉伯人、伊斯兰教传入中国以及造纸技术的西传和其他交流;第三阶段是公元十至十三世纪的友好往来,包括中国造船和航海技术的发展以及在宋、辽时期的阿拉伯商人;第四阶段是在公元十三世纪后期至十四世纪的友好往来,包括科学文化的交流,并说明了元朝陆路交通发展至顶峰时期大量的拉伯人来华的原因;第五阶段是公元十五世纪至十七世纪的友好往来,包括明帝朱元璋积极发展与其他国家贸易,使得陆路交通和海上交通得到发展,国际交流蓬勃发展。

^① 全菲、韩志斌编著:《列国志:阿曼》,社会科学文献出版社,2010年版。

^② 张俊彦:“中古时期中国和阿拉伯的往来:兼论中国和阿曼的关系”,《北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》1981年第03期。

沈福伟在论文《中国和阿曼历史上的友好往来》^①中指出，阿曼和中国的交往史可以划分为四个阶段：第一阶段是宋代之前，该部分介绍了两国间的交往，包括椰枣通过海路从阿曼进入中国，并在中国南部种植，见证了两国在经济和园艺上的交往，后来中国商船到达波斯湾，进一步促进了两国间的交流。第二阶段是宋代。沈福伟认为，在公元十世纪中叶北宋统一中国后，政府大力鼓励海外贸易，因此，中国船只通往印度洋。自公元十一世纪起，海外贸易大有起色。直到十二世纪上半叶，中国和阿曼的友好关系进入了高潮时期。当时，苏哈尔与广州可以贸易直航。第三阶段是1260年元朝建立以后，元朝与伊尔汗之间的海上交通得到改善，阿曼和中国之间的贸易也有了起色。第四阶段是到中世纪末期，经过明初的海禁，在永乐（1403-1424）年间，中国在印度洋上展开了规模宏大的贸易和外交活动。这种海上活动，以郑和率领的宝船队七下西洋而名扬四方，震动了整个印度洋，展开了中国和阿曼友好往来的第四个高潮。

最新的学术成果之一是黄培昭的《中国和阿曼关系》^②。阿曼和中国都有着悠久的历史，两国的友好交往源远流长。这篇文章将笔墨侧重当今的关系，梳理了两国在政治、经济、文化等领域关系。首先，文章描述了两国在汉、唐、宋、元、明、清等时期的交往。其次，文章描述了两国政治、经济、文化交往的繁荣发展。文章最后部分涉及两国关系中存在的问题，其中一个历史上的问题：中国同阿曼伊斯兰酋长国和“解放阿曼人民阵线”的关系，另一个问题是阿曼与台湾之间的关系。

第四节 研究方法

一、历史研究方法

对一个社会学家来说，运用历史证据来佐证现实至关重要。不深入研究大量有关中国与阿曼的历史文献，在实地调查时，研究者便可能无法看到阿曼与中国关系中体现出的各种重大可能性。进一步说。此外，部分阿曼与中国往来的历史事实在现今社会很可能体现得并不明显，如果这些事实很重要，它们可能会存在于一些不容易获得的当地历史文献中。

上海外国语大学中东研究所是人文社科重点研究基地，当我来到中东研究所

^① 沈福伟：“中国和阿曼历史上的友好往来”，《世界历史》1981年第02期。

^② 黄培昭：“中国和阿曼关系”，《阿拉伯世界》，2000年第2期。

后，运用历史学方法进行研究的必要性变得更为清晰。当时中东所有许多研究项目，当我问及是否有阿曼-中国关系史的相关研究项目时，回答是否定的。阿曼和中国的交流史内涵丰富，因此很有必要对两国的外交史进行叙述。

有关阿曼和中国文献关系研究的一个主要特点是，文献数量很少。其次，这些文献或侧重中国的历史和现实，或聚焦阿曼的历史和现实。由于种种社会和政治原因，对阿曼或中国的官方数据应持保留或怀疑的态度。

二、文本解读方法

本论文研究更多地依靠外语专著（论文）和中国古典文献，通过对文本的解读来深入考察阿曼与中国的关系发展，主要英语专著（论文）如下：

1. Fei-Ling Wang 'To incorporate China: A Policy for a new era', The Global and Mail 21(1)(Winter).68, 1998
2. Gary Klintworth, 'China's evolving relationship with APEC', International Journal 50(3)(Summer), 488, 1995;
3. Gary Klintworth, 'China's evolving relationship with APEC', International Journal 50(3)(Summer), 488, 1995, p.488;
4. Stuart Harris, 'The economic aspects of security in the Asia-Pacific region', Journal of Strategic Studies 18(3)(September), 37, 1995;
5. Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's foreign policy, 1949-1977, Cambridge University press, 1979;
6. John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East, New York: pinter, 1991;
7. Hashim S. H. Behbehani's China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955—1975, London: KIP, 1981;
8. Lillian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East , New York: L.B.Tauris, 1993;
9. A.H.H, Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982;
10. P. R. Kumaraswamy, China and the Middle East: the quest for influence, Sage Publications, 1999. etc.

主要中文专著（论文）如下：

1. 黄培昭：“中国和阿曼关系”，《阿拉伯世纪》2000年第02期；

2. 沈福伟：“中国和阿曼历史上的友好往来”，《世界历史》1981年第02期；
3. 张俊彦：“中古时期中国和阿拉伯的往来：兼论中国和阿曼的关系”，《北京大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》1981年第03期；
4. 仝菲、韩志斌编著：《列国志：阿曼》，社会科学文献出版社，2010年版；
5. 王猛：《中国参与中东：行为体视域的理论与实践》（博士论文），西北大学，2006年；
6. 钟志成著：《中东国家通史·海湾五国卷》，商务印书馆，2007年版。

然而，不可否认的是，对与自身文化价值观不同的文化进行阐述要困难得多。虽然当下的这项跨文化研究项目不可避免地带有阿曼人或者中国人的价值观，但是焦点（两个国家间的交流）背后的问题实质或许有助于避免意识形态方面的偏见。必须承认，笔者无法做到完全客观，事实上这种极端并并不可取，但笔者对结论所基于的事实尽可能做到论述精确。

三、问卷调查方法

除上述研究方法外，本文还尝试利用问卷调查法，即为深入研究阿曼与中国关系，本人将实施对重要外交官的访谈和发放问卷，使本文对阿曼与新中国关系的历史细节有更加清楚的认识，还原历史原貌，从而为准确、客观评判阿曼与中国的关系以及对两国未来关系走向有更加清楚的认识。

第五节 章节安排

本博士论文分为六个部分，其中主体部分分为四章。第一部分是博士论文的导言，介绍本论文的选题、研究重点、学术价值、现实意义、前期文献综述、研究方法等，为本文制定出一套系统的框架；第二章考察1949年新中国成立前的阿曼与中国的交流关系，包括唐朝以前、唐朝时期、元朝时期和明清时期的两国关系；第三章是本文的理论分析框架，运用新现实主义的分析视角，考察阿曼与新中国的外交关系；第四章研究新中国成立后阿曼与中国全面互动关系，即接触——建交——建立全面关系；第五章讨论阿曼与中国关系的主要影响因素，包括地缘政治、地区秩序、意识形态、领导层与政治结构、国际体系转型，以及双方关系发展面临的一些问题，包括阿曼与中

国关系中的台湾因素等等；第六章是本论文的总结部分，分析了阿曼与中国关系的发展轨迹，展望了两国关系发展的未来。

第二章 新中国成立前阿曼和中国的交流关系

阿曼和中国都是历史悠久的国家，数千年以来，两国间的交往从未中断过。本章的论述按时间顺序包括四个部分：唐朝以前、唐朝时期、宋元时期和明清时期。本章对阿曼与中国交往的论述至新中国成立之前。

第一节 唐朝以前的阿曼与中国关系

自古以来，阿拉伯半岛就是东西方中转站，也是非洲国家和亚洲国家沟通的桥梁。阿曼位于阿拉伯半岛的东南隅，是东西方贸易往来中的货物集散地，同时也是航船在东西方旅程中不可避免的交通要道。阿曼首都马斯喀特对连接阿曼和其他海湾国家的海上交通而言至关重要。

阿曼的苏哈尔港位于马斯喀特北岸的巴提纳之滨，是通往印度洋的门户。该港物产丰富，它曾是亚洲最大的港口城市，在伊斯兰世界，从四世纪到十世纪，苏哈尔的知名度名列第四。十五世纪之前，这里的海上贸易一直蓬勃发展。每年伊历 7 月 10 日至 15 日，这里会举行一个很大的市集，许多阿拉伯国家和非洲东岸国家的商人前来进行贸易活动。大量的象牙、香料和阿拉伯国家富有特色的香料从苏哈尔港销往中国和东方。苏哈尔港是最能体现古老的阿拉伯国家与中国之间友好关系的港口。阿拉伯地理学家雅古特·哈玛维（Yagoot Hamayw）在其著作《地名词典》^①提出，苏哈尔港是“通向中国的门户”。

阿曼和中国交往的历史背景是阿拉伯地区和中国之间的交往。作为阿拉伯世界政治、经济和文化的参与者之一，阿曼全程参加了与中国的交往。

在远古时代，居住在东亚的中国人与邻国间有大量的接触和交往。据史料记载，西汉时期，张骞已经开始探索连接中国和中亚的交通要道。^②公元前 138 年，张骞受汉武帝派遣出访（大宛），月氏（大月氏）、巴克特里亚（大夏）和粟特（康居），至公元前 126 年回国。公元前 115 年，他再次受派遣通西域。这一次，他到达了乌孙，并让随从的助手出访了部分其他西亚国家，包括后来逐渐发展成当今阿曼的一个国

^① J, C, Wilkinson, *Sohar (Sohar) in the Early Islamic Period: The Written Evidence*, South Asian Archaeology, 1977.

^② the Western Regions (a Han Dynasty term for the area west of Yumenguan, including what is now Xinjiang and parts of Central Asia).

家。张骞的助手们大多会带着这些国家使节对汉朝的朝贡回来，这便是汉朝和阿拉伯国家交往的开始。张骞出访阿拉伯国家困难重重，但确实是伟大的壮举。在当时，一方面他必须克服出使的西域国家及部落对汉朝的不信任和疑虑；另一方面，他也不得克服翻越有着“世界屋脊”之称的帕米尔高原时的重重险恶。与张骞同时代的中国著名史学家司马迁将张骞出使西域称之为“凿空”（开辟通往西域的道路）。^①

张骞两次出使西域带回了大量有关中国与中亚和西亚交往的记录信息。他和同伴可能从中了解了安息人，并称之为“条支国人”，“条支”一词从波斯语的发音“塔吉克”音译而来。《史记》（约公元前 91 年编撰完成）和《汉书》（约公元 84 年编撰完成）中记录了“条支”的相关信息，是西亚国家在中国历史典籍中首次正式出现的记录。

此后，越来越多的汉朝使节被派往西亚国家。一年内这样的派遣会有十多次，或者至少五到六次。如果距离中国比较远，使节们会花上八到九年时间往返；即使距离不是很远的国家，有时也要花上两三年的时间，这样的情形在当时很常见。使节们沿途也会进行贸易。他们离开中国时会携带一些丝绸之类的中国的特产。当使节们穿过河西走廊和帕米尔高原到达中亚和阿拉伯半岛后，会将随身带的特产卖往欧洲。中国使者们往返于中国和中亚的这条道路因此被称为“丝绸之路”。我们也可以说，这是史书中第一个有关中国和西亚国家往来的记录。西汉的王莽在位期间（公元 9-23 年），丝绸之路曾一度中断。东汉时期，另一位著名的探险家班超（公元 31-102 年）重新开通了这条交通要道。班超和甘英重访西域，带回了大量有关阿拉伯半岛的信息，“阿曼”就是从这时开始出现在中国史书中。据《后汉书》记载，向西走约三千四百英里，即可到达阿曼；再往前走约三千六百英里可到宾斯国；越过宾斯国南面的河流向西南方向可到达于罗国；再往前走九百六十英里可到达安息国；乘船向南行驶可抵达大秦。这是中国古书中有关阿曼最早的记录。^②

汉朝时期，中国人在从东亚到西亚的陆路交通上一直处于主导地位，随后，阿拉伯人开辟了从红海和波斯湾出发、绕过印度半岛和马来半岛到达中国南方的海上航线。古代阿曼的造船技术和航海技术非常有名，苏哈尔港曾被阿拉伯地理学家称为“通向中国的门户”。这显然证明了阿曼人曾为东西方的海上交流做出过巨大贡献。

《后汉书》^③第 88 卷中提到过西域的安息，清楚地记录了安息的地理位置，是史书中最早的记录。书中提到，从安息（今伊朗）向西走三千四百（约 1700 公里）里

^① *Historical Records, Biography of Zhang Qian.*

^② *The Chronicles of the later Han Dynasty, Biography of the West Regions. Vol. 118.*

^③ *The History of Late Han Dynasty is a classic of block-printed edition, finished in 28th year of Jiajing Reign, Ming*

即可到阿曼；从阿曼向西走三千六百里（约 1800 公里），即可到达斯宾国（Sibin），近今伊拉克首都巴格达。《后汉书》原文记载：“自安息西行三千四百里至阿蛮国。从阿蛮西行三千六百里至斯宾国。”

据中国史书记载，中国商船到达波斯湾最早的记录大约在公元五世纪，即中国南北朝的刘宋时期。^①据阿拉伯著名史学家马苏第在《黄金草原》中的记载：公元六世纪，中国商船经常出入波斯湾。当时，中国商船可以直接驶抵阿曼、巴林、巴士拉等第；同样，这些地方的商船也可以直接驶抵中国。^②很明显，当时中国和阿拉伯地区之间加快了海上的交流。

第二节 唐朝时期的阿曼与中国关系

中国和阿拉伯世界的往来始于唐代，发展于宋元时期。当时，唐朝在东方建立了强大的王朝。同一时期，先知穆罕默德建立了伊斯兰教，帮助统一了阿拉伯世界，建立了阿拉伯帝国。

自古以来，印度洋一直是海上交通的发源地。公元五世纪，中国的远洋航船曾到达波斯湾地区。自唐代开启“香料之路”后，中国和阿拉伯国家之间的海上贸易日益频繁。当时，中国的远洋航船有两三层之高，可直接驶入波斯湾地区。众多阿拉伯商人乘坐中国船只抵达印度和中国经商。为发展海外贸易，唐代首次在广州设立市舶使。越来越多的阿拉伯商人，包括阿曼商人来中国进行贸易活动，并定居于此。载着大量中国和阿曼商人的船只航行在蓝色的大海上是多么壮观的景象啊！在唐代，阿拉伯人被称为大食人（Tajikin），该词从波斯语中的“塔吉克”或“大食”音译而来。在伊斯兰教传播前，先知穆罕默德曾到过巴勒斯坦和叙利亚，因此对中国有所了解。公元651年，第一批大食使节被派往中国，当时正值第三任正统哈里发奥斯曼执政时期。从那以后，越来越多的使节被派往中国。据唐代史料记载，公元651年到798年间，大食使节来华共39次，平均不到四年就会有一次使节来访。

阿拉伯半岛沿海地区是“世界古代文明的发祥地”之一。千百年前，阿拉伯半岛各民族，包括阿曼人就已掌握了灌溉技术，利用地下水进行灌溉，建立了复杂的灌溉系统。在阿曼的高原地区和草原地区，游牧畜牧业也很早就开始发展，手工业和商业也

Dynasty(1549),written by Fan Ye(in Nanchao Song Dynasty), noted by LiXian(in Tang Dynasty and recorded by Sima Biao).

^① Biography of theSouth China, *History of Song Dynasty*.

^② NaZhong. 1979. The friendly relations between China and the Arabian World in the medieval, *History Teaching*, Vol.1.

蓬勃发展。自古以来，阿曼的造船和航海技术世界闻名。英国历史学家维尔·戈登·柴尔德（Vere Gordon Childe）曾写道：“阿拉伯世界南部沿岸地区，特别是阿曼地区，是与埃塞俄比亚、信德（今印度）和波斯湾地区进行贸易的航海家的诞生地。阿拉伯海就是因为这些阿拉伯的航海家而得名的。早在公元前4000年，这些海上贸易中心就已经蓬勃发展。5000年前，伊拉克苏美尔人称阿曼为“Maghan国”。在苏美尔语中，“Maghan”意为“船”。由此可见，阿曼人以造船和航海为生。阿曼在海岸建立了许多大型港口、码头和造船厂，其中最大的要属苏哈尔、马斯喀特等。阿曼的木帆船拥有极强的适航性：快速、灵敏、轻便。阿曼人民对波斯湾的海上航行、印度洋和东西方之间海上交通的发展做出过巨大的贡献。

公元750年，在阿拉伯人的帮助下，艾布·阿巴斯推翻了倭马亚王朝，建立了阿拔斯王朝。为了与唐王朝争夺赭时（Chach，今塔什干）地区，呼罗珊总督和他的士兵于公元751年在怛罗斯击败了由高仙芝领导的唐朝军队。752年，即怛罗斯战役后次年，首个官方记载的阿拔斯王朝特使被派往中国，此后，陆续有使者被派往中国。有时，使者们一年内甚至来中国多次。因此，阿拔斯王朝曾经派军队帮助唐肃宗平定公元757年的“安史之乱”也就不足为奇了。据说，阿拔斯王朝762年建立新都时，第二任哈里发曼苏尔曾说过，“我们很幸运拥有底格里斯河，能够与遥远的中国有互通往来。”^①这足以证明两国间的友好交往十分频繁。

正是这种频繁的交往进一步丰富了中国人有关阿拉伯地区的地理知识。唐代著名地理学家贾耽详细记录了中国的对外交通条件，他曾描述过从广州到阿曼的交通情况。当时，波斯人占领了阿曼的苏哈尔地区，波斯总督驻兵在苏哈尔附近。波斯人将苏哈尔命名为“Mazun”。据贾耽的记载，从苏哈尔向西北行走11天便可抵达幼发拉底河河口，经巴士拉再向西北陆路行走一千公里就可到达首都巴格达。据阿曼史料记载，从亚丁到巴格达的通商路线的确经过阿曼和苏哈尔。贾耽的记录与阿拉伯半岛的地理条件基本吻合。^②

广州、泉州、扬州等地是唐朝对外贸易的重要港口。公元760年，政府派军到扬州平定宋州刺史刘展叛乱。数千名阿拉伯人和波斯人在广陵之战中丧生。这表明在扬州生活的阿拉伯和波斯商人数量巨大。广州曾是中国的海上门户，当地的阿拉伯商人比扬州更多。有一份写于851年名为《历史的锁链》的珍贵史料中曾描述了公元九世

^① Joseph Needham. *Science and Civilisation in China*. vol.1.

^② *New History of the Tang Dynasty, Records of the Geography*.

纪到中国经商的阿拉伯商人苏莱曼在中国和印度各类见闻。阿拉伯历史学家艾布·赛义德·哈桑对该资料进行了增补（约916年增补完成）。据说，当时中国政府对在广州的外国人征收人头税，所以可以肯定当时广州有12万穆斯林、犹太教徒、基督徒和拜火教徒，这在当时确实是一个巨大的数字。

除扬州和广州外，阿拉伯人还在泉州定居。今天在泉州东门外的灵山上还有一些穆斯林的坟墓，包括三贤、四贤墓，穆罕默德的这两位弟子唐代来中国进行传教。唐朝和阿拉伯世界不仅通过海路互通往来，也通过陆路进行了大量的交流。事实上，大食曾派遣军队（可能是驻扎中亚的军队）帮助唐朝平息“安史之乱”。此外，前面提到的艾布·赛义德·哈桑也在著作中记录了有人携带了大量麝香包从撒马尔罕途径中国许多城市最后到达广州的事件。因此，我们可以发现，双方间的陆路交通在当时也十分繁荣。

对于波斯湾地区而言，阿曼不仅是重要的货物集散地，还是航船中转的枢纽。苏莱曼在他的游记中层多次提到阿曼的马斯喀特，哈桑也认为阿曼是中国贸易的重要港口。哈桑提到，由于广州的贸易业务受到黄巢起义的严重影响，很多靠与中国贸易为生的阿曼人因此而破产。

当时，大量信仰伊斯兰教的阿拉伯人涌入中国并长期定居于此，甚至在中国结婚生子，使得伊斯兰教在中国得到广泛传播。在第三任正统哈里发欧麦尔统治时期（634-644年），伊斯兰教开始从阿拉伯半岛向外部世界传播。公元636年，阿拉伯人打败拜占庭帝国的军队，占领了大马士革。638年，阿拉伯人进入耶路撒冷；640年，占领叙利亚、巴勒斯坦等国；642年，攻占萨珊和埃及，占领了亚历山大。因此，阿拉伯人垄断了通往中国的道路。在中国，阿拉伯穆斯林的出现首先是出于宗教目的而不是商人的商业目的，跟随而来的还有一批伊斯兰传教士。因此，在中国，穆斯林商人大量的商业活动不会早于642年版。

公元八世纪中期，阿曼航海家艾布·欧拜德·卡西姆（Abu Obide Qasim）曾沿“香料之路”横渡印度洋，到达广州，成为中国史书中记载的首个到达中国的阿曼航海家。

公元九世纪中叶，阿拉伯航海家苏莱曼在中国和印度经商多年后回到阿曼，撰写了《苏曼东游记》一书。书中记载了从阿曼往东至中国的航海路线，即从波斯湾出发，经阿拉伯海和印度洋，再由印度马拉巴尔海岸经马六甲海峡、孟加拉湾、中国南海，最后到达广州。该书的记录与贾耽《古今郡国县道四夷述》中的记载基本吻合。这条著名的海上贸易路线与“丝绸之路”一样重要，被称为“香料之路”。

苏莱曼书中记载的信息为东西方海上航线的研究提供了依据。书中对当时在中国的阿拉伯人作了许多生动的描述。通过这些记录，我们发现，早在唐朝时期，广州就有阿拉伯人专门的居住区，政府还在该居住区指定阿拉伯穆斯林领袖来处理诉讼和管理宗教活动。如今广州的怀圣寺被认为是中国最早建立的清真寺之一。虽然目前还没有确凿证据证明该寺始建于唐代，但根据苏莱曼的记载，早在公元九世纪广州就已出现了一批清真寺。

中国和阿拉伯世界之间的频繁往来必将促进双方在文化和技术上的交流。其中，最重要的史实之一是中国造纸技术的西传。宋朝时期，中国远洋船舶制造业实现了巨大发展。当时，中国船只在印度洋上异常活跃，中国航船经常出入波斯湾地区，甚至在红海乃至非洲东海岸都能发现中国航船的影子。有一条史实值得注意，在隋唐以前，中国僧人经常搭乘外国船只，而到了唐宋时期，尤其是在唐朝，外国商人前往中国时多乘坐中国制造的船只。据法国学者保罗·伯希（Paul Pelliot）研究，公元762年，杜环是乘坐中国船只从波斯湾地区回到广州的。元朝船舶运输大多沿用宋朝的贸易规则，因此从元朝的贸易规则可以推断，宋朝时期外国人在就已获准乘坐中国船只前往海外。我们发现当时有大量的外国人乘坐中国船只，从中可以看出，中国当时的造船技术和航海技术有了重大进展。

第三节 宋朝时期的阿曼与中国关系

公元十世纪，宋辽政权间的对抗在中国上演。这两大政权都通过陆路运输和海上运输分别与条支国（阿拉伯世界）进行往来。据中国史料记载，条支国曾于公元924年派使者到辽。1021年版。辽代甚至同意了条支国王的请求，并将一位公主嫁给了条支国的王子，一个皈依了伊斯兰教的中亚国家的王子。公元966年，宋朝的一个和尚带着国书前往西域的条支国。从开宝元年（公元968年）起，条支国一直派遣使节来宋朝。据现有史料统计，从公元924年至公元1207年的284年间，两国大约有43批有记载的使节，即每六年一批次。

该时期后半叶，整个伊斯兰世界面临了来自十字军东征的威胁。阿拔斯王朝被塞尔柱土耳其人取代，后者遂开始统治美索不达米亚，安纳托利亚（小亚细亚）则长期处于战乱中，所以这些地区派往中国的特使都来自阿拉伯世界，如吉达、马赫拉、苏哈尔以及东非、肯尼亚和其他国家，而来自条支的使节大多由哈里发派遣而来。

也就是在同一时期，中国的陶瓷技术传到了阿拉伯世界，然后通过阿拉伯人传到欧洲。大量的中国瓷器、丝绸、中药都通过海上运往海外。近几十年来，从巴士拉港所在的波斯湾到亚丁湾一直到东非海岸都出土了大量宋朝的钱币和瓷器碎片。这表明，中国船只在这条海运线曾非常活跃。

在宋代，中国的远洋商船还开辟了新的“香料之路”，从广州（或泉州）出发，横跨印度洋，绕过印度，直接从苏门答腊到佐法尔地区。这条路线不仅缩短了距离，还可以充分利用印度洋的季风优势。在冬天东北季风盛行的时节，商船可直接从西线到达佐法尔地区；而在次年夏天西南季风盛行时，商船再返回到泉州或广州。通过这种方式，时间可以缩短三分之一以上。新航线的开通进一步加强中国与阿曼的贸易和友好往来。

中国商船返回时从马赫拉和阿曼装载象牙、犀角、玻璃、珍珠、玛瑙等具有异国情调的商品，而阿拉伯香料的数量总是最多的。香水在中国上层社会曾十分盛行，香料的消费量也着实惊人。因此，宋朝政府垄断了香料交易。根据中国外贸统计，在宋神宗（1077年）统治的第十年，中国在广州收集的乳香达174,336公斤。因此，这种从阿拉伯到中国的“香料之路”与汉代的“丝绸之路”一样重要。当时的海上航线，无论是经佐法尔抵达波斯湾的传统航线还是经印度洋抵达佐法尔的新航线都必须经过阿曼。中世纪时期，阿曼的佐法尔地区以盛产乳香而闻名。宋朝有史料记载：“乳香，或地香来自阿拉伯佐法尔地区的山脉或山谷。”因此，这条“香料之路”与阿曼紧密联系在一起，直到现在我们仍然可以看到瓷器碎片，在马斯喀特博物馆里还藏有明清时代的完整瓷器。

阿曼和中国之间的友好关系也可以从文献中找到例证。

泉州市舶使赵汝适曾编撰过《诸蕃志》（1225年）一书，书中记载了“瓮蛮国”（即阿曼）的相关情况。该书介绍了阿曼的地理位置、风俗习惯、特产、贸易和金融状况，和阿拉伯史书中的记载基本一致。赵汝适在《诸蕃志》中还提到了“勿拔国”，可能今天佐法尔的马尔巴特（Marbat）地区。书中还提到了“奴发国”，许多中外学者都认为是佐法尔。

在宋代，中国的航海业和造船业变得更加先进，海上交通盛极一时。当时，广州、泉州、明州（宁波）、温州、秀洲（嘉兴）、江阴、密州（诸城）等地都设立了提举市舶司以鼓励外商在中国从事贸易活动。阿曼和中国之间的海上贸易与友好交往得到进一步发展。阿曼通过海路向中国提供象牙、犀角、珍珠、宝石和各种香料药材，并

运回中国的丝绸、瓷器、茶叶、金银和硬币。在“香料之路”上，中国和阿曼两国商贾成群、群桩繁荣。

在宋代，从阿曼和阿拉伯世界其他地方前往广州、泉州及中国其他城市的商人数量不断增加。同时，从苏哈尔与阿曼来的商人在广州势力强大。

宋代时期，外国商人大多居住在广州和泉州，其中有很大一部分是阿拉伯地区最富有的商人。南宋以后，由于战争对安纳托利亚（小亚细亚）地区社会和经济的破坏，许多阿拉伯人选择东移，甚至在中国永久定居。当时，外国商人在广州和泉州的聚居地称为“蕃坊”。每个“蕃坊”都有一名领袖（蕃长）来管理内部事务，吸引外商来中国从事贸易，只有德高望重的外国人才会被宋朝政府选为蕃长。

值得注意的是，有一位名叫辛押陀罗（Xinya Tuoluo）^①的阿拉伯商人曾是广州蕃坊的领袖，宋朝政府封其为“归德将军”。有趣的是，皇帝的诏令由宋朝著名作家和政治家苏轼（1037-1101年）起草，诏令中提到辛押陀罗被授予荣誉的原因是他带了礼物亲自到北宋的都城开封谒见宋朝皇帝，并帮助吸引阿拉伯商人来宋经商，因此被称为“归德将军”，以期其付出更多的努力。现在，诏令的原文仍可以在苏轼的文集中找到。

据《宋史》^②记载，辛押陀罗曾告诉宋政府，他愿意捐钱帮助修复广州城墙。虽然他的建议并没有被采纳，但从中可以看出他的富有程度。熙宁五年（1072年），他准备从广州返回家乡，宋神宗特别赠与其“白马一匹，鞍辔一副”。一名外国商人被授予将军的头衔并在归国时得到皇帝赏赐的礼物，这实在是一种殊遇，这也说明阿曼人民确实为阿曼和中国之间的友好交流做出突出贡献。

阿拉伯历史学家和地理学家马苏第在《黄金草原和珠玑宝藏》中也有过记载：公元六世纪，中国商船经常到访波斯湾地区，并可直达阿曼、巴林、巴士拉和其他地方，反之亦然。苏哈尔是海上从非洲东海岸到中国最重要的一站。根据《宋史·层檀国传》，如果顺风，从层檀经苏哈尔至广州只需要一百六十天。马苏第在《黄金草原》中曾记录了当时桑给巴尔的非洲人如何捕捉大象，将象牙销往阿曼，再从阿曼销往中国和印度的情况。

^① Xinya Tuoluo is a merchant of Sohar, Oman. The land of Muskat, according to academic appraisal, is Maskat or Mezoen on the east Coast of Oman.

^② The History of Song Dynasty, written by Tuo Tuo(Yuan Dynasty)etc., was carved by Ming Nanjing and revised by Ming Qingdi.

第四节 元朝时期的阿曼与中国关系

公元十三世纪初，蒙古游牧民族开始在东亚崛起。1206年，铁木真成为蒙古可汗，汗号成吉思汗。在统一蒙古并占领金国北部大部分土地后，铁木真带领自己的军队向西攻占了西辽和中亚的花刺子模。后来经过窝阔台、蒙哥、忽必烈的统治，蒙古人在伏尔加河下游的撒莱建立了金帐汗国（1240-1480年），在伊朗、阿富汗、美索不达米亚和中亚西南部建立了伊儿汗国（1258-1388年），在蒙古西部建立了窝阔台汗国，在中亚地区 and 新疆建立了察合台汗国。1279年，忽必烈推翻南宋政权，建立了大元帝国。

当然，这种扩张行为给该地区被征服的民族带来了巨大痛苦，但从另一方面来看，整个扩张过程对发展东西方交通贡献良多。蒙古人十分重视在各地建立邮政系统，努力保障东西交通的顺畅。自汉朝以来的千余年间，双方在海上和陆路的交通总是因政治动荡而被迫中断。然而，到了元代，亚洲和东欧的大部分地区，从山海关到布达佩斯，都处于蒙古人的控制之下，东西方交通不再中断，从而达到了顶峰。

自公元八世纪建立阿拔斯王朝起，阿拉伯帝国的政治局势相对稳定。由于地理位置的特殊性，它成为东西方的交通枢纽。一方面，阿拉伯人翻译了大量希腊古典作品；另一方面，他们通过吸收东方发明，将其与自身特点相融合并对其进行研究，对新阿拉伯文化的形成做出了许多贡献。当时，阿拉伯人在数学、天文学、地球科学、药学等领域具有极高的造诣。蒙古帝国的建立进一步为中国与阿拉伯世界的科学文化交流创造了有利环境，并推动各种交流到达顶峰。

例如，火药就是在这个时期传入阿拉伯世界的。早在唐代，中国发明的硝酸盐已传入阿拉伯地区，阿拉伯人称硝酸盐为“巴鲁克德”，意为“中国雪”。然而，他们只懂得如何使用硝酸盐制造玻璃、用于医疗和炼金术。1225年至1248年间，火药经印度人介绍给阿拉伯商人，再由后者传入阿拉伯世界。由于蒙古人和阿拉伯人之间的战争一直持续到1258年，并以旭烈兀攻占巴格达而告终，枪械才得以传入阿拉伯地区。

如上所述，自唐代以来就有阿拉伯人（包括阿曼人）定居中国，并与中国人通婚生子，世代生活在中国。这种情况在元代发展迅速。我们知道，蒙古帝国的扩张是自西向南的，在它攻占中亚和西亚后，大批当地年轻人被迫加入军队进攻南宋。这些从西域来的人在元朝一般被称为“回回”，包括中亚人和波斯人，当然也包括数量众多的阿拉伯人。在元朝建立后，他们也并没有被遣送回国。这些年轻人不可能带着家

人去东方，因此在中国落户后，他们与当地妇女（大部分是汉族妇女）通婚，建立了自己的家庭，并逐渐被汉人同化。

从西域来元朝的人大多为知识分子和上层人士。他们归顺蒙古军队并将家人或整个部族带到了中国。此外，一些商人也自愿留在了中国。他们在中国居住了很长一段时间，并逐渐被当地人同化。元代统治者按照被征服的次序将居民分为四个类别：第一类是蒙古人，第二类是色目人（包括回族人）；第三类是汉人（指原辽、金统治地区的居民）；第四类是南人（南宋领土内的居民）。居民的政治地位和社会地位由于划层次的不同而各异，色目人的工作往往更重要，也更体面。据统计，在元代，有32位色目人成为宰相和平章政事（负责中央政府民事事务的官员），而各级地方行政主管人员的数量远不止于此。

其中比较著名的人物是咸阳王赛典赤·赡思丁（1211-1279年）。据《元史》记载，他是先知（穆罕默德）的后裔之一。在中国期间，赛典赤赡思丁曾担任陕西、四川和云南的平章政事。尤其在云南任职期间，他积极建设水利工程，六年来开垦耕地约二十亩，大力促进教育，并改善了四川和云南之间的交通。这样看来，他对云南的生产和文化发展贡献巨大，加强了云南与内陆的沟通。此外，他的后代中有很多人也在元朝担任过高级官员。

一些著名的阿拉伯学者也在元代出现，如上文提及的宋末元初著名诗人蒲寿庚的哥哥蒲寿晟。另一位学者赡思（1277-1351年），家族三代都是定居中国的阿拉伯人，曾是元朝政府的一名高级官员，去世后被追封恒山郡侯，谥号文孝。他博学多才、精通历史，一生撰写了多部作品，包括《西域异人传》与《西国图经》。但不幸的是，这两本书都已经失传。现在唯一可以找到的是《永乐大典》中两卷《河防通议》。

阿拉伯人和其他西域民族长期定居在中国，他们与中国妇女结婚生子，逐渐形成了中国的新民族——回族。到了明代，回族人已成为中华民族大家庭中的一员。

第五节 明清时期的阿曼与中国关系

明代（1368-1644年）初期，政府加大了与外邦交往的力度。后来，在永乐皇帝（1403-1424）手下一个太监郑和的领导下，远航的目标得以实现。

郑和原是云南回族人，他的父亲和祖父为获得哈吉的称号都曾赴麦加朝圣。由此可以看出，郑和承担七下西洋的重任并非偶然。从永乐三年（1405年）的处女航到宣

德八年（1433年）最后一次返航，郑和七下西洋，在海上呆了近三十年版。他曾去过中南半岛、马来半岛、马来西亚、印度次大陆、阿拉伯半岛和东非沿岸共三十多个国家，包括阿曼的佐法尔、亚丁、麦加和其他阿拉伯半岛国家。他的事迹为中国远洋史写下了光辉的一页。

据《明史·外国列传》记载，佐法尔曾派使者于永乐19年（1421年）来到中国，永乐皇帝令郑和带礼物和国书回访佐法尔。这可能是郑和第六次访问西域（永乐19年-20年，即1421-1422年）。佐法尔也派出特使回访，并在永乐21年（1423年）年抵达北京。宣德5年（1425年），郑和第七次远航再访佐法尔。这次，佐法尔国王派遣其特使与郑和回明朝，于宣德八年（1433年）抵达北京。这些特使在北京待了三年版。这些关于阿曼和中国之间的使节友好交流在史书中都有正式记载。

在访问期间，马欢、费信、巩珍等会阿拉伯语的人一直跟随着郑和。因此，他便可以在没有语言障碍的情况下，亲自深入访问，获得了有关阿拉伯半岛的第一手材料。这些资料记录了他们访问期间的所见所闻，具有非常重要的价值。《明史》中大部分有关这些国家的记录都是来自郑和下西洋时所收集的材料，其中准确描述了佐法尔的情况。一般来说，阿拉伯半岛是一个少雨干燥的地方，但佐法尔地区因受西南季风的直接影响，所以夏季雨量充沛，适宜耕种，绿色蔬菜和果树随处可见。这里的居民到现在都有用香的习惯，我们还可以在马斯喀特博物馆看到佐法尔特有的各种上釉的粘土香炉。《明史》中也记载过，当郑和其他中国使节到达阿曼时，国王拿出乳香、没药等香料与中国客人进行交易。他还派使者带乳香和鸵鸟回访中国。

小 结

通过上述分析我们可以看到，自汉朝至明朝的1500年来，阿曼和中国的友好关系不断发展。但是，从明代万历年后，中国与阿曼以及其他阿拉伯国家之间的海上贸易逐步减少，甚至完全被切断过。其中的一个重要原因就是西方殖民侵略和海盗猖獗。公元十五至十六世纪，西班牙和葡萄牙殖民帝国逐渐崛起。1468年，葡萄牙殖民舰队向东绕过好望角，并于1507年闯入阿曼海岸。1508年，葡萄牙殖民军首领摧毁了马斯喀特、苏哈尔等港口城市。他们席卷财富并将数以千计的居民抢去为奴。葡萄牙殖民者沿阿曼海岸建立了很多坚固的堡垒，用来残酷统治阿曼人民。之后他们又攻入伊拉克和印度的沿岸地区，镇压了当地各国的起义，占领了阿曼、伊拉克、伊朗和印度沿

岸地区，并继续扩大到东南亚地区。由于侵略扩张和猖獗的海盗行径，这些地方的经济衰落、贸易获得下降，就连贸易路线也被切断了。因此，十六世纪中叶后，中国商船几乎在马六甲海峡的西面消失了，中国无法再与阿拉伯国家保持商贸联系，其中一个重要原因就是葡萄牙殖民者的武装攻击、大肆扩张和海盗行径。

第三章 新现实主义与阿曼和新中国的外交关系

第一节 新现实主义分析框架

关于阿曼与中华人民共和国的关系及其重要性,学界的研究成果可谓汗牛充栋,研究的视角也各不相同。然而迄今尚无专门解读和预测阿曼与中华人民共和国关系的理论著作。因此,尽管研究两国关系和预测两国关系未来走向的研究方法多种多样,但真正能够准确把握两国关系发展轨迹的成果可谓凤毛麟角。不仅如此,现有研究成果一般只关注两国关系发展的某些具体问题和具体方面,但往往都具有片面性而缺乏全面性。这些学者要么仅考察影响两国关系发展的外部因素,要么仅考察影响两国关系发展的内部因素,都把外部或内部因素视为独立变量而忽视了其他变量。

总的说来,研究阿曼与新中国关系缺乏总的理论作指导,一方面是因为社会科学本身的局限性,即社会科学“常常受潜在规范或政策倾向性的影响,其概念缺乏明晰性;决策者自身的关切以及话语往往影响到决策过程中”。^①另一方面,研究阿曼与中华人民共和国的关系缺乏大理论的支撑,主要是因为中国外交行为与实践的模糊性。正如萨缪尔·金(Samuel Kim)所言,中国外交政策的模糊性使研究中国外交政策的学者很难对其行为进行理论化抽象。^②

鉴于此,本论文第三章试图运用新现实主义理论和世界体系理论来解读阿曼与中华人民共和国的关系,以期对两国关系有更加深刻的理解。本章旨在选择恰当的理论与方法,界定相关学术概念,以帮助我们更好地把握阿曼与新中国关系发展的基本轨迹。

二战结束后,国际政治中的传统现实主义理论主导了国际关系长达20年。在此期间,美苏崛起为世界两大超级大国,主导了世界事务;冷战决定了美苏之间的对峙关系。两极国际格局的产生以及冷战的出现要求国际社会必须用一种新思维审视和处理国际关系。其结果是现实主义国际关系理论的出现,西方学者的主流思想者从乌托

^① S. S. Kim, "China's International Organization Behavior," in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 402.

^② S. S. Kim, "China's International Organization Behavior," in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 402.

邦式主义转向现实主义，从理想主义转向对权力的信仰。然而，20 世纪 70 年代，国际关系的新一派思想开始出现，特别是 1973 年石油危机之后。这一派主张国际合作与相互依赖，并强调国际机制的重要性。换言之，国际和地区组织的出现，使信奉现实主义和信奉相互依赖的自由主义思想出现，而且使新现实主义思想也开始出现在国际关系学界。二战结束后，传统的权力政治思想在美国再次出现并获得新的发展。约翰·赫兹、乔治·凯南、沃尔特·李普曼和汉斯·摩根索等提出了“权力政治”思想，与西方传统的乌托邦思想形成了鲜明对比。E. H. 卡尔、汉斯·摩根索、乔治·凯南、雷蒙德·阿隆、亨利·基辛格、哈德利·布尔等继承了现实主义传统，其余修昔底德（公元前 400 年）、马基雅维利（1469-1527）和托马斯·霍布斯（1588-1679）的哲学观一脉相承。这些学者的哲学思想不是基于“国际关系应当是什么”，而是“国际关系是什么”。^①他们认为，人性本质上就是不断拓展自己的权力和利益而不是拓展理想和规范。

现实主义国际关系理论认为，国际体系实际上建立在以下 7 个假设之上：

1. 国际关系中国家是主要行为体；
2. 国家是统一的理性行为体；^②
3. 国内政治可以与外交政策清晰地分割开来；
4. 国际政治就是在国际无政府状态下寻求权力；
5. 权力主要可界定为军事力量；
6. 国家之间的权力大小存在较大差异。^③
7. 在国际事务中，国家安全是最关键的，属于“高级政治”的议题。^④

由以上七点可以看出，现实主义理论主要依靠权力、理性和均势的概念，认为国际政治的本质就是争强权，并以权力来界定国家利益。^⑤因此，他们认为利益和权力在理解一国行为和关系互动过程中将起到中心作用。摩根索不仅将权力视为竞争性国际体系中实现目标的手段，而且视为目的本身。由于人性的缘故，现实主义者认为国家之间的利益关系不可能和谐。相反，他们认为，国家之间的目标常常相冲突，这必

^① See Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses*, New York: The Modern Library, 1950.

^② Daugherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, New York: Harper Collins, 1990, p. 81.

^③ Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1993, p. 81.

^④ Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1993, p. 7; p. 36.

^⑤ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967, p. 5.

然会导致战争。由于权力的核心是军事权力，权力的扩展就需要依靠战争。

现实主义者强调指出，政府的行为是理性的，他们的行为具有一致性和倾向性，并会按照收益—成本的利益判断决定对外政策的行为，实现利益的最大化。他们承认信息缺失的问题，但是坚信决策者能够最大限度实现自己的决策目标。^①而且，现实主义者认为，有些道德原则不适用于具体的政治行为。例如，马基雅维利认为通过不道德手段实现国家的政治目的是正义的和可以被接受的。^②现实主义的均势论认为，所谓的均势就是权力斗争过程中发生的力量平衡。^③均势的目的就是维护体系的稳定，阻止任何大国主导地区形势。^④因此，稳定依靠大国之间的力量平衡。

新现实主义国际关系理论借用了传统现实主义的概念，使传统现实主义能够适应国际政治生态的新发展。新现实主义的代表人物是肯尼斯·沃尔兹，其代表作是《国际政治理论》（1979）。罗伯特·吉尔平、乔治·莫德尔斯基、查尔斯·金德尔伯格和约翰·米尔斯海默等人对新现实主义的发展也作出了巨大贡献。其中肯尼斯·沃尔兹的《国际政治理论》旨在“考察国际政治理论”，“建立一种新理论以弥补现行理论之缺陷”。^⑤因此，沃尔兹讨论了理论是什么、不是什么，以及理论是如何建构的等等。理论不同于规律，因为理论是解释规律的陈述。当然，沃尔兹的解读不同于传统政治理论家的解释，后者一般将理论视为一种哲学层面的分析和解读。他强调指出，为了超越观察的事实……我们必须抓住需要解释的问题。^⑥每个人都可以预测太阳升起和降落，但完全根据经验发现，却不能在理论上解释为什么太阳会有升起和降落这种现象。为了构建一种理论，人们必须学会简化，即“只考虑其中重要因素，考虑其背后的因果关系及相互依赖关系”。这就要求学者必须设计一套假设来解释这种现象。^⑦

沃尔兹强调指出，一种好的国际政治理论必须是体系层面的，因为国家之间的组织结构关系对政府的对外行为产生重要影响。沃尔兹认为，体系由一整套相互联动的单元组成，其决定了单元的行为，并使单元之间形成共识。因此，沃尔兹反对“还原理论”（Reductionist Theories），认为摩根索、基辛格所谓“维护和平与保持国际稳定取决于个体的立场和国家的内部属性”这一假设是错误的。他也反对基辛格的观点，

^① Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1993, pp. 35-36.

^② See Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses*, New York: The Modern Library, 1950.

^③ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967, pp. 161-163.

^④ Daugherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, New York: Harper Collins, 1990, p. 31.

^⑤ K.N.Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 1.

^⑥ K.N.Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 6.

^⑦ K.N.Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 10.

即国际战争和不稳定是由国际体系中的革命国家决定的。沃尔兹强调指出：

“为了把系统方法变成理论，人们需要从通常较为模糊的对系统力量的认识转变为更加明确具体的认识，即考察组成系统的单元特征，分析系统与次系统产生的原因，并分析一种体系向另一种体系演变时背后的动因是什么。”^①

因此，沃尔兹分析指出，我们需要超越对体系本身的简单描述，发现其结构。“系统理论能够解释在相互联动的单元之间，其行为的限制和促进因素是什么。”这种系统能够告诉我们迫使单元采取行动的原因。“从中我们可以推理和预测单元可能采取的行为以及单元的命运”，^②因为单元会在系统的框架下考虑自己的位置，并以此考虑自己的利益和战略。沃尔兹认为，我们需要理解行为背后的背景，然后我们才能理解单元行为的本身。由于国际体系的结构决定了单元（国家或单元）之间的国际政治关系，有必要理解沃尔兹所谓的“机构”究竟是什么。^③沃尔兹认为，结构就是单元相互组织的形式和秩序。“结构不是一组政治组织集合到一起，而是他们之间存在相互安排。”沃尔兹从三个层面理解结构：

1. 单元相互构成体系的组织原则（等级制还是无政府状态）；
2. 各体系的具体功能；
3. 单元之间的力量分布。^④

沃尔兹认为，由于我们生活的国际体系是无政府状态的，我们不需要考虑单元的功能，因为单元之间的功能具有趋同性，单元与单元之间的功能并没有什么不同之处。因此，我们在审视国际政治时的关键因素是考察各单元能力大小及分布状况，如沃尔兹所言：

系统的结构变化取决于系统中单元力量对比的变化；系统的结构变化又决定了系统中单元的行为及其结果。^⑤

系统中最有意义的能力无疑是主要大国的力量。大国与小国的区别不在于单元本身的特性与功能，而在于其各自能力大小。

新现实主义接受这样的传统现实主义假设，即主权国家是国际主要行为体，国家最关心的是生存。然而，这并非意味着在国际无政府状态下合作是不可能的。国家之

^① K.N.Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 40-41.

^② K.N.Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 72.

^③ K.N.Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 81.

^④ K.N.Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 88-101.

^⑤ K.N.Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 97.

间合作的目的是增强自己的能力。^①新现实主义解释一国的国际组织行为时认为，主权国家利用国际组织最大限度提升自己的全球地位，获得多边援助和信息与技术，同时尽可能减少主权受到的限制。^②

沃尔兹根据其对国际结构的理解发展了自己的均势理论。他认为，一种好理论不仅能够解释摩根索所提出的权力及权力平衡，而且能够解释国际政治中均势是如何生成的，以及权力结构的变化是如何影响世界政治中结盟与冲突行为的。^③

苏联解体、冷战结束实际上解释了新现实主义者关于国际体系的两极结构。冷战结束后，新现实主义者不断强调：国际体系中的主要行为体会通过重新结盟和提升自身权力来阻止一极体系的出现，避免任何一国国家主导国际局势。^④基于这一逻辑，国际体系由两极向一极演变将意味着从无政府结构向等级制结构的演变。

如其他国际政治理论一样，新现实主义受到了广泛批评。克瑞斯汀·丝维斯特（Christine Sylvester）认为，任何理论都不能是完美的，新现实主义者无疑忽视了女性在世界政治中的作用。新现实主义者强调国家的管理艺术就是“男性的管理艺术”，因为男性认为女性具有非理性、按照直觉判断事务和易于受诱惑的特点决定了其难以在国家事务中扮演重要角色。理查德·阿什利（Richard Ashley）指出，新现实主义是一种静态的和保守主义理论，他们描述了国际结构，好像国际体系中只有一种结构一样，而且似乎这种结构是独立于国家而存在的，而不是学者们建构的。在他看来，国际关系是男性和女性这些活生生的人建构的，而不是所谓的结构决定的。他指出：

“在新现实主义理论中，我们丝毫看不到男性与女性成为国际政治的主体；现实主义者强调国家之间无休止的争夺，但是国际政治是人们根据自己的理解，根据自己所处的环境，根据自己所代表的机构来改变国际政治面貌的。他们有思想，有感情，但是新现实主义者完全忽视了人的主观能动作用。”^⑤

罗伯特·考克斯（Robert Cox）将新现实主义视为“问题解决理论”，即根据自己的理解去认识世界，强调其强大的社会、权力和机制的作用，并认为这些外部的结构决定了个体的行为。考克斯认为，“其目的是使单元之间更好地协调，处理各自面

^① S.D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism*, Berkely: University of California Press, 1985.

^② S. S. Kim, "China's International Organization Behavior," in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 29.

^③ K.N.Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 102-128.

^④ C. Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 108.

^⑤ R.K.Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in R.O.Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critiques*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 291.

面临的难题，解决复杂国际社会中的难题，使体系更好地运作。”^①因此，新现实主义理论只接受占主导优势的秩序，却不能解释国际秩序的变化。约翰·鲁杰(John Ruggie)也反对新现实主义假设，认为其难以解释体系的变化，以及其他变量如交往密度(Dynamic Density)。

世界体系理论是另一个考察外部因素对国际体系影响的理论，该理论也能解释阿曼与中华人民共和国关系发展的历程。世界体系理论可以上溯到卡尔·马克思和列宁，但沃勒斯坦(Immanuel Wallerstein)发展了世界体系理论。沃勒斯坦分析的核心议题是世界体系，即“拥有劳动分工与多种文化体系的统一行为体”。他强调指出，世界体系是分析和研究社会行为的重要层面，非洲的贫困问题，巴尔干的种族冲突问题，一国的外交政策问题甚至是家庭生活问题都受此世界体系的影响。沃勒斯坦认为，资本主义世界经济组成了现代世界的分析维度，并可分为核心、周围和半周围三个层面，这三个层面通过不平等交换和不平等发展保持着联系。因此，一国的对外政策是由世界体系而不是其他因素决定的。^②

第二节 阿曼和新中国外交关系的新现实主义分析视角

如前所述，新现实主义认为，一国的外交政策并非观察家所发现的那样复杂，其外交行为实际上是国际体系的结构决定的，也是可以通过国际体系的结构特征加以解释。该学派一般认为，在国际无政府状态下，一国的国家利益可以界定为安全，即通过权力的增加来增强生存能力。在此逻辑下，权力平衡对于国家间关系起到重要作用。新现实主义者认为，权力平衡不是由一国的政策宣示或某个事件决定的，而是由重大事件决定的。^③阿曼与中华人民共和国的关系与新现实主义关于国家利益(生存)的假设以及利用一切手段增加在国际体系中的经济、军事和政治力量起到重要作用。新中国成立后对安全问题给予高度关注，成为中国对外政策的短期、中期和长期目标，甚至不惜通过军事和战争手段解决针对外部威胁的领土安全问题。冷战时期，阿曼与中华人民共和国都将权力视为军事权力，认为其是国际体系中最重要的主导力量。因

^① R.W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in R.O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critiques*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 209.

^② See Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth Century Paradigms*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

^③ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, p. 209.

此，无论是阿曼还是中国都将与势力或美国视为盟友，维持地区均势。但是，到了20世纪60年代末至70年代初，中国高层领导开始重新认识新现实主义者的权力平衡观念和权力概念本身，并提出了实现四个现代化宏伟目标，即实现农业、工业、科技和国防现代化成为中国高层领导人审视权力的重要因素。

国际体系的结构影响了阿曼与中华人民共和国对权力平衡的认知。在两极体系下，他们被迫于美苏这两个超级大国建立战略联盟关系；冷战结束后，两极格局瓦解，国际体系的结构发生变化，阿曼与中国开始在各个层面开展友好往来。两国的外交政策基于共同的目标，那就是为两国关系的发展架起一座桥梁，为两国的合作带来更多的发展机会。阿曼与中国在国际舞台上发挥了建设性影响作用。两国都根据国际法原则以及根据合法性原则为基础处理对外事务，如相互尊重主权、互不干涉内部事务、奉行睦邻友好政策以及和平解决争端等。通过促进国内以及与邻国的安全、稳定和互信，阿曼与中华人民共和国的对外政策已经成为促进经济社会发展的重要工具。

一方面，中华人民共和国努力增强其国际体系中的实力，阻止国际体系向某一个大国主导或支配的方向发展。在此背景下，中国扩大了与发展中国家以及俄罗斯的合作，凝聚共识，在国际事务中制衡美国支配国际体系，阻止任何敌意大国与南亚或东南亚国家结为军事同盟，威胁其国家安全。因此，中国加快了四个现代化步伐，参与更多的国际经济与技术合作，同时与俄罗斯和以色列发展军事合作关系。四个现代化建设大大提升了中国的经济和军事实力。中国政府认为，其必须首先放弃以往以阶级斗争为纲的理念，其次采取新政策，使中国在国际事务中扮演领导角色。因此，中国实施了“对外开放政策”，通过对外合作和吸引外资来提升经济实力。中国参与冷战后国际经济秩序的重建体现了新现实主义的国际体系观。邓尼·罗伊（Denny Roy）和托马斯·克里斯坦因（Thomas J. Christensen）指出，中国在国际和地区组织中的合作并非出于促进政治和经济一体化的原则，而是因为中国除此之外，没有其他手段摆脱在经济上的虚弱局面。^①因此，通过实施“对外开放政策”，中国政府试图取得短期和中长期发展目标。其短期目标就是维护中国政治稳定，为中国提供更多的就业机会；其长期目标就是成为世界上尤其是在亚洲事务中奠定超级大国地位。

第一，阿曼与邻近的阿拉伯海湾合作委员会（AGCC）成员国（巴林、卡塔尔、沙特、阿联酋和科威特）保持传统的友好合作关系。1981年成立的海合会最高委员

^① Denny Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, p. 229; Thomas J. Christensen, "China's Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 5, September/October 1996, pp. 37-51.

会的咨询机构就设在阿曼马斯喀特，阿曼一直受到其他海合会成员的信任和尊重。阿曼积极增强其作为海湾国家的身份和地位，欢迎并以实际行动推动阿拉伯海湾合作委员会国家促进彼此间合作，与邻国保持了密切的友好合作关系。阿拉伯海湾合作委员会成员国互访频繁；阿曼与也门共和国和伊朗伊斯兰共和国也保持密切交流关系，就双边、地区、海湾和其他事务交流看法。2006 年，阿曼在沙特吉达建立新领馆，以进一步促进阿曼与沙特日益提升的友好合作关系。

第二，阿曼通过阿拉伯国家联盟这一平台，支持阿拉伯国家采取一致行动和动议，提升阿盟的影响力和效率。此外，阿曼与阿拉伯成员国的双边关系和多边关系也取得了较大发展；阿曼与其他阿拉伯国家形成的各种联合委员会在促进阿拉伯民族共同事业方面发挥了重要作用。为维护阿拉伯地区的和平与稳定，阿曼坚决支持巴勒斯坦人事业，支持其获得合法权益，并在国际和地区舞台上积极支持巴勒斯坦事业。阿曼反对以色列采取的压制行动，认为以色列在被占领土上采取的行动增加了地区紧张，呼吁以色列执行国际决议，支持建立独立的巴勒斯坦国。2004 年 12 月，巴勒斯坦民族权力机构主席阿巴斯访问马斯喀特；2006 年 4 月，哈马斯政治领导人哈立德·迈沙阿勒(Khaled Meshaal)访问阿曼。在伊拉克问题上，阿曼支持伊拉克新政府的政治进程，支持新政府为维护地区稳定、国家统一与领土完整所付出的不懈努力。多年来，阿曼支持伊拉克的重建工作，帮助伊拉克人民减少痛苦。阿曼采取了一系列措施，包括举办经济、文化、旅游、科技和艺术论坛，如“2006 马斯喀特—阿拉伯文化都”项目等，在此过程中，马斯喀特展示了阿拉伯世界和阿曼灿烂的文化遗产。

第三，阿曼与世界上其他国家和民族保持接触和对话关系，以促进相互理解与相互合作。阿曼支持各国之间保持友好往来，支持国际社会成员国通过对话和在国际法框架内解决分歧，认为应本着宽容与互利的精神建立和平与稳定关系。本着这种精神，阿曼在联合国、联合国教科文组织（UNESCO）、世界卫生组织（WHO）和世界贸易组织（WTO）等国际组织中与国际社会其他成员保持了广泛交流关系。联合国教科文组织执行委员会投票一致同意阿曼主持在巴黎召开的第 33 次大会，卡布斯苏丹（Sultan Qaboos）向大会发来贺信。2005 年 9 月，阿曼也出席了联合国大会，卡布斯苏丹在事先准备好的演说稿中，也重申了阿曼反对恐怖主义、认为国际社会“在合作与信息交流的基础上开展国际反恐战略合作”的时机已经到来。在卡布斯苏丹的演说中，他强调了区分自卫、抵御侵略的合法权利与恐怖主义行为的重要性。阿曼也强调了联合国和其他国际组织为成员国服务、积极应对国际形势变化的重要性，认为这种

努力应当“常态化和全面化”。

第四，阿曼对外政策中的经济层面也取得了较好成绩。阿曼与世界上许多国家都保持密切的经贸往来；阿曼也与世界各国保持友好交往的长期历史，包括远东的中国，西方的美国，这种经贸往来可上溯到数百年前。对于阿曼来说，这些重要的经贸联系成为阿曼制定对内政策以及在国际和地区舞台上发挥作用的重要因素。阿曼积极支持大阿拉伯自由贸易区组织（the Greater Arab Free Trade Organization）建设，积极推动与伊朗伊斯兰共和国建立合作关系，促进环印度洋地区合作联盟（Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation），同时与美国建立合作关系。阿曼与美国的自由贸易区谈判虽尚未完成，但建立起来，将大大促进阿曼的经济发展机会。阿曼经济的快速发展已经吸引了本地区以及地区以外国家投资阿曼，并带动了阿曼若干大型工业项目的建立，包括苏尔（Sur）、塞拉莱（Salalah）和尼兹瓦（Nizwa）的苏哈尔（Sohar）工业园区。其中有些项目已经启动，为阿曼的国民经济发展带来了繁荣。

第五，阿曼与亚洲、东非和中非也建立了关系。阿曼与这些地区国家的关系源远流长，几个世纪前印度洋曾经是这些国家通往阿曼的门户，当时阿曼商人与这些亚非原住民保持非常密切的贸易往来。如今，这些国家与阿曼进一步提升了友好合作关系，积极应对全球化，本着互利共赢的原则促进共同合作。1997年，在环印度洋地区合作联盟成立期间，阿曼发挥了积极作用，并积极促进成员国之间的经贸合作，特别是贸易、旅游、科技、海洋运输和渔业等领域。该联盟下的渔业支持联合体（Fisheries Support Unit）于2005年在马斯喀特成立。2003年，阿曼加入“亚洲合作对话”（Asian Cooperation Dialogue）机制，2005年4月22日签订了亚非新伙伴关系战略宣言。2005年3月9日，阿曼与老挝人民民主共和国建立外交关系，同年3月25日，阿曼与阿富汗共和国外交关系上升为大使级。2005年，阿曼与许多国家的外交往来密切，来访高官包括巴基斯坦前总理肖卡特·阿齐兹（Shaukat Aziz），4月份泰国前总理他信·西那瓦（Thaksin Shinawatra）来访，以及同月阿塞拜疆外长马梅德亚罗夫（Elmar Mammadyarov）访问阿曼。当年11月，韩国总理李海瓚（Lee Hac-chan）到访；2006年3月，印度国防部长穆克杰（Pranab Mukherjee）与阿曼国王苏丹卡布斯举行会谈。阿曼与东非和中非的关系上溯到几个世纪前，现在再次活跃起来。阿曼与该地区许多国家如坦桑尼亚、南非、毛里求斯、塞内加尔、埃塞俄比亚、肯尼亚、赞比亚和其他国家保持广泛而密切的合作关系。这些联系使阿曼在非洲事务中发挥积极作用，并为未来双方关系的发展开辟新的篇章。

小 结

从上文可以看出，研究阿曼与中国关系是基于两个假设之上的：第一，由于两国关系的复杂性，其双边关系很难用一种理论或一种模式加以解读，阿曼与中国关系可以从不同的理论视角加以解读；第二，本博士论文试图从新现实主义的角度考察两国关系。本文通过研究发现，阿曼与中国关系发展的主线与国际关系中新现实主义假设一脉相承。中国努力提升自身经济、政治和军事实力，这是中国发展对阿曼关系的重要考量，阿曼发展对华关系也主要基于这一因素。为进一步阐述两国关系发展中的新现实主义因素，有必要首先梳理两国关系发展的主要脉络。这将是第四章所要考察的主要内容。

第四章 新中国成立后阿曼与中国的全面互动关系

第一节 新中国与阿曼的初步接触

在建国后的第一个十年中，中国在政治上被海湾地区和阿拉伯半岛地区的大多数国家所孤立，其中也包括阿曼。20世纪50年代到60年代，中国对阿曼的态度反映出中国当时的外交政策。中苏结盟时期，阿曼被中国视为西方国家的“追随者”。因此，中国未能与阿曼建立外交关系。

然而，到50年代末期，这种情况开始改变。随着中苏联盟走向破裂，海湾和阿拉伯半岛地区开始在中国外交政策中有了新的意义。中国逐渐将该地区视作针对西方帝国主义发动革命武装运动的潜在战场和中苏对抗的竞技场。^①

中国对两个超级大国外交政策的最新分析促使其介入到阿曼民族运动中。中方认为阿曼苏丹一直与英美帝国主义有着千丝万缕的联系，于是就支持当地的伊玛目加利卜·本·阿里领导的反阿曼苏丹运动，甚至向他们提供军事援助。^②中方官员和阿曼民族运动的领导人就此在开罗和亚丁举行多次会谈。佐法尔解放阵线（OLF）代表团和后来的阿拉伯海湾解放战线（PFLOAG）代表团先后访问了北京。整个20世纪50年代至60年代，中国向阿曼的革命运动提供了政治、经济和军事的支持。而到了1970年，阿拉伯海湾解放战线被认为已完全得到中国在这些方面的支持。中国的意识形态和政治影响通过这些支持贯穿其整个运动，国际社会和地区国家因此也称这场运动为“毛泽东主义运动”。^③这种影响还表现在该运动领导人针对殖民主义的声明中。穆罕默德·艾哈迈德·加萨尼（Muhammed Ahmad Ghasani）是运动总指挥执行委员会成员，他指出：

根据伟大领袖毛泽东领导下的中国革命经验，我们已经制定出一条独立自主的战线。这条战线依靠广大贫困人民开展持久的人民战争，采用农村包围城市的策略以最终夺取城市，从而将革命的烈火燃烧到整个阿拉伯海湾地区，将英国殖民者逐出我们的土地……殖民者再也不能熄灭“6·9革命”的火焰，因为我们拥有毛泽东思想作为

^① J. Calabrese, "From flyswatters to Silkworms: The evolution of China's role in west Asia" *Asian Survey* 30(September), 1990, pp.862-876.

^② H.S. Behbehani ed, *China and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: A Report*, London: KPI, 1981, p.165.

^③ H.S. Behbehani ed, *China and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: A Report*, London: KPI, 1981, p.178.

武器。“枪杆子里出政权”这句真理已在我们的人民心中深深扎根。作为阿拉伯海湾国家的人民，我们不再相信诸如“议会道路”、“和平演变”的谬论。我们坚定不移的信念是：殖民主义的反革命暴力只能由人民的暴力革命来清算！祖国的独立只能通过“枪杆子”来实现！人民的解放只能通过流血战斗来获得！^①

谈到与中国友好革命运动关系时，加萨尼赞扬了中国对他们武装革命的支持并认为，“这种支持推动了我们在1970年这关键一年中大规模发展武装革命”。^②

1972年4月，由于中国与阿曼反政府运动的联系，阿曼苏丹宣布：尽管中国与科威特、伊朗建立了正式外交关系，阿曼将依然与中国断绝任何交往。^③因此，在建立正式外交关系前，中阿关系仅限于由中国商品进口的间接贸易。中国政府主张通过某种国际军事活动，旨在削弱苏联、对抗美国，从而开始介入阿曼并对阿曼革命运动予以支持。由于中国与阿曼革命运动关系这一背景影响，双方直到1978年才建立起正式的外交关系。

第二节 阿曼与中国外交关系的建立

佐法尔战争结束几年之后，在1978年5月25日，中国和阿曼建立了正式的外交关系，双方在伦敦签署了建交联合公报，主要内容为：

中华人民共和国政府与阿曼政府于1978年5月25日决定建立大使级外交关系并互派外交大使。中华人民共和国坚定不移的支持阿曼政府维护国家独立和发展国民经济的正义事业。阿曼政府承认中华人民共和国是唯一代表中国人民的合法政府。在互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处的原则下，双方政府同意发展两国间友好关系与合作。^④

尽管联合声明承认北京是中国唯一的合法代表，但台湾贸易代表团依然被允许在阿曼首都马斯喀特保留。^⑤中国的《人民日报》发表社论对中阿建交表示了欢迎，并强调了与阿曼建交的战略和政治意义，社论说：

阿曼位于阿拉伯半岛的南部，位于连接波斯湾和印度洋的咽喉要道，占据着重要的战略位置。历史上，阿曼便遭受到帝国主义和殖民主义的侵略和压迫。阿曼人民为

^① BBC. SWB, FE/3402, 12, June 1970: A4/2-3.

^② BBC. SWB, FE/3402, 12, June 1970: A4/5.

^③ A.H.H. Abidi, *China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf*, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982, p.252.

^④ FBIS-CHI-78-103, 26 May 1978, p. A73.

^⑤ FBIS-CHI-78-123, 26 June 1978, p. A26.

寻求独立，对帝国主义和殖民主义进行了英勇抗争。今天，阿曼政府正致力于维护国家独立和发展国民经济。在外交事务中，阿曼遵循保持中立原则和不结盟原则，并号召海湾地区 and 红海地区的国家团结合作共同对抗大国霸权。所有这一切都得到了中国政府和人民坚定的支持。

为了减轻海湾和阿拉伯半岛国家中其他国家对于中国的恐惧感，社论进一步强调道：

中国政府一贯主张，国家不分大小应该一律平等。每个国家的人民都有权根据自己的意愿选择他们自己的道路。我们希望在互利、和平共处的基础上与其他国家建立并发展友好关系。中阿外交关系的建立为双方多领域友好合作开辟了美好未来。这将有利于进一步发展与阿拉伯国家人民的友好关系。^①

两国政府决定建立外交关系过程中受许多关键性因素影响。就中国政府而言，与阿曼建立外交关系主要受以下因素影响：

1. 中国十分担心苏联在南也门、伊拉克、印度、扎伊尔等地的渗透。中国推测，苏联如果渗透到这些地区，根据其“南下政策”计划，将占据海湾和阿拉伯半岛地区。莫斯科本身也对中阿建立外交关系持批评态度，因为苏联将双方建交行动视作在此区域反苏联盟的形成。^②

2. 中国对于苏联向第三世界渗透的猜度越来越大，因而发展与美国关系的意义显得越发重要。整个20世纪70年代，北京和华盛顿都在密切关注苏联在世界各地日益扩大的影响。苏联已经侵入捷克斯洛伐克，宣布了勃列日涅夫主义，与中国的边界武装冲突日益升级，并于后来入侵了中国的邻国阿富汗。这些因素导致了中国外交政策的重大变化：首先，中国与美国达成了一些重要协议以提升双边关系，其结果是20世纪70年代末双方建立正式的外交关系；第二，中国对威胁世界稳定因素的看法发生了变化，认为苏联才是世界稳定的最大威胁和世界安全的主要敌人。中国对外部世界认知的变化，无疑也体现在对海湾和阿拉伯半岛地区包括阿曼的外交政策中。

3. 中国不希望伤害与科威特、伊朗已建立的政治关系。中国支持阿曼革命团体，而伊朗支持阿曼苏丹反对那里的革命者，但中国又不想看到阿曼出现针对伊朗的敌对政策。因此，通过与阿曼政府建立外交关系，中国能够改善与伊朗的关系并消解科威特对于该地区革命运动的恐惧感。

^① FBIS-CHI-78-105, 26 May 1978, p. A30.

^② J.A. Kechichian, *China and the Soviet Union, 1949-1984*, London: Longman Group, 1995, p.190.

4. 中国希望通过与阿曼建立正式关系的契机,为与其他海湾和半岛国家建交打开一扇大门,并切断这些国家与台湾的联系。

5. 20世纪70年代中国针对海湾地区外交政策中最重要的变化是,终止其对该地区革命团体的支持。其中最值得注意的是终止其对佐法尔叛军的支持,该势力企图向整个地区输出他们的革命思想,挑战阿曼执政家族的合法性。中国政府担心,苏联正试图填补英国从该地区撤出后留下的权力真空。因此,中国认为有必要遏制该地区的革命倾向,转而与统治当局建立更好的政治、经济和社会联系,这种变化主要就是为了防止苏联成功地填补了在该地区的权力真空。

对于阿曼政府,与中国建交的驱动力主要来自以下几个方面:

1. 阿曼政府与中国一样,也感受到了苏联在该地区及周边地域的渗透企图。因此,阿曼希望以改善与中国的关系作为对抗苏联的砝码。尤其在中美建交以后,阿曼作为美国亲密的同盟,已经做好了与中国改善关系的准备。阿曼苏丹卡布斯(Qaboos)指出:

苏联加快了在这个地区既定扩张主义的步伐,这种扩张政策与殖民主义时代的野蛮行径无异。一段时间以来的事实明白无误地暴露了苏联的两个企图:第一,最终获得对中东地区尤其是产油地域的控制权;第二,借以向印度洋扩张,控制非洲国家,进而是整个远东地区。^①

2. 通过与中国正式建立外交关系,阿曼政府希望中国完全停止对阿曼革命运动提供政治与意识形态方面的支持和军事援助,从而终止阿曼境内的这一反叛行为。

两国建交后双边关系稳定发展,不久就促成了双方各领域的友好合作并得以不断扩大。1978年6月,阿曼外交大臣扎瓦维(Qais Abd al-Munim al-Zawawi)访问了中国。在访问期间,他会见了中共中央主席华国锋。华国锋主席指出,苏联试图控制海湾石油运输路线的野心会直接威胁到阿曼的安全。中国方面愿意阿曼与海湾和阿拉伯半岛国家搁置争议,加强团结,共同对抗苏联的干涉。在这之前,中国外交部长黄华也表达了类似的观点。黄华在欢迎阿曼嘉宾的宴会上表示,尊贵的客人来自波斯海湾和红海的沿岸,那里拥有重要的战略意义和丰富的战略资源。两个超级大国在该地区激烈争夺,意图控制石油资源、航海通道和战略要地。随着野心的膨胀,有的超级大国打着“社会主义”的牌号四处制造事端,企图到处扩张,加强对此区域的控制。^②

^① Interview with Xinhua in JPRC-76-746-China Report, 3 November 1980, p.16.

^② FBIS-CHI-78-121, 22 June 1978, pp. A22-A23.

中国首任驻阿曼大使袁鲁林于1979年4月抵达马斯喀特。阿曼任命苏拜希（Ibrahim Hamud al-Subayhi）为首任驻中国大使。

第三节 20世纪80年代阿曼与中国的关系

20世纪80年代中阿关系继续反映了中国在该地区的总体外交政策。随着苏联入侵阿富汗，中国对其戒备日渐加深，其结果是中国欢迎美国与阿曼签订一份协议。该协议规定，阿曼为美国提供军事设施以应对该地区危机，作为回报，美国将帮助重新装备阿曼武装部队。同时，中国也十分愿意看到英阿签署的一项协议，即英国将向阿曼提供更多的武器装备，包括喷气式飞机、导弹和扫雷装置等。

在中国政府眼中，阿曼的这些防御力量将是保卫海湾地区安全和防止苏联向其周边地区渗透的重要保障。苏联对阿富汗的入侵以及“南下”波斯湾，都迫使阿曼必须强化其防御力量，并加强外交努力，以维护该地区安全。

中国高度赞扬了阿曼政府为阻止苏联对该地区渗透而采取的措施，认为阿曼旗帜鲜明的站在反对霸权主义的立场上，同时公开指责了莫斯科侵略和扩张的野蛮行径，并强调指出，苏联“南下”战略将会威胁到阿曼、其他海湾国家甚至全世界的安全。

①

20世纪80年代初期，中国开始强调海湾和阿拉伯半岛国家相互改善关系的重要性，以此作为防止苏联干涉这一区域的重要一步。例如，1982年10月阿曼与南也门邦交正常化，中国对此表示欢迎。中国人将此类行动视为增强海湾和阿拉伯半岛国家间团结的积极举措。^②

20世纪80年代，中阿两国政治关系发展迅速。双方都看重彼此在海湾地区事务中的政治作用。苏联未能在该地区实现既定目标的另外一个原因，就是两伊战争的爆发以及中国与交战双方的良好关系。在阿曼眼中，中国在该地区有着十分重要的影响力，一是因为中国是唯一与德黑兰和巴格达都保持亲密关系的大国，再就是大量中国武器被实际运用到了那里的战场。

在此背景下，双方政府间官方互访频繁。

1980年10月，中国副总理姬鹏飞对阿曼进行访问。

^① *Beijing Review*, No.29, 21 July 1980, p.10.

^② *Beijing Review*, No.49, 6 December 1982, p.14.

阿曼国防安全副首相阿萨德（H.H. Sayyid Fahr Bin Taimur Al-Said）于1982年11月对中国进行了访问。访问期间，双方就阿曼所关心的一些问题进行了讨论，如中国正为伊朗和伊拉克提供的飞毛腿和蚕式导弹，这些导弹均能对该地区固定石油设施以及经过霍尔木兹海峡的超级油轮形成毁灭性打击。副首相承诺将寻求海湾合作委员会的支持，以加强与中国的正式外交关系。作为交换，中国承诺停止向两伊供应任何导弹。^①

1983年10月，中国国务委员、外交部长吴学谦在访问阿曼期间，正式邀请苏丹卡布斯访问中国，但此次访问最终未能成行。

1984年7月，阿曼苏丹特别代表阿萨德（H.H.Sayyid Thuwaini Bin Shihab Al Said）造访中国期间，中方高级别官员出面热情接待，以示加强更加紧密的双边关系。

同年11月，由司法部部长邹瑜率领的中国司法代表团访问了阿曼。

同年12月，由解放军副总参谋长何政文将军率领的中国军事代表团对阿曼进行了访问。何政文会见了一些阿曼高级军事官员，包括阿曼总参谋长助理，苏丹武装卫队指挥官、空军指挥官武装力量训练营指挥官、海军上校等。这是两国军事官员的首次会晤。约瑟夫（Joseph Kechichian）认为，这些会见并未使阿曼改变自己的武器供应来源，即由西方转向中国。但通过接触，阿曼军方了解了中方的底线，这也拓宽了他们处理此类问题的视野。然而，考虑到中国向两伊提供了大量武器装备，本次会晤也让马斯喀特可以更好地评估中国在两伊战争中的地位和作用。^②

1985年11月中国副总理姚依林对阿曼进行访问并出席了阿曼建国15周年庆典。

1986年7月14日，中国国务院代总理万里在北京接见了阿曼外交国务大臣阿拉维（H.E. Yusuf bin Abdallah al-Alawi）率领的代表团。

1987年3~4月，阿曼社会事务与劳动大臣访问中国。1988年9月，阿曼外交部政治事务副大臣访问中国，专门就中国在结束两伊战争所起的积极作用表达阿方正式的谢意。

1989年10月26日至28日，受苏丹卡布斯邀请，中国国家主席杨尚昆对阿曼进行了友好访问，并受到阿曼人民的热烈欢迎。成千上万的阿曼人民在街道两旁挥舞着两国国旗，苏丹卡布斯亲自接见杨尚昆主席，并感谢中国对联合国安理会598号决议的支持。在双方会谈中，苏丹卡布斯说，尽管两国信仰与社会体系不同，但是两国在提升

^① J.A.Kechichian, *Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign policy*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publications, 1995, p.192.

^② J.A.Kechichian, *Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign policy*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publications, 1995, p.194.

经济合作、协调处理重大国际及地区事务以及交流相关经验等方面有着巨大的潜力和广阔的前景。中方高度赞扬卡布斯苏丹在处理复杂而敏感的地区事务时所付出的努力，维护了海湾地区和霍尔木兹海峡的安全，促进了两伊和谈，协调海湾国家与伊朗改善了关系。整个会谈期间，中方赞扬了阿曼的外交政策，并强调中阿在更多的国际事务中秉持了共同理念。尽管中国几次正式邀请苏丹卡布斯访华，但20世纪80年代他始终没有到中国进行访问。

1980年5月，由阿曼伊斯兰宗教事务代表团访问了中国。数月后，由中国伊斯兰教协会副会长沈遐熙率领的中国伊斯兰代表团回访阿曼。在此之前，1979年11月中国伊斯兰教协会副会长哈吉·穆罕默德·阿里·张杰率领中国穆斯林代表团参加阿曼国庆庆典。1980年6月，一个包括杂志社和报业代表在内的阿曼信息传媒代表团访问了中国。

两国在1981年就文化领域合作问题签署了协议，内容包括艺术家和民俗歌舞团互访等。同年阿曼的仿古船“苏哈尔”号抵达广州。

1982年，阿曼青年代表团访问了中国。两国签署了促进双方青少年交流合作互访的协议。

1983年，双方政府在马斯喀特签署了民航协定。

1985年1月，双方签署了旨在促进体育交流的协议。

从20世纪50年代开始，中阿非政府间交流就十分活跃。在经济方面，1978年5月前，两国间贸易关系以中国对阿出口为主导。1978年5月中阿建立外交关系之后，两国经济和技术合作在某种程度上有了明显发展。中国在医疗、体育、餐饮、渔业、种植业以及加工业等方面向阿曼提供了许多劳务服务。1979年，中国驻阿曼大使馆建立了经商处。中国对阿出口额从1976年585万美元迅速增长到1983年的906万美元。1980年10月，阿曼工商大臣访华并签署了贸易协定。出口到阿曼的中国商品主要为纺织品、机械设备、谷物、粮油食品、轻工产品、服装和硬件产品等，两国间贸易量持续增长。中国对阿曼出口额1986年达到1000万美元。（此处原文有点混乱）

尽管20世纪80年代中阿贸易量比70年代增长了近6倍，但中阿贸易额仅占中国与海湾地区国家总贸易量的3%。1986年至1992年，由于石油价格暴跌的影响，阿曼收入下滑，随之进口量也有所下降。与此同时，由于阿曼国内市场狭小，许多中国商品都是经由阿联酋转口到阿曼，因此中国对阿曼的商品直接出口量呈逐年下降，但这并不意味着中国与阿曼经济联系的减弱。实际上，有人认为80年代阿曼能够给予中国的经

济利益十分有限，当时中国有充足的能源去建设自己的经济现代化，而不急需阿曼的石油供给。另一方面，阿曼与日本以及西方国家有着长期的贸易关系，因此阿曼市场对中国产品的依赖也十分有限。

阿曼政府高度重视与中国政府的文化合作。阿曼人十分珍视其祖先远航至中国的伟大成就，并将该壮举视作中阿友好交流的象征。1980年11月，阿曼民族遗产与文化部以及阿曼政府文化代表团一行人搭乘由苏丹卡布斯命名的阿曼仿古双桅木帆船“苏哈尔”号，从马斯喀特港口出发，沿着1200年前传说中辛巴达开创的航线，横渡印度洋，穿过马六甲海峡，历经6000英里、超过7个月激动人心的航海历程，终于在1981年7月1日到达了广州，并受到了广州人民的热烈欢迎。阿曼与中国分别派出了官方文化代表团参加了“苏哈尔”号从马斯喀特出发的起航仪式和到达广州的欢迎仪式，并进行了友好互访和交流。1981年7月3日，“苏哈尔”船员参观怀圣寺，受到那里广州伊斯兰兄弟的热烈欢迎。这座清真寺是1000年前由一位著名的阿拉伯—伊斯兰传教士旺格（Wange）建造，是中阿友谊的结晶和象征。

1981年8月15日，中华外国文化委员会主任黄镇与阿曼大使在北京签署了双方文化、卫生、新闻等方面的合作协定，主要项目是举办文艺互展、艺术家与艺术团互演、交流考古经验、教育专家互访以及相互提供奖学金等，两国教育机构建立合作关系，通过人员、经验和信息的交流，加强体育机构的相互联系，鼓励在新闻和技术领域的合作。

1983年，中国文化部部长朱穆之访问阿曼，之后两国副部长级的交流频繁。1993年10月，中国文化部长助理高运甲访问阿曼，提出了1994~1996年两国文化交流计划，并在此基础上签署了1997~1999年实施方案。两国的合作在文化、教育、新闻、体育、宗教、考古学等领域取得了成功。1981年，两国签署了一份文化合作协定，该协定系统地阐述了双方艺术家与民间团体交流机制。1980年5月，阿曼宗教与伊斯兰事务代表团访问中国。几个月后，中国伊斯兰协会代表团回访阿曼。1982年6月，阿曼青年代表团访问中国，签署了一份关于青少年交流合作的协定。1984年，阿曼卫生大臣协同苏丹特使访问中国，与中国卫生副部长郭子恒举行会谈。他希望中方能够派出专家，帮助阿曼在药用植物资源调查及针灸师麻醉师培训等方面的工作。

第四节 20世纪90年代阿曼与中国的关系

20世纪90年代，阿曼政府在政治上加强与中国的关系，其可以从以下高层领导人互访看出：

1993年10月19日，中国副总理邹家华在北京人民大会堂会见阿曼石油矿业大臣。

1994年9月30日，中国国家副主席荣毅仁在北京人民大会堂会见阿曼国家咨询委员会主席。

1996年9月13日，中国总理李鹏在北京中南海会见阿曼外交大臣。

1999年5月18日，阿曼苏丹卡布斯·本·赛义德会见了正在阿曼进行正式友好访问的全国政协主席李瑞环。

1999年5月与11月，中国全国人大常委会委员长李鹏与中国全国政协主席李瑞环分别率领代表团访问阿曼。访问期间，中阿两国领导人共同回顾了两国外交关系，并对当前双边关系表示满意，并就进一步加强两国关系坦率交换意见。全国政协主席李瑞环亲切会见苏丹卡布斯。两次访问就促进两国合作关系取得了丰硕的成果。

20世纪90年代，中阿两国在经济领域取得了显著成绩。两国政府于1980年签署贸易协定。1989年12月26日至28日，国家主席杨尚昆对阿曼进行正式友好访问，中国与阿曼建立了贸易关系。1989年11月，两国建立双边联合贸易委员会，至2000年举行了六次会议。1992年10月，阿曼工业商业大臣率领代表团前往中国，与对外经贸部部长李岚清共同举办了阿曼-中国混合委员第一次会议。1993年7月，李岚清副总理访问阿曼，举行第二次会议。同年，中国成为石油净进口国，而阿曼成为中国重要的石油供应商之一。1995年3月，两国政府签署了《鼓励和保护投资协议》。自1995年以来，中国进口的原油数量日益增加。因此，两国签署了一项合同，从1995年每天进口2万桶石油增加到1996年每天10万桶，这使得阿曼在1997年成为中国的第三大石油出口国。1997年6月，阿曼工商大臣与苏丹特别代表访问中国，并与对外经贸部部长吴仪主持阿曼-中国混合委员会第三次会议。1997年，中国政府开始进口阿曼的石油液化气和并在沿海城市兴建天然气接收站。

90年代，阿曼对中国的重要性还表现在战略方面。自1993年后，中国开始转向阿曼和其他海湾城市保障长期能源供应以适应因经济的快速增长而增加的能源消费。因此，中国开始更加重视发展与阿曼的关系。1993年6月，中国石油天然气集团总公司副总经理邱中建访问马斯喀特，并表达了该公司由阿曼工人培训中石油雇员的意愿。

因此,石油问题被提上议事日程。1993年,随着中国成为石油净进口国,中国开始进口大量阿曼原油。自此,中国成为阿曼石油主要受援国。1993年后,中国成为继日本和韩国之后阿曼第三大原油进口国。1995年以来,中国从阿曼的原油进口逐年持续增长,这让中国在1997年成为阿曼第三大原油进口国,仅次于位居首位的日本和第二位的泰国。

1995年,中国与阿曼政府签订增加原油购买数量的合同,进口原油量将从1995年的每天2万桶提高到1996年的每天10万桶^①。在1998年的前四个月,中国从阿曼的进口石油达4050万桶,继日本、泰国、韩国成为第四位。

阿曼成为中国成功的贸易伙伴。如果中国希望成为海湾和半岛地区主要的原油进口国,这一点非常重要。因此,中国的经济将增长将持续到下个世纪,中国对阿曼原油的进口也不会中断。

1997年,中国政府开始进口阿曼液化天然气(LNG)。在这个过程中,中国选择了三个沿海地点建设液化气接收站。据报道,其中一个在广东省,该省政府于1994年与阿曼签署了液化气网络信^②。1999年5月,中国政府还希望与阿曼在保护、开发和利用水资源问题上进行共同研究。

中国与阿曼贸易也随之增加了,从80年代仅占中国对海湾和半岛地区国家贸易总额的3%到90年代的15%。90年代的前6年,中国进口商品额占贸易总额的95%以上。阿曼成为中国在海湾和阿拉伯半岛地区的主要出口商。阿曼在中国市场的总价值达3256亿美元,比第二位的沙特阿拉伯多约100亿美元。1997年,两国贸易金额达136.2455亿美元,比去年增长65.8%,在西亚和北非的国家中占第三位。其中从中国进口额达50.192亿美元,占阿曼进口总额的0.99%,比1996年增加了30%。

1998年,由于油价下跌与中国进口石油总量减少,两国贸易总量减少45.3%,减少额达75亿美元。但在1998年,中国向阿曼的出口额增加至3942万美元,创下历史最高记录。1999年,双方制定了避免双重征税的协定,法律手续完成后将正式签署。

1999年,两国间贸易额跌至66亿美元。^③2004年,贸易额达439亿美元,包括428亿的出口额和11亿的进口额。

中国从阿曼进口额激增的原因在于中国增加了对阿曼原油的进口。意识到阿曼的重要性,中国国家主席江泽民会见苏丹卡布斯的特别代表图威尼·本·西哈布·赛义

^① *Middle East Economic Digest*, Vol.37.No 23, 11 June 1993,p.29.

^② *Middle East Economic Survey*, Vol.41.No 13, 30 March 1998,p.A8.

^③ 黄培昭:《中国阿曼关系》,《阿拉伯世界》2000年第2期,第14页。

德 (Thuwayni bin Shihab al Said)，强调了中国希望在新世纪与阿曼建立长期、稳定、全面的合作关系。中国国家主席高度赞扬阿曼对促进阿拉伯国家团结，维护海湾地区稳定做出的努力。

表 4-1： 阿曼对外原油出口统计表 (1992-1994)

	1992		1993		1994	
	(%)	(百万 桶)	(%)	(百万 桶)	(%)	(百万 桶)
日本	40.4	102.0	33.6	89.9	42.1	113.9
美国	0.6	1.5	4.1	10.9	5.9	16.0
法国	0.4	0.9	0.3	0.7		
韩国	28.0	70.8	25.7	68.7	17.1	46.3
新加坡	4.6	11.6	6.2	16.5	2.3	6.1
泰国	5.3	13.5	6.5	17.5	9.9	26.8
菲律宾					1.0	2.6
中国台湾	7.9	20.0	7.9	21.0	7.1	19.2
澳大利亚			0.2	0.6	1.4	3.9
中国			10.4	27.9	9.8	26.5
其他	12.8	32.2	4.9	13.2	3.4	9.1
总计	100.0	252.5	100.0	267.4	100.0	270.4

资料来源：阿曼发展部，统计年鉴（阿曼：信息与文件中心，1995）189页；统计年鉴1995，193页；统计年鉴1997，173页。

表 4-2： 阿曼对外原油出口统计表 (1995-1997)

	1995		1996		1997	
	(%)	(百万 桶)	(%)	(百万 桶)	(%)	(百万 桶)
日本	34.7	99.4	30.4	90.5	28.2	85.9
美国	2.5	7.2	4.6	13.6	0.5	1.5
法国			0.6	1.8		
韩国	18.8	53.8	19.2	57.0	16.5	50.3
新加坡	3.0	8.7	2.6	7.8	0.2	0.5

泰国	13.5	38.8	18.3	54.4	23.5	71.6
菲律宾	2.2	6.3	3.7	11.1	4.8	14.5
中国台湾	5.8	16.7	3.0	9.0	2.0	6.2
澳大利亚	1.0	2.9	1.3	3.9	0.9	2.7
中国	11.4	32.8	14.2	42.4	22.7	69.2
其他	7.0	20.0	2.0	6.1	0.8	2.3
总计	100.0	286.6	100.0	297.6	100.0	304.7

资料来源：阿曼发展部，统计年鉴1994（阿曼：信息与文件中心，1995）189页；统计年鉴1995，193页；统计年鉴1997，173页。

1980-1999年阿曼与中国贸易数据（单位：百万美元）

年份	总和	出口	进口
1980	1276	1276	
1989	13902	790	13112
1990	12034	571	11463
1991	51243	640	50603
1992	45509	818	44691
1993	57210	1103	56107
1994	43103	1766	41337
1995	49640	1488	48152
1996	82336	1214	81122
1997	136246	1696	134550
1998	74588	3942	70646
1999	66245	2708	63537

资料来源：黄培昭：《中国和阿曼关系》，载《阿拉伯世界》2000年第2期。

在20世纪90年代，阿中两国加强了在文化和公共卫生领域的交流。

1991年7月，阿曼国家遗产及文化部秘书访问广州，并参加中国“苏哈尔”(Sohar)——仿古木船——周年庆典及“阿曼文化周”活动；11月，中国文化部代部长贺敬之访问阿曼，并主持阿曼的中国文化周活动；12月，由阿曼资助的“苏哈尔”船纪念碑

在广州建成。

1993年10月,阿曼卫生部副大臣访问中国,并针对中国的传统医学,整形外科、烧伤、药用植物、骨科、护理工作等方面做了调查。1997年10月,双方卫生部长签署了《1997年-1999年卫生合作执行计划》。

1999年9月,在张文康部长的邀请下,阿曼卫生大臣阿里·本·穆萨(Ali bin Moussa)访问中国。双方就公共卫生合作举行正式会谈,并交流意见。阿曼部长提出中国中医医生和护理人员去阿曼进行交流,增强在医学研究领域的相互合作。目前,有不少中国医生、护士和其他医护人员在阿曼交流学习。

在最近几年,中药进入阿曼医药市场,例如乌鸡白凤丸、龟灵集、牛黄降压片、华佗膏、天王补心丹、逍遥丸、冰片散、马应龙、人参蜂王浆等深受阿曼人民好评。目前,中国制药厂拥有专利的药品已经占据阿曼药品市场。这标志着中阿两国在医疗卫生领域的合作将不断发展。

第五节 21世纪初阿曼与中国的关系

2000年1月,中国外交部副部长吉佩定访问阿曼,会晤了阿曼外交大臣,递交了中国主席江泽民致苏丹卡布斯的一封信函。同年10月,对外贸易部副部长孙广相率领中国政府贸易代表团访问苏丹。他和阿曼工商部大臣共同主持了第四届阿曼—中国经济贸易混合委员会并在会议记录上签字。10月31日,江泽民主席在人民大会堂接受了阿曼新大使的国书。11月6日,中国驻阿曼信大使赵学昌向苏丹卡布斯递交国书。

2001年4月,外交部部长助理张业遂率中国政府代表团在阿曼首都马斯喀特参加第三届环印度洋地区合作会议。会议期间,受到了阿曼外交大臣亲切接见。同月,阿曼石油燃气部大臣被中国对外经贸部部长石广生邀请访问中国,国务委员吴仪和石广生部长分别会见了。同年6月,阿曼外交大臣访问中国,并会见了中国外交部部长唐家璇。中国外交部副部长杨福昌主持了第十三轮阿曼—中国外交部政治协商会。

2001年9月30日,苏丹卡布斯向中国主席江泽民赠送了“苏哈尔”号模型,以庆祝中国国庆52周年庆典,同时也纪念仿“苏哈尔”号抵达中国20周年版。2001年12月,苏丹卡布斯向中国捐助20万美元,用以帮助泉州海外历史博物馆伊斯兰—阿拉伯展厅的建设。9月,正值庆祝中国国庆52周年,也是纪念仿古代“苏哈尔”号抵达中国20周年,阿曼大使向外交部副部长杨福昌递交苏丹卡布斯致江泽民主席的

礼物——“苏哈尔”号模型。10月，江泽民致信苏丹卡布斯表达他的谢意。

2001年12月1日至4日，全国人民代表大会常务委员会委员长李鹏对阿曼进行了正式友好访问。李鹏委员长与阿曼咨询委员会主席及副首相展开了友好会谈，双方都对阿曼—中国友好关系十分满意，并交换了意见。双方就如何进一步促进和发展双边合作以及共同关心的问题达成了广泛共识。12月2日，阿曼通讯社报道说，李鹏委员长是访问阿曼的中国高层领导人之一，这无疑将促进双方的友好合作关系。一些媒体认为，加强友好合作将有利于两国所有人民。

2002年3月22日，受阿曼政府邀请，国务委员吴仪率领中国政府代表团对阿曼进行为期4天的友好访问。3月23日，在东南部城市塞拉莱，苏丹卡布斯会见了中国国务委员吴仪。卡布斯指出，阿曼一直以来十分关心中国的发展，并希望与中国进一步在政治、经济、贸易和其他领域发展合作关系。吴仪高度赞扬了在卡布斯领导下国家取得伟大成就以及追求中立，不结盟，睦邻友好的外交政策。她积极评价了中阿友好关系并指出阿曼仍然是中国最重要的石油来源国，有着巨大的双边合作潜力，特别是商业和石油领域合作的方式和途径。吴仪出席了中阿石油合作备忘录的签字仪式，并签署了两份石油直接贸易合同。她还会见了阿曼内阁事务副首相，并就进一步发展双边关系和共同关心的领域交换意见。

2003年10月22日，苏丹卡布斯在马斯喀特会见了中共中央纪律检查委员会书记吴官正。苏丹卡布斯说，苏丹人民非常珍惜两国人民的传统友谊。他期望并相信我们两国在能源，交通，经济和贸易等领域一定能够取得积极成果。吴官正说，中国的新一届领导集体高度重视与包括阿曼在内的海湾国家发展友好关系。中国愿与阿曼共同努力，进一步将已存在的友好合作提高到一个更高、更广、更深的层次。

2003年12月5日，中国国家副主席曾庆红会见了阿曼外交大臣尤素福·本·阿拉维（H.E.Yusuf Bin Allawi），双方就一些国际事件交换了意见。

2004年6月，中国外交部部长李肇星在青岛会见了来参加亚洲合作对话第三届外交部部长级会议的阿曼外交大臣。双方签署了中阿部长级外国战略磋商备忘录。同年7月，继海湾合作委员会代表团之后，阿曼国家经济金融事务部代表团对中国进行了访问。

2004年9月11日的傍晚，苏丹卡布斯会见了中国外交部部长李肇星。双方一致同意加强双边关系符合两国人民的利益，有利于中阿关系的发展。中阿关系的友好合作有着广阔的前景。

2005年6月，中国副总理曾培炎访问阿曼，并与阿曼副首相举行会谈。双方就能源、通讯和其他领域签署了合作协议。同年9月，阿曼副首相访问中国，并受到中国总理温家宝和副总理曾培炎的友好接待。

2006年2月，中国外交部副部长吕国增访问阿曼，并主持了两国第一次部级战略协商。同年5月，阿曼外交部部长在中国参加了第二届中国-阿拉伯合作论坛部长级会议。6月，中共中央政治局委员，广东省委书记张德江访问阿曼。

2006年4月，第二届中国-阿拉伯合作论坛部长级会议在北京召开。同时，中国向阿曼提交了中阿关系的历史性文件。

2007年11月8日，中国全国人民代表大会常务委员会副委员长司马义·艾买提访问阿曼，并得到阿曼内阁事务副首相的亲切会见。9日，司马义·艾买提分别与阿曼国家委员会主席和阿曼协商会主席展开会谈。双方就进一步促进双边关系和立法机构间的交流深入的交换了意见。

2007年3月，阿曼外交部副部长访问中国参加两国举行的第二轮部长级战略协商。

2009年11月12日，中共中央政治局委员、全国人民代表大会常委会副委员长王兆国在阿曼首都马斯喀特会见了阿曼国家委员会副主席。中阿两国有着历史悠久的友好合作，两国在各领域的友好合作已平稳发展30年版。此外，中国全国人民代表大会和阿曼国家委员会有着紧密联系。中国重视发展与阿曼的外交关系，愿进一步扩大人员交流，深化务实合作，加强在国际和地区事务中的沟通与协调，推动双边关系不断取得新进展

2010年5月，阿曼外交部总干事出席了第四届中阿合作论坛部长级会议。

2010年11月6日，应阿曼协商会议的邀请，中国人民政治协商会议主席贾庆林开始了对阿曼的国事访问。8日，他与阿曼协商会议主席展开会谈。双方就共同关心的问题、增进中阿关系深入交换了意见并达成一致。

中国愿意在以下领域持续加深两国关系：

一，尊重彼此的利益，促进双方战略互信；

二，深化务实合作，增强经济贸易、能源、基础建设、渔业领域的合作，扩大新领域的合作范围；

三，扩大文化交流，促进两国人民友好关系，加强在教育、文化、艺术等领域的交流，旨在建立中阿长期友好关系坚实的基础；

四，当涉及到安理会改革、国际金融系统改革、全球天气变化、中东地区热点等

全球性问题时，应加强多边合作，保持各方紧密联系，共同维护发展中国家权力和利益，维护中东海湾地区的和平与稳定，维护世界的共同财产和永久和平。

阿曼高度赞赏了中方在政治、经济、社会领域给予阿拉伯人民的坚定支持。阿曼希望继续扩大友好关系，促进合作，从而推动双边关系长期稳定的发展。

会后，贾庆林出席了两国建造郑和纪念碑的奠基仪式，并签署了关于人力资源培训和促进双向投资合作的文件。会谈中，双方就中阿关系，国际地区时间共同关心的问题交换了意见。他们相信此次访问将增进两国人民的相互了解和两国人民的友谊，并在双方友好合作方面取得新进展。

进入21世纪，阿曼和中国进一步扩大了经济交流，不仅表现在增长的贸易额，还表现在商品质量的稳步提高。

从21世纪开始，中阿间经济交流不断扩大，不仅表现在增长的贸易额，还表现在商品质量的稳步提高。中国对阿曼出口商品主要为大型港口设备、纺织品和服装，主要从阿曼进口原油。阿曼是中国主要的石油销售商，两国石油交易总额超过双边贸易额的90%。

2002年，中阿贸易总额达到15.06亿美元，其中中国出口额为6000万美元，进口额为14.46亿美元。

2004年，中阿贸易总额达到43.9亿美元，其中中国进口额为42.8亿美元。中国从阿曼进口了1635万吨原油，阿曼成为中国最大的石油供应国。^①

2005年，中阿贸易总额为43.3亿美元，其中中国出口额为1.910亿美元，主要为电子机械产品、钢材、高科技产品、纺织品等；中国进口额为41.3亿美元，主要为原油。

2006年，中阿贸易总额为64.7亿美元，其中中国出口额为3400万美元，进口额为61.3亿美元。

2000年底，中国总共签订了87份劳动合同并拨款53.74亿美元，完成交易量39.87亿美元。截止2000年底，在阿曼一共有187名中国外包劳务人员。^②超过50家中国企业在阿曼分布在电信，建筑，服务和油田等领域。这些热点领域将成为推动两国扩大其他领域、地区合作的强劲动力。阿曼政府鼓励民营企业与中国企业间的合作。两国必然会在石油、天然气、矿产、公路建设、通讯、计算机和程序开发领域有着巨大合作

^① Hou Shumin & Zhao Wenyan, "A Chinese Oman cooperation and prosperity business summit BBS" in Beijing, China international times, on September 26, 2005, 5th version.

^② *International Business Daily*, on December 14, 2001.

潜力。

中阿在资源发展、通信业、交通业、工业、城市建设等领域有良好的进展。中石油、中石化、中国通信业巨头华为公司、水利水电建设集团公司成功的承包了一批基础设施工程项目。

2004年底，在阿曼的中国投资者建立了五个大型投资公司，即中国石油天然气集团公司、中国石油和化工、天津水泥工业设计研究院（TCDRI）、威海华岳建设发展有限公司、宁波燎原灯具灯笼股份制有限责任公司。中阿双边贸易实现强劲、可持续发展。双方就技术、卫生、文化、宣传、航空运输和其他领域合作以及避免双重征税已经签署多项协议。中国石化集团与阿曼石油部于2003年签署了一项协议，协议授权中国企业在阿曼南部地区开采石油并开展石油交易活动。为了加强两国之间的关系，阿曼和中国也举办了部长级综合委员会，定期召开会议讨论两国之间投资、技术合作和协议实施等事宜。

2004年1月，中国与阿拉伯国家联盟联合建立了“中阿合作论坛”。这是中国 and 包括阿曼的阿拉伯国家的一个新的对话和合作机制。2004年6月，作为阿曼和中国外交史上的一个里程碑，中阿战略协议在中国青岛签署。上述活动丰富了中阿广泛合作的内涵，促进交流合作层次，进一步推动两国在各个领域合作和交流，促进两国共同发展。

2005年9月24-28日，应中国政府的邀请，阿曼内阁事务副大臣法赫德·本·马哈茂德（H.E.Fahd Bin Mahmoud）率代表团对中国进行正式访问。代表团包括外交部、工商业部、农业和渔业部、石油和天然气部、新闻部等部领导以及一些商业和工业著名企业家和商会主席。代表团访问期间，阿曼大使馆于9月27日早晨在北京召开了中阿合作商业繁荣峰会。工商部部长率领阿曼代表团参加。

作为2010年上海世博会的赞助方，中阿贸易论坛于2010年9月27日在上海召开。这次论坛有50个企业代表，超过250位中国商界人士针对在阿曼快速发展的现阶段，如何寻找双边贸易机遇这个话题展开讨论。2009年，中阿两国贸易总额超过12亿美元。

①

在21世纪，在现有文化交流机制下，阿曼和中国在文化和高层互访方面交流频繁。2004年1月，中国国家宗教局局长叶小文访问阿曼，分别会见了阿曼副首相及宗教事务大臣。2005年11月，阿曼教育秘书参加联合国教科文组织的中国第五届国家教育高

① Chen Xiaoxun, "Oman Welcomed China's Metallurgical Enterprises to Invest," *China Metallurgical News*, October 12, 2010, A2.

层会议。北京大学校长许智宏访问阿曼。12月，中国国际友好城市联合会会长陈昊苏访问阿曼，推进两国人民的友好交流与合作。

2006年4月，阿曼旅游大臣访问中国，两国签署了关于中国旅游团到阿曼执行计划的谅解备忘录。6月，阿曼文化遗产部长到中国参加阿拉伯艺术节。阿曼 IOC 青年代表团访问中国。11月，苏丹卡布斯大学校长纳塞尔访问中国。

2007年6月28日，“中国-阿曼友好协会”建立。该组织希望全面发展两国关系，进一步加强文化交流。在双方的共同努力下，两国将打开一个经济，政治和文化交流的新篇章。2007年7月3日，阿曼和中国共同成立“北京大学卡布斯苏丹阿拉伯研究讲席”。

小 结

本章主要考察了新中国成立后阿曼与中国的全面互动关系，包括初步接触、建立外交关系和确立全面互动关系三个阶段。从阿曼与新中国关系发展的轨迹可以看出，新现实主义对于双方关系发展更具有解释力，因而贯彻两国关系发展主线的，是双方领导人对地缘政治、经贸利益和国际体系特征等因素。这些因素决定了阿曼与中国关系始终朝着积极的方向发展。

第五章 影响阿曼与中国关系的主要因素与两国关系未来

第一节 影响阿曼与中国关系的主要因素

地缘政治、历史、官僚体制、知识分子以及媒体等不同的因素在中阿关系的形成中扮演着十分重要的角色。为了调查这些因素对于中阿关系的影响，我们着重关注影响中阿关系的主要因素：地缘政治，地区秩序，历史传统，意识形态和领导因素。

一、地缘政治因素

对于理解国际关系，地缘政治是一种十分重要的观点。由于国家实际利益以及中国在中东能源安全和地理位置，中国在阿曼具有地缘政治利益，能源利益，安全利益以及其他重要战略利益。因此，中国在中东的利益决定着中阿关系的走向。从长远来看，中国坚持和平、发展与合作的原则，进一步与阿曼保持友好关系。由于独特的地理位置，阿曼在中东地区，素有“三大洲交界处”、“交界地”和“五海三洲点”等称号。它连接了欧亚非三大洲，控制了五个航海通道（即直布罗陀地区，西西里地区，苏伊士运河，曼德海峡以及霍尔木兹海峡），是国际海陆空交通枢纽。阿曼在世界政治的地缘政治战略中占有重要一席。事实上，它是世界三大宗教的发源地，有着至关重要的社会文化意义。同时，它也被称为具有丰富石油储量的“世界油库”。由于其地缘政治战略意义，因此阿曼对于中国至关重要，这也是双方开展合作的动机与基础。

中国在地缘政治方面有两个鲜明的特点：一方面，中国是典型的海陆复合型国家，另一方面，由于资源短缺，中国的能源安全面临严峻的考验。中国位于欧亚大陆的东端，临太平洋西海岸。这种海陆复合国家拥有相对广阔无垠的疆土，以及对海洋和海洋通道开发的便利条件。但上天赋予的两个便利条件同时也遭受着海陆战略安全面临的压力和挑战，从而蒙受双重的安全威胁。现实中，中国面临来自东西两面的战略压力。在西方，中国受北约国家的制约，这将导致内陆前所未有的复杂地缘政治安全环境；而东部的海洋权力被美日联盟所遏制。更糟糕的是，来自东西双方的制约已逐渐形成夹击的事态。对东西两面的严重依赖是中国地缘政治的特点。这使得中国以中东为焦点争取西线的支持，以应对东线的挑战。能源是中国和平崛起的重要保障。在西线，无论中亚或中东都储藏着石油以及其他战略资源。另外，由于中国和中东地理联

系紧密，根据中国的“大周边国家战略”，中东地区已经成为一个重要的组成部分。根据以上考虑，中阿之间地缘政治的支持注定是中阿关系前进的一支重要力量。

二、地区秩序

地区秩序对中国1949年后的外交活动中产生了巨大影响。中国传统的世界秩序观分为以下几个方面：

1. 中国对世界秩序的划分是分等级的，而不是平等主义。⁷⁸
2. 中国在世界核心是其文明和美德，尤其是中国统治者的美德
3. 权力的平衡是不存在的
4. 国家权力是国家美德的体现。权力是道德的，因为它源于拥有美德。
5. 国际社会是国内社会的延伸。没有边界的存在是因为没有单一民族国家的存在。边界只定义于文化差异中。^①

中国人认为他们在世界的中心，中华文明是所有文明的源头。他们视他们的国家为“中央王国”或“世界的中心国家”，中国皇帝作为普遍的统治者在万物的中心，而那些未教化的野蛮人分布在周边地区。他们认为他们的文明是优于其他任何国家，他们的统治者则是上天的使者、龙之子来治理凡间的土地。外国等级排名的高低取决于他们是否接近于中国文化。在中国人的世界秩序中，领土界限是不明确的，“野蛮人”与中国的相互交流的目的就是让前者沿着中国的道路转变。外国的野蛮人来到中国融入中华文明，学习中国在自然与社会科学的方面取得的成就。那些愿意来中国学习中华文明的外国人必须接受中华文化，承认天地之间中国皇帝至高无上的权利，并带去贡礼。这种朝贡制度使朝贡国得到了皇帝批准在中国交易的许可。因此，朝贡制度是建立与实施和中国外交关系的手段。为了与中国进行贸易活动，外国人需要定期向中国皇帝献上贡品。而这些朝贡活动被中国人视为对野蛮人的一种优越感。

1942年8月27日，中国与英国签订了南京条约，标志着中国传统世界秩序观的崩溃。中国历史上对于世界秩序本质根深蒂固的设想与西方和俄罗斯不同。而这种设想可能是当代中国外交关系的一个复杂因素。他将过去观念对于中国外交政策的影响细分为以下几个层面：

^① Mancall, M.(1963) 'The Persistence of tradition of China's foreign policy'. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 349(September), pp.17-19.

1. 对于西方帝国主义强权中国有着鲜明立场并表达了强烈的愤慨,因为正是西方主义强权促进了中国传统世界秩序与影响的崩溃。

2. 在处理与邻国关系中,中国的优越感表现在与巴基斯坦、尼泊尔和缅甸边界协议的签署上。这些协议的签署都是基于中国的友好与善意。

3. 在与美国和俄罗斯的外交关系上,中国采用当代中国外交政策的一些老技巧,包括文化交流活动,官方访问以及“师夷长技以制夷”的理念。

中国古时候的朝贡制度现在已经被歌舞团、官方代表团、学者与交换生、记者以及公民领袖所替代。自明朝开始,中国通过文化交流进行个性化的外交已是中国外交的核心。他也看到了在过去中国外交关系的仇外心理,这导致中国与邻近的亚洲国家和超级大国采取民族主义的外交政策,根据斯卡拉皮诺^①的观点,中国正寻求达到以下三个目标:第一,界定和捍卫他的边界;第二,寻求获得一个缓冲地带以得到深层次的安全;最后,在一定区域行使一定程度的霸权。对于他来说,中国在与周边国家制定边界时正在展现出傲人的一面,而不是委曲求全。

除了以上论述,过去的理念以及传统世界秩序等级制度对中国外交政策有着不同程度影响。这体现在1950年中国对于世界的划分为“两大阵营”以及在70年代提出了“三个世界理论”。这种分类更加强调了每一个理论中国家的等级排名。

在十九世纪末,尽管由于强大的西方国家和日本,中国被迫放弃与外国人士开展活动的一些行之有效的方法和思想。这些方法仍然影响着许多中国领导人。20世纪20年代到30年代,孙中山和蒋介石分别认为中国必须变得强盛,以便在世界舞台上再次扮演传统的领导角色并发挥中国文化道德的影响。毛泽东则相信中国革命对于世界革命是至关重要的,于是他接受了马克思列宁主义思想。根据克兰默·宾的观点,在新中国建立之后,之前的中华民族的两个使命合二为一,这种使命感通过中国人民强烈的民族感情和对伟大中华文明的骄傲不断增强。他总结到:

中国这两个特殊的使命都有一个共同基本素质,中国人民深信烙印在他们血液里的中国文化价值观以及生活方式将在未来引领世界的潮流。^②

石之瑜(1990)研究了儒家思想、佛家思想、道家思想等中国的传统文化和规范对中国的外交行为的影响。他提出了三种不同的领导方式:等级领导,常态领导,反

^① Scalapino, R.A (1962): 'Traditions and trabsition' in the Asian policy of communist China's in E.F. Sacaepanik(ed.) *Symposium on Economic and social Problem of the Far East*, Hong Kong University Press.pp.262-277).

^② J Cranmer-Byng(1973): 'The Chinese view of their place in the world.' *The China Quartely* 53(January/March),pp.76-79).

叛领导。等级领导是指一种为了某种道德信条，寻求一个强制性的机制以获得大多数人的支持的领导方式。同时这种领导方式强调忠诚和组织结构。常态领导是指试图通过物质鼓励调和国家利益与个人利益的一种领导方式。反叛式领导是指鼓励大多数人民去反抗现状的一种领导方式。根据他的观点，采取某种领导方式取决于领导人的个性，个人经历以及现实环境。他指出，在文化大革命之前，毛泽东采取了等级式领导，这种领导方式倾向于运用“非对称式”的外交思想，主张儒家思想中通过外交惩罚和奖励，优越性和服从性以展现控制力。刘少奇，周恩来和邓小平采用了常态领导方式，这种领导方式往往倾向于采用“对称式”的外交思想，主张儒家思想中的仁爱共存，以及通过双方让步维护它们。文革之后，毛泽东采用了反叛式领导，这将易经的思想应用到了外交政策中。它主张“革命兄弟”并且挑战“不公正”权威。^①石之瑜的总结指出，中国的外交政策反映了中国领导人对于世界的看法以及国家间关系的管理。

克雷皮尼说中国的历史在当代中国外交留下了不可磨灭的印记：

1. 中国反对任何国家干预其内政，这种旧的传统观念在中国今天的外交政策里还在执行着。

2. 中国对于国内外系统的传统观点中的等级性以及它们个系统内的权力分配依然在中国目前在东亚和东南亚利益中扮演重要角色。中国对于一个区域政策不仅受秩序的影响，同时也受期望的影响。

3. 中央政府的官方控制力是中国历史对于当代中国外交的影响的另外一个方面。因为这种控制力被认为是保持中国统一性的重要保障。^②

所有以上论述表面，历史和传统在中国对外活动中有重要影响。

三、意识形态

有关意识形态在中国的外交政策作用的一些著作表明，在意识形态作用的发展中，有两个阶段。首先是1949-1978年的毛泽东时期，第二个是1979年到现在后的毛泽东时期。意识形态在中国外交政策中的作用按照这个时间尺度不断发展。在第一个阶段，意识形态被认为是中国对外政策的形成的决定性因素。学者和政治家对于中国外交的分析都是基于马列主义和毛泽东的教导。对外政策是一种意识形态的反映。20世纪50年代，中国采取对苏联“一边倒”的外交政策。60年代，中国支持第三世界

^① Chih-yu Shih (1990), *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp.80-190).

^② de Crespigny(1995), "Tradition and Chinese foreign policy" in S.Harris and G.Klintworth(eds.) *China as a Great power: Myths, Realities, and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region*. New York: St. Martin's press, pp.42-43.

大团结，主张建立一个崭新的第三世界。70年代，中国正式与美国建交。所有这些外交活动都可以视为中国向马列主义，毛泽东思想转换的必然结果。从80年代起，许多学者和分析家都开始看到意识形态在中国外交思想中地位的下降。因此他们看到诸如民族主义，现代化和国家利益的新理论代替马列主义，毛泽东思想在外交活动中的地位。

那些解释意识形态对于中国对外活动的人们倾向于重视马列主义和毛泽东思想的影响。舒尔曼^①根据两种思想的不同行为将两者区别出来。他将马列主义定义为“纯意识形态思想”，而将毛泽东思想定义为“实用思想”。对于他来说，“纯意识形态思想”旨在塑造人民的思想而不是立即指导行动。而“实用思想”旨在指导思想并应用于具体政策。从这个角度上考虑，“纯意识形态思想”是全世界共产党员共同分享的思想。而“实用思想”则是各地共产党根据各国不同情况而有所不同。根据他的观点，“纯意识形态思想”在“实用思想”在中国发展过程中起到了关键作用。毛泽东的世界观被认为是中国外交政策在“纯意识形态思想”影响下的产物。毛泽东思想的两大主题在中国外交政策形成中的作用吸引了众多分析家的关注。首先，列宁关于帝国主义的解释极大地影响了毛泽东对于国际关系中“敌人”的概念。詹姆斯·杰·雄强调说，中国人无法在传统观念中解释帝国主义，而列宁关于帝国主义的理论填补了许多中国人的思想空白，其中就包括毛泽东。^②在中苏联盟的50年代，毛泽东坚持列宁主义的帝国主义理论，并将反对帝国主义作为反对美国为首的西方国家宣传的口号。毛泽东将世界秩序分为两大阵营：以苏联为首的共产主义阵营和以美国为首的资本主义、帝国主义阵营。两大阵营的矛盾成为影响中国对外政策形成的基本因素。因此他看到“一边倒”政策是完成中国对外政策目标最可靠的政治策略。

我们属于以苏联为首的反对帝国主义战线的一方。因此我们对于本方给予真诚友好的帮助，而不是帝国主义一方。

毛泽东思想对于中国对外政策另外一个重要的影响方面是他的矛盾论。根据毛泽东思想，社会向最终社会形态共产主义社会的发展过程中，要经历许多阶段。每一个阶段，都有一些“主要矛盾”和“次要矛盾”体现在实现社会从一个阶段进步到另一个阶段的奋斗当中。解决好每个阶段的主次矛盾将是实现社会进步的首要步骤。^③这

^① Schurmann(1968), *Ideology and organization in Communist China*, 2nd edn. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.19-33.

^② Hsiung(1970), *Ideology and Practice the evolution of Chinese Communism*, London: Pall Mall Press, pp.36-37.

^③ Mao Zedong(1971), "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" in *Selected Reading from the Works of Mao Tzedong*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, pp.91-98.

种分析从根本上解释了历来中国外交政策随着与美苏关系的改变而进行的演变。60年代以后，中苏关系的恶化，中国将外交重点转到第三世界，后又转到美国，这一系列变化都可以用矛盾分析来解释。约翰·W加佛在政治领域解释了毛泽东思想的矛盾论。他指出，在中国历史的每一个阶段，总有一个主要敌人阻止中国完成她的最终目标：20世纪30年代主要敌人是日本，40年代是中国的民族主义，50和60年代是美国，70年代是苏联。这意味着在每一个阶段开始，中国不得不努力解决主要矛盾，以便过渡到下一个阶段。^①

因此，意识形态对于中国外交政策的影响可以分为以下几个方面：

第一，在1949年新中国宣布独立之后，受到意识形态的影响，中国选择了“一边倒”的政策，并且在处理外交事物中，遵循苏联的外交道路。因此，中国被世界上非共产主义国家所孤立，结束了与美国的全面对抗。

第二，从20世纪50年代前期无视第三世界到50年代末60年代积极加入第三世界，毛泽东思想转变了中国对外政策战略。和平共处五项原则作为中国与其他第三世界国家外交的主要基本元素标志着中国愿意与这些国家建立友好关系，以削弱美国在亚洲的战略地位。^②

第三，20世纪60年代，毛泽东的革命思想在第三世界国家中扮演了重要角色。中国创造性的提出了“人民战争”，并在1965年支持世界上23个国家的革命事业，为这些国家革命者的军事训练，武装供应，思想教育投入了大量资源。

第四，毛泽东思想中矛盾论帮助中国外交政策从最初的中苏联盟调整到70年代中美建交。根据毛泽东思想，当时莫斯科是北京的首要敌人而非华盛顿，因此中国即使要需与次要敌人联盟，也要首先消灭首要敌人。

四、领导层与政治结构

有些人提出领导在中国外交政策的形成与决定中也发挥着重要作用。大卫·巴克曼同意此观点并强调说，中国共产党的领导在执行中国外交政策中起到了决定性作用。根据巴克曼的观点^③，毛泽东毋庸置疑是中国外交政策的制定者。他完全享有中国外交政策决定权，外交政策即是他的主要思想和政治关注点。多克·巴尼特^④拓展

^① Garver (1993), *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp.44-48).

^② Garver (1993), *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p119.

^③ Bachman(1998), "Structure and Process in the making of Chinese foreign policy," in S.Skim(ed): *China and the World: Chinese Foreign policy faces the New Millenmium*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.37-41.

^④ A. Doak Barnett(1985), *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, Boulder, CO: westview press,

了这个论点并指出毛泽东在他去世之前完全主导了中国外交政策的制定。而邓小平在80年代至90年代的许多外交事件的处理中做出了最后决定。他还指出邓小平在他去世之前的几年中，虽然没有在党内或者政府中担当最高职务，但他依然是国内外事件最后的决策者。大多数重大决策都是由他提出。然而，巴尼特将毛泽东和邓小平两者外交决策方法区分开来。毛泽东的决策方法是基于构建一个支持他政治主张的联盟。毛泽东的决策方法展现了个人主义，因为他完全享有决策权。而邓小平的决策方法是基于建立一个支持他政治主张的联盟，而非对其他人强加个人的政治观点。^①这种方法也在江泽民时代得以继续实行。

巴克曼^②指出，中国的政治结构具有高度集权同时又高度灵活的特点，政治上的讨价还价也能影响中国的对外行为。中国政治结构的特点是影响国家的外部活动形成的一个重要因素。这些特点通过协调和控制中国实体中存在的问题和竞争影响外交政策和外交活动，使得整个国家奉行国际上重商主义的政策。他强调向沙特阿拉伯出售导弹便是例证。他指出中国党和政府中的高层官员甚至都没和外交部商讨，便决定对外出售武器。因此，中国政治结构中的集权特点使得决定权集中在少数几个高层官员的手中。

哈里哈丁认为在后毛泽东时期的政治改革已经改变了中国政治体制中意识形态的一些特点。他将这种政治体制描述为一种集权协商政权。在这种政权体系中，政党可与个人、机构在国家政策的决定方面，进行政府内或非政府的商讨。哈丁认为这是对之前极权主义的重大改变。^③但是，这种政治制度并不是真正的多元制度，甚至不是真正的民主制度。据此分析，中国仍然不允许其他独立政党、独立媒体以及独立社会专业组织参与国家政策的制定和形成。赵全胜^④表示，中国外交政策制定过程从毛泽东时期的“垂直集权主义”转变为后毛泽东时期的“水平集权主义”或“集体集权主义”。前者是在一个垂直的指挥系统中一人主导的进程。而后者则是参与对外政策决定群体主导的进程。1982年独立外交政策的采用便是后毛泽东时期一个关于“平行”或“集体集权主义”的例子。

p.12.

^① A. Doak Barnett(1985),*The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, Boulder,CO:westview press, p.16.

^② Bachman,D (1994), “Domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy”, in S.S.Kim(ed):*China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,p.51.

^③ Harding(1987), *China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, p.200.

^④ Zhao Quansheng(1992): “Domestic factors of Chinese foreign policy: From Vertical to Horizontal authoritarianism”. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 519(January), pp.162-164.

五、国际体系转型

随着国际体系转型，中国与阿曼的关系也发生了变化。新现实主义理论为中阿关系的变化提供了一个很好的解释。在冷战时期，中国在与阿曼关系中的首要考虑是提升自己的经济实力，新现实主义认为，一国的外交政策主要是追求自身的经济、政治和军事实力的提升，尤其是相对其他行为体而言，中国的行为可以说是对该理论的一个生动注解。中国对石油的需求使得中国热心于发展与中东国家的关系，关心中东地区的和平与稳定。

随着苏联的解体和冷战结束，中国越来越认识到，任何对海湾地区和阿拉伯国家的石油输出构成的威胁都将对中国造成重要的安全和政治影响，因此中国开始变得更加关心这个地区的稳定。

第二节 中国与阿曼关系中的主要问题

一、中国与阿曼伊斯兰酋长国的关系

阿曼是阿拉伯半岛最古老的国家之一。公元7世纪成为阿拉伯帝国的一部分。1624年，建立亚里巴王朝，其势力曾扩张到东非部分海岸和桑给巴尔岛。18世纪中叶，建立赛义德王朝，定国名为“马斯喀特苏丹国”。在20世纪初，阿曼各部落开始反抗赛义德王朝和英国殖民者的统治，1920年，赛义德王朝被迫签署“色博条约”，阿曼被分为“马斯喀特苏丹国”和“阿曼伊斯兰教长国”。1955年，在英国的支持下，马斯喀特苏丹国废除了色博条约，因此阿曼伊斯兰酋长国开始武装反抗英国和马斯喀特苏丹国。他们的反英斗争获得了阿拉伯世界的同情和支持。在1957年8月，在全世界反对殖民主义的斗争中，中国政府通过阿拉伯国家联盟表示，中国反对英国干涉阿曼的内政。

1959年2月，阿曼副伊玛目访问中国并与中国领导人进行了会谈。中国决定向阿曼提供20万美元的现金援助和价值70万美元的军事援助。然而，由于运输的问题，这些军事援助的物质最终没有到达，只有现金援助的承诺变成了现实。1967年，马斯喀特苏丹国和阿曼伊斯兰酋长国又重新统一为“马斯喀特和阿曼苏丹国”，中国也就中

断了与之前阿曼伊斯兰酋长国的外交关系。1970年7月23日，卡布斯发动宫廷政变，废父登基，宣布改国名为“阿曼苏丹国”并沿用至今。

二、中国与“阿曼人民解放阵线”的关系

1970年，中国人民对外友好协会邀请了阿曼人民解放阵线的代表团访问中国，周恩来总理与代表团进行了会谈，双方达成协议，中国将提供武器、现金、药品和粮食援助，同时帮助训练部分无线电人员。在70年代，苏联开始军事干预海湾地区和阿曼的内政。在苏联的帮助下，阿曼人民解放阵线开始变得左倾化，其目标也扩大为“解放阿拉伯半岛和海湾地区”，在这种背景下，中国开始停止对阿曼人民解放阵线的支持。1973年底，阿曼政府开始请求伊朗派军代帮助镇压阿曼人民解放阵线。此后，阿曼人民解放阵线的军事力量遭到严重削弱，同时在外交上也陷入到严重孤立的状况。直到1975年底，长达10年之久的阿曼人民解放阵线运动逐步陷入衰退。

在阿曼的历史上，阿曼伊斯兰酋长国和阿曼人民解放阵线是两个有重要影响力的组织，中国与这两个组织的关系也是特定历史阶段的产物，包括对他们的援助。在这方面，阿曼政府也能理解中国的立场，并让它成为历史，因此，这并不构成中国和阿曼建立正式外交关系的障碍。在中国与阿曼外交关系正常化的谈判中，阿曼外交大臣说：“中国奉行不干涉内政的原则。尽管中国曾支持过阿曼的自由民主运动，这些事情都已经过去了，成为历史，因此阿曼愿意与中国建立友好的外交关系”。在1978年6月，当阿曼外交大臣访问中国，谈到佐法尔问题时，中国领导人表示，中国尊重阿曼的主权，应该由阿曼人民自己解决内部的问题，这样双边关系中的问题解决了。

三、阿曼与中国台湾的关系

早在20世纪70年代，阿曼与中国台湾就开始有经贸上的往来。1977年4月，在沙特的推动下，阿曼同意台湾建立一个“‘中华民国’商业代表办公室”（Commercial Representative Office of “Republic of China”）。在1977年到1978年，中国与阿曼外交关系正常化的谈判中，中国首席谈判代表宋之光指出，世界上只有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分，因此希望阿曼取消台湾在阿曼的商业代表办公室。阿曼谈判代表和外长表示，阿曼奉行“一个中国”的政策，阿曼与台湾的关系并不密切，阿曼是在沙特的推动下才允许建立了台湾在阿曼的商业代表办公室，阿曼从没有接受过任何台湾的援

助或援助计划，并且承诺，在中国与阿曼正式外交关系建立之后，阿曼一定会取消台湾在阿曼的商业代表办公室。1978年8月5日，在中国与阿曼建立正式外交关系之后的2个月，阿曼勒令台湾的商业代表办公室撤出。

但另一方面，台湾并没有停止对阿曼的渗透，台湾与阿曼的商业关系仍然继续保留了下来。1981年8月，台湾在阿曼设立了一个“远程贸易服务中心”（Far East Trade Service Center）。1991年6月，远程贸易服务中心更名为“台北驻阿曼经济文化办公室”（the Taipei Economic and Cultural Service Center in the Kingdom of Oman）。1991年底，阿曼以工商委员会的名义在台湾建立了一个“商业代表处”。由于阿曼的商业代表处并没有为阿曼带来实实在在的利益，同意台湾也准备从1997年停止对阿曼的援助，因此阿曼决定从1996年6月起关闭在台湾的商业代表处。

在中国与阿曼建立正式外交关系以来的20多年里，阿曼基本上恪守了“一个中国”的原则，并反复强调，阿曼与台湾建立的商贸联系是非官方的，在官方层面上双方没有任何互动。但另一方面，阿曼实际上有时也默许了台湾的一些官方举动。1994年11月，阿曼决定重开到台湾的航线，但后来由于中国的压力放弃了。1995年4月，台湾的所谓“经济副部长”访问阿曼，并决定在阿曼投资工厂和建立一些训练中心，以为阿曼训练工程师。1998年10月，台湾所谓“经济助理部长”应阿曼工商委员会的邀请访问了阿曼。

阿曼在经贸上与台湾保持了密切的关系。1995年，双边的贸易额达到3.56亿美元，其中台湾出口产品主要是棉花、亚麻织品、机器装备等，进口产品主要是原油、矿产品、水产品等。1998年，台湾是阿曼主要的原油出口地之一，位列第6位。

小 结

自从两国建立外交关系，阿曼与中国双方在政治、经济和文化领域就有着顺利的合作和良好的发展。通过双方领导人和其他访问团的互访，双方增进交流。两国都十分欣赏对方在国际和地区事务上一致或类似的观点，珍惜彼此慷慨的援助以及在解决国际事务中的协调和支持。双方强调在经济、贸易、文化、公共卫生及其他方面的互利合作。而这些合作有着巨大的潜力。中阿应在包括政治沟通、经贸往来、文化交流

等多种领域开展合作。

政治沟通是建立国际关系、进行政治交流的基本手段，并在增进政治关系中扮演重要角色。从政治交流的角度来看，中阿双方的这种互动本质上是一种建立在公众和互信基础上的对话和协商，以达成在公共事务中建设性的共识，从而促进两国对于共同价值观和利益的认识。建交以来，中国与阿曼的关系发展十分顺利，双方政治互信得到进一步巩固，双方各级务实合作得到了加强。这种政治沟通加深了双方的互相了解，增进了双方友好互信，扩大了各级互利合作，分别促进了双方的经济建设，同时提高了两国在国际社会中的影响力。

冷战结束以后，和平和发展成为现代国际社会的主题。经济全球化已成为当今国际社会的主流。经济全球化是指世界经济的一体化，全球化对世界各个领域产生深远的影响。制造，管理，投资，金融以及其他经济活动都超越了国界和地域的限制在各个国家相互依存的经济整体中蓬勃发展。全人类紧密而频繁的经济活动伴随着侵犯、吞并和相互屠杀，而现在这种情况正在减少，并逐渐消失。在世界经济整体中，中国和阿曼两大经济行为体，像是两家大型公司，既是相互依存的贸易伙伴，也是市场上的竞争对手。因此，处理经济贸易关系的原则就是注重整体上的长期合作关系和双方的互利共赢的局面。这肯定会导致一个牢固的，双赢的合作竞争关系。中阿之间的这种经济联系不仅促进了双边的政治互信，也帮助实现双方优势互补，利益最大化及合作共赢。一方面，随着现代产业的参与，这种双赢的经济联系成为全球化经济互动原则的新发展；另一方面，它也是新经济环境下所应坚持的基本原则。实践证明互利共赢是具有重大现实意义和指导意义的原则。

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第六章 结 论

第一节 阿曼与中国关系的发展轨迹

本文主要讨论了阿曼与中国的关系，以及两国关系发展的主要影响因素及未来走向。众所周知，阿曼和中国都是文明古国，都是拥有深厚历史与文化积淀的美丽国家。阿曼人民同中国人民一样真诚、淳朴、开放、宽容，两国人民的这些品质受到世界各国人民的赞赏，这是阿曼与中国在中华人民共和国成立前保持友好交往关系的前提和基础。

新中国成立后第一个十年里，中华人民共和国在政治上与海湾国家以及阿拉伯半岛国家关系冷淡，包括与阿曼。当时，中国与苏联结盟，中国政府视阿曼为西方的“傀儡”，中国与阿曼建立外交关系以及保持联系自然无从谈起。然而，20世纪50年代后期开始，中国开始将海湾地区及阿拉伯半岛视为反对西方帝国主义、与苏联社会帝国主义展开竞争的舞台。持续数年的佐法尔（Dhofar）战争结束后，阿曼与中国于1978年5月25日建立外交关系。

中国对外政策第二次作出巨大变化是在1982年版。这一年，中国宣布奉行“独立自主的外交政策”。这种政策的调整，主要是因为中国对美国和苏联关系的认知变化。尽管中国与苏联当时改善了关系，但是中国对苏联的恐惧一直延续至20世纪80年代末。苏联在阿富汗和南也门的军事存在，以及两伊战争的爆发，都加深了中国对苏联战略意图的疑虑。中国政府担心，苏联会利用中东地区漫长的战争拉一方，打击另一方。在此背景下，20世纪80年代以来，阿曼与中国的在政治、经济和文化等方面的关系不断提升。

20世纪90年代，中国外交政策再次发生重要变化。苏联解体、东欧剧变、冷战结束，预示着美国将成为世界唯一的国际警察，阿曼与中国关系再次发生重要变化。冷战结束后，获取海外石油成为中国发展对中东外交的重要动因。1993年开始，中国在四十年的时间里首次成为石油净进口国。随着中国经济的快速发展，据估计，到2015年，中国日净进口石油量将达到700万桶。在目前以及在今后相当长时间里，海湾和

阿拉伯半岛都将拥有世界上最丰富的石油储量。^①另据估计,2000年,77%的中国进口石油来自于海湾和阿拉伯半岛地区,包括阿曼;2005年,这一数字上升为92%。

第二节 阿曼与中国关系的未来

自从两国建立外交关系,双方在政治、经济和文化领域就有着顺利的合作和良好的发展。通过双方领导人和其他访问团的互访,双方增进交流。两国都十分欣赏双方在国际和地区事务上一致或类似的观点,珍惜彼此慷慨的援助以及在解决国际事务中的协调和支持。双方强调在经济、贸易、文化、公共健康及其他方面的互利合作。而这些合作有着巨大的潜力。中阿应在包括政治、经济、文化等多种领域相互合作。

政治互动是建立国际关系、进行政治交流的基本手段,并在增进政治关系中扮演重要角色。从政治交流的角度来看,中阿双方的这种互动本质上是一种建立在公众和互信基础上的对话和协商,以达成在公共事务中建设性的共识,从而促进两国对于共同价值观和利益的认识。建交以来,中国与阿曼的关系发展十分顺利,双方政治互信得到进一步巩固,双方各级务实合作得到了加强。这种政治沟通加深了双方的互相了解,增进了双方友好互信,扩大了各级互利合作,分别促进了双方的经济建设,同时提高了两国在国际社会中的影响力。

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附录一：

《中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛关于中阿双方建立战略合作关系的天津宣言》^①

2010年5月13-14日，天津

中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛第四届部长级会议于2010年5月13日至14日在中华人民共和国天津市举行。

与会代表本着对话、合作、和平、发展的宗旨，回顾了半个多世纪中阿关系的发展进程，特别是中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛成立6年来的建设成就，对中阿合作取得的丰硕成果表示满意，决心进一步发挥中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛的作用。

我们强调，中阿深厚的传统友谊和发展中阿关系的共同意愿是双方合作的坚实基础。进一步提升中阿合作水平具有重要意义，为此我们需要共同努力，加强发展中国家团结与合作、维护世界的和平与安全。

我们看到，当前世界正处在大发展大变革大调整时期。谋求和平、可持续发展和促进世界各国和各国人民之间的平等互利合作已成为时代的要求之一。经济全球化和世界多极化趋势不可逆转，国与国相互依存更加紧密，开展国际合作是应对新威胁和新挑战的重要有效途径。

因此，我们共同倡导世界各国秉持和平、发展、公正、民主、合作、包容理念，团结应对各种全球性挑战，依据和平共处五项原则及其他公认的国际关系准则，本着推动对话与合作的精神，在平衡、公正的国际关系所遵循的原则和基础上，推动建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界。

^① 资料来源：中华人民共和国外交部，<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/1179/t694604.htm>。

我们呼吁各国携手推动国际安全合作，通过政治外交途径和平解决国际争端和地区冲突，反对一切形式的恐怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义，反对把恐怖主义与特定的民族、宗教挂钩。

我们主张加强南南合作和南北对话，致力于推动经济全球化更快地朝着均衡、普惠、共赢方向发展，着力提高发展中国家在国际金融体系中的代表性，营造有利于发展中国家可持续发展的国际环境。

我们呼吁尊重各国自主选择发展道路的权利，倡导开放包容精神，促进不同文明间的对话与交流，推动不同文明共同发展。

鉴于上述，我们宣示，在中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛框架内建立全面合作、共同发展的中阿战略合作关系；并为此：加强各层次互访，开展战略对话和磋商，共同维护广大发展中国家的利益；继续在各自核心和重大利益问题上相互支持；加强各领域合作，交流治国理政和发展经验；发挥双方经济互补优势，推动双方互利合作，促进共同发展；支持不同文明间对话，致力于不同种族、宗教、信仰和文化间的相互尊重与和谐共处；加强中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛建设，充分发挥论坛各项机制的作用，并根据形势发展和双方共同利益，拓展新的合作领域。

我们认为，建立全面合作、共同发展的中阿战略合作关系，是中阿双方的共同愿望，符合双方利益，有利于增进发展中国家的团结与合作，也有助于推动建立公正、合理的国际政治、经济新秩序，促进世界和平与发展。

附录二：

中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛第四届部长级会议公报^①

中华人民共和国与阿拉伯国家联盟成员国（以下简称“双方”）的外长或其代表和阿盟秘书长，于2010年5月13日至14日在中华人民共和国天津市召开“中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛”（以下简称“论坛”）第四届部长级会议。

与会代表回顾了论坛框架下政治、经贸、投资、能源、高教、科研、新闻、文化、文明对话领域的各项机制和重要活动，对论坛第三届部长级会议以来中阿双方建设面向和平和可持续发展的新型伙伴关系取得的丰富成果表示满意；决心进一步丰富中阿友好合作内涵，推动论坛基础和组织建设深入发展。

强调新形势下，应加强中阿对话与合作，提升中阿各领域关系水平，以实现中阿人民的共同利益，推动世界的和平与发展；双方郑重宣示，在论坛框架内建立全面合作、共同发展的中阿战略合作关系。

经过讨论，双方达成以下共识：

一、政治领域

1—重申相互尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处的原则。尊重和支持各国根据本国国情自主选择发展道路。

2—加强领导人和各级政府官员之间的互访与沟通，相互交流治国理政和发展领域的经验。加强双方议会、政党和民间组织之间的友好合作关系。在论坛框架内，保持双方在共同关心的重大国际和地区问题上的双边和集体政治磋商，以促进双方合作、交流、友谊和互信。

3—阿拉伯国家强调支持中国的主权和领土完整，坚定奉行一个中国政策，反对

^① 中华人民共和国外交部亚非司编：《“中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛”文件汇编》，北京：世界知识出版社2010年版，第54-61页。

任何形式的“台湾独立”，不同台湾建立官方关系和进行官方往来，支持台海两岸关系和平发展和中国和平统一大业；反对宗教极端势力、民族分裂势力和恐怖主义势力从事反华分裂活动。

4—中国强调支持阿拉伯国家根据联合国有关决议、“土地换和平”原则、“阿拉伯和平倡议”以及中东和平“路线图”计划实现中东地区和平与稳定的战略选择；呼吁尽快重启各线和谈。双方支持在国际社会达成共识的“两国方案”框架下，在联合国有关决议和阿拉伯和平倡议的基础上，建立拥有完全主权的独立的巴勒斯坦国；恢复阿拉伯合法权利，彻底结束以色列 1967 年以来对包括东耶路撒冷在内的阿拉伯领土的占领，在中东实现全面、公正、持久的和平；呼吁以色列响应阿拉伯国家的和平愿望，在“阿拉伯和平倡议”基础上与有关阿拉伯国家进行谈判，全面执行安理会有关决议；呼吁国际社会继续对巴勒斯坦提供政治和经济支持，改善巴勒斯坦人道主义状况；解除以色列对加沙的封锁，开放口岸，促进加沙重建；要求以色列停止在包括东耶路撒冷在内的阿拉伯被占领土修建定居点等行动；根据联合国有关决议解决巴勒斯坦难民问题；要求以色列停止一切加剧紧张局势的行动，以维护地区稳定，为中东和平进程向前推进创造有利条件。

赞赏中国为联合国在中东地区维和使命作出的贡献，和对包括阿拉伯埃及共和国在内的阿拉伯国家为实现巴勒斯坦内部和解所作积极努力的支持。

中国支持叙利亚根据联合国有关决议收复被占领的戈兰高地，呼吁继续落实安理会关于从黎巴嫩南部被占领土撤军的第 425 号和第 1701 号两个决议。

5—强调尊重伊拉克的独立、主权和领土完整，不干涉其内政，尊重伊拉克人民自主决定其未来，谴责针对伊拉克人民、机构和基础设施，威胁伊稳定和政治制度的各种形式的恐怖主义行为。支持伊拉克政府致力于稳定安全局势、坚决打击恐怖主义、制止破坏稳定和政治进程的企图。强调必须推动民族和解和经济重建。欢迎 2010 年 3 月在伊拉克举行的议会选举，以及国际社会为支持和帮助伊拉克及伊拉克人民发挥的积极作用。

6—强调支持包括阿拉伯联合酋长国倡议和努力在内的所有旨在通过和平谈判、根据国际法准则和平解决三岛（大通布、小通布、阿布穆萨）问题的和平努力。

7—强调支持苏丹的主权、安全、领土完整与稳定。应充分发挥苏丹、非盟和联合国三方磋商机制的主渠道作用，推进达尔富尔地区联合国非盟混合行动的部署，维护并巩固安全与稳定，推动达尔富尔的和平努力和政治进程。欢迎在卡塔尔埃米尔哈马德·本·哈利法·阿勒萨尼殿下主持下，苏丹政府于2010年2月23日在多哈同正义与平等运动达成的框架协议以及2010年3月18日在多哈同解放与公正运动达成的框架协议和停火协议；欢迎哈马德埃米尔关于注资20亿美元成立达尔富尔发展银行的倡议；欢迎卡塔尔国、大阿拉伯利比亚人民社会主义民众国、阿拉伯埃及共和国等有关各方在阿拉伯-非洲委员会框架下为解决达尔富尔问题所作努力。赞赏中国为实现苏丹安全、稳定与发展所发挥的作用。强调支持苏丹民选政府为落实《全面和平协议》，推动北南和平进程继续向前发展所作出的努力。欢迎2010年4月在苏丹举行的总统和议会选举。欢迎巴林王国关于由阿盟组织召开苏丹南方发展大会的倡议，阿方希望中国与会。

8—强调继续推动索马里和平进程对于地区安全与稳定具有重要意义，尊重索马里的统一和国家主权，呼吁国际社会进一步支持索马里政府和索马里民族和解，以实现和平与稳定、消除地区海盗问题。加强中阿双方在地区和国际场合就索马里问题的协调，鼓励和支持和解努力，推动索马里实现和平与稳定，参与索马里重建。

9—倡导对话和协商，鼓励通过政治途径和和平手段处理热点问题和分歧。

10—支持维护国际核不扩散体系，主张通过外交谈判解决核问题，以维护世界的和平与稳定。呼吁中东地区所有国家无一例外地加入核不扩散条约，使中东成为无核武器区，支持尽快实现此目标的国际努力。承认所有《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国在严格履行相应的国际义务和承诺前提下享有和平利用核能的权利。

11—谴责一切形式的恐怖主义，反对将恐怖主义与特定的民族、宗教挂钩。认为反恐必须坚持以《联合国宪章》和其它公认的国际法和国际关系准则为基础，坚持联

联合国及其安理会的主导与协调作用，反对双重标准。继续加强在双边领域和联合国等国际组织内的反恐合作。呼吁各方尽快完成“全面反恐公约”的谈判。

12—同意加强在联合国等国际组织框架内的对话与合作，推动多边主义原则，维护联合国的权威和在国际事务中的主导作用。支持联合国通过必要、合理的改革，增强权威和效率，提高应对各类威胁和挑战的能力，更好地履行《联合国宪章》赋予的职责。支持安理会为维护国际和平与安全发挥首要职责，安理会改革应优先增加包括阿拉伯国家在内的广大发展中国家代表性，通过广泛、民主讨论，就各类问题找到“一揽子”解决方案，并达成协商一致。双方反对任何国家强行推动改革方案。

13—呼吁改革国际经济、金融机构治理结构，反映世界经济格局的变化，更好地应对全球经济、金融领域的挑战。改革的重点是增加包括中国和阿拉伯国家在内的新兴市场和发展中国家的发言权和代表性。继续加强宏观经济金融政策协调，推进国际金融体系改革，完善全球经济治理机制，抵制各种形式的保护主义，给予发展问题更多关注，为世界经济全面复苏作出贡献。

14—呼吁国际社会共同努力，应对气候变化的严峻挑战。强调《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《京都议定书》是应对气候变化国际谈判与合作的主渠道，重申对《公约》和《议定书》确立的目标、原则的承诺。重申支持《公约》和《议定书》两特设工作组谈判在哥本哈根会议已取得成果的基础上，继续推进“巴厘路线图”谈判，并于2010年《公约》第十六次缔约方会议和《议定书》第六次缔约方会议上达成进一步的安排，促进《公约》和《议定书》全面、有效和持续实施。双方应在有关谈判进程中继续加强沟通和协调，坚持“共同但有区别”原则，维护发展中国家的共同利益。

15—促进不同文明间的对话，增进各国人民间的相互理解；尊重各国人民的文化特性，以平等、相互尊重和包容的精神兼容并蓄，交流互鉴；积极参与旨在加强不同文明、文化、宗教间对话的地区和国际倡议。为此双方支持沙特阿拉伯王国国王陛下关于不同宗教和文明之间开展对话的倡议，认为这有助于在不同宗教和文明之间架起沟通的桥梁，也有助于遏止极端思想的传播，加强不同宗教和文明之间的相互包容和对话。

二、经贸和发展领域

16—积极扩大中阿贸易规模，规范贸易秩序，提升贸易水平。按照双方现行体制，根据有关国际法准则，推动包括涉及双方倾销案件在内的贸易争端的解决。

17—积极拓展投资合作领域。改善投资环境，鼓励双方企业进行投资，发挥双方资金、技术、人才、市场的互补优势。强调根据双方现行的协议和法律保障投资者的权益。

18—共同推动核能、风能、太阳能等清洁能源、新能源和可再生能源的开发和利用，为双方相关企业开展合作创造有利的环境。

19—加强在石油和天然气领域的合作，实现共赢，一方面为中国的经济社会发展提供必要的能源，另一方面为阿拉伯国家的石油和天然气提供稳定的市场。

20—加强基础设施建设合作，规范和促进双边劳务合作，根据双方现行法律保障劳务人员合法权益。

21—扩大人力资源开发领域的合作，扩大培训规模，创新培训方式，拓宽培训领域。

22—本着互利、互让的精神，继续推动中国与海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会自贸区谈判进程，争取尽早达成协议。

23—继续加强海关双边交流与合作，中方愿与阿盟开展货物贸易统计领域的技术合作。

24—鼓励双方在符合各国相关法律规定条件下开展金融领域的互利合作。鼓励双方金融机构共同为双方投资、承包工程项目和贸易提供金融支持和便利。

25—促进双方在共同感兴趣的领域开展多种形式的科技合作与交流。

26—加强在环保、防治荒漠化等领域的合作与对话，应对人类在此领域面临的严重挑战；支持联合国在推动全球环保和可持续发展方面发挥重要作用。

27—阿拉伯国家欢迎中国举办 2010 年上海世博会，希望此项重要活动有助于增进中国同阿拉伯国家在内的世界各国人民之间的友谊与交流。

三、开展人文交流和文明对话

28—鼓励双方研究机构、大学和教育机构在教育、科研、学术交流等领域的合作，包括双方进行汉语、阿拉伯语教学。

29—鼓励和支持中阿文化机构进行官方和民间的交流项目，利用信息通讯技术保护文化遗产及整理、出版文化作品，重视从文化上的相互借鉴，实现共同发展。

30—继续完善双方定期轮流举办艺术节的机制。

31—鼓励中阿双方互设文化中心，并就此相互提供便利。探讨在中国举办阿拉伯文化年在和阿拉伯国家举办中国文化年的可行性。

32—支持中阿友好组织和民间团体加强各领域的交流与合作，加深双方人民相互了解和友谊。

33—欢迎联合国大会通过突尼斯共和国总统宰因·阿比丁·本·阿里总统提出的将 2010 年作为世界青年年的倡议，呼吁阿拉伯国家和中国积极参与由联合国主办的世界青年大会，并通过举办各种国家和地区层面的活动为庆祝世界青年年做出贡献。

34—密切双方新闻、出版领域的合作，通过各种大众传媒（电视、报刊、广播）

增进中阿人民的相互了解和友谊。

四、加强“中阿合作论坛”建设

35—加强协调与合作，共同努力落实论坛公报和行动执行计划所确定的原则及目标，为双方人民创造更多的共同发展实惠。

36—坚持创新，不断充实中阿合作内涵，完善论坛机制，探索符合双方实际及中阿双边关系特点的论坛建设模式。

37—支持论坛与双方各自参与的其他区域或多边合作机制建立横向联系，拓宽共同合作空间。

38—对中华人民共和国承办论坛第四届部长级会议表示感谢和赞赏，对 2012 年在突尼斯举行论坛第五届部长级会议及 2011 年在阿拉伯国家或阿盟秘书处举行论坛第八次高官会表示欢迎。

本公报于二〇一〇年五月十四日在中华人民共和国天津市签订，一式两份，每份均用中文和阿拉伯文写成，两种文本同等作准。

中华人民共和国政府代表

阿拉伯国家联盟代表

杨洁篪

阿姆鲁·穆萨

中华人民共和国外交部长

阿拉伯国家联盟秘书长

附录三：

中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛 2010 年至 2012 年行动执行计划^①

2010 年 5 月 13—14 日 天津

中华人民共和国和阿拉伯国家联盟成员国（以下简称“双方”），满意地回顾了“中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛”（以下简称“论坛”）成立以来为巩固中国与阿拉伯国家传统友好、深化双方政治互信，促进对话与合作，提升中阿关系整体水平所作出的积极贡献。

双方高度评价《中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛第三届部长级会议公报》和《中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛 2008 年至 2010 年行动执行计划》的落实情况，赞赏论坛框架下第六、七次高官会、第三届企业家大会暨首届投资研讨会、第三届中阿关系暨中阿文明对话研讨会、首届中国艺术节、第二届中阿友好大会、首届中阿高教与科研合作研讨会、第二届中阿能源合作大会、第二届中阿新闻合作论坛在推动中阿关系方面所取得的积极成果，强调应继续落实上述“公报”和“执行计划”的宗旨和要求，并执行论坛第四届部长级会议通过的文件。

双方同意，为全面落实上述文件，不断提升中阿友好合作关系水平，特制定《中阿合作论坛 2010 年至 2012 年行动执行计划》，具体如下：

第一条 论坛机制

双方强调论坛部长级会议机制、高官委员会机制、其他各领域合作机制和日常联络机制对于论坛建设的必要性和重要性，高度赞赏上述机制对于论坛建设所作出的贡献。

双方欢迎论坛第五届部长级会议于 2012 年在突尼斯举行，论坛第八次高官会于

^① 中华人民共和国外交部亚非司编：《“中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛”文件汇编》，世界知识出版社，2010 年版，第 62--72 页。

2011 年在阿拉伯国家或阿盟秘书处举行。

第二条 政治合作

双方重申坚持《中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛宣言》和《中国—阿拉伯国家合作论坛行动计划》所阐述的原则立场，强调进一步加强政治合作的重要性。双方支持在论坛框架内建立全面合作、共同发展的中阿战略合作关系，在各自关切的核心和重大利益问题上相互支持，开展战略对话和磋商，共同维护发展中国家的利益，促进世界和平与稳定。

为此，双方同意继续加强现有的政治磋商和联络机制，特别是在论坛高官会框架下的政治磋商机制，就双方关系和共同关心的国际和地区问题进行磋商，磋商议题由中国外交部和阿盟秘书处于会前商定。必要时经双方同意可随时举行高官会进行政治磋商。

双方强调，应加强在包括联合国等国际组织的立场协调。

第三条 经贸合作

双方对近年来中阿经贸合作取得的进展表示满意，高度评价 2009 年 4 月在中国杭州举办的第三届中阿企业家大会暨首届投资研讨会取得的积极成果，双方同意：

（一）继续举办贸易和投资促进活动，积极参加在对方举办的展览会、投资贸易洽谈会等活动，鼓励相互投资，介绍双方经济城市的投资机会、投资法律法规和优惠政策，制定投资信息交流机制，密切双方企业家的面对面交流，举行贸易与投资促进专题研讨会，加强在支持中小企业发展方面的合作。

（二）继续为双方人员往来提供便利。根据各国现行法律为对方人员办理入境签证、工作证、居留证等手续提供便利。

（三）探讨签署双边基础设施建设合作协定、劳务合作协定，为规范和扩大上述领域合作制定法律框架。

（四）通过双方有关部门、行业协会和企业等渠道，加强经验交流，在项目设计、沙漠治理等实用技术领域开展技术合作。

（五）加强中阿政府部门间的质检合作，推进双边合作研究和能力建设项目，确保相互进出口产品质量安全，保护双方消费者健康，促进双边贸易健康发展。

（六）研究建立阿拉伯国家与中国贸易争端解决机制。

（七）继续加强双边海关交流与合作，中方愿与阿盟开展货物贸易统计领域的技术交流与合作。

（八）加强阿拉伯国家和中国的银行合作，为双方贸易往来提供资金和便利。

（九）双方在国际经贸场合协调立场。

（十）积极筹备 2011 年在巴林举行的中阿合作论坛第四届企业家大会暨第二届投资研讨会，此会由巴林工商会主办。

（十一）为鼓励阿拉伯国家对华推介优质产品，中方积极考虑在中国上海五角世贸商城设立“阿拉伯国家产品展销中心”。

第四条 能源合作

双方高度评价 2010 年 1 月在苏丹首都喀土穆举行的第二届中国—阿拉伯能源合作大会取得的成果及会上签署的《中国国家能源局和阿拉伯国家联盟关于中阿能源合作机制的谅解备忘录》等文件，决心积极落实文件的宗旨和要求，并欢迎于 2012 年在中国召开第三届中阿能源合作大会，双方同意：

（一）继续加强能源领域的合作，特别是在互利基础上开展石油、天然气、电力、新能源、可再生能源和替代能源领域的合作。双方支持在上述领域的相互投资，愿为上述领域的共同项目提供便利，并进行在能源及能源相关项目的环保等领域的经验交流和技术转让。

（二）开展包括核能发电和核能海水淡化在内的和平利用核能领域的合作。

（三）根据 2010 年 1 月在喀土穆举办的第二届中国—阿拉伯能源合作大会签署的谅解备忘录，双方成立最高委员会，负责提早进行下届会议的筹备工作。

（四）在风能、太阳能利用方面开展交流合作，为双方企业合作创造有利的环境，共同推动可再生能源开发利用。

（五）双方共同努力跟踪第二届中国—阿拉伯能源合作大会后续行动落实情况。

第五条 环境保护合作

双方对《中华人民共和国政府与阿拉伯国家联盟环境保护合作联合公报执行计划（2008—2009 年度）》的执行情况及 2008 年 6 月在北京举办的阿拉伯国家环境管理高级研修班情况感到满意，双方同意：

（一）继续加强中阿环境保护合作机制，由中国环境保护部和阿盟秘书处、阿拉伯国家环境部长理事会负责协调工作。

（二）在中阿环境保护合作机制下交流有关环境保护政策和立法经验，继续开展人员培训，推广与环境保护和废弃物处理有关的技术和产品，在灾害早期预警与应对方面交换信息与经验，并在有关国际和地区组织中保持协调。强调中阿双方相关部门均应在资金和人力支持上予以保障，落实中阿环保合作，促进洁净和环境友好型技术转让领域的应用科学研究。

（三）支持适应气候变化合作，推动自然灾害和突发事件防控机制建设，包括监测机制、灾害早期预警与应对技术，发展并更新环境措施标准。

第六条 林业合作

双方强调愿意促进在防治荒漠化和水管理方面的交流与合作，鼓励专家和管理人员互访，交流防治荒漠化项目方面的经验，包括在荒漠地区实施防治荒漠化发展项目，学习中国企业荒漠化土地改良经验，监督该领域的执法情况等。中方愿参与阿拉伯国家生态恢复项目建设，在阿拉伯国家建立防治荒漠化试验示范区，帮助阿拉伯国家建立以公路、铁路交通防护体系，绿洲聚居区综合防治模式为主的防沙治沙体系。

第七条 农业合作

（一）双方愿加强在农业和粮食安全领域的合作，鼓励双方农业科技人员和管理人员加强交流，增加信息沟通。

（二）鼓励双方有意愿、有实力的农业企业开展经贸合作，促进双方农产品贸易发展，为双方农产品进入对方市场提供便利。

第八条 旅游合作

双方对近年来旅游合作取得的进展表示满意，强调：

（一）愿继续拓展这一领域的合作，包括鼓励双方旅游部门和旅行社间的交流，开展宾馆评级与培训领域从业人员及专家间的互访和经验交流，举办旅游推介会、旅游研讨会，并为此提供信息和必要便利，鼓励双方公司实施旅游、投资项目，并根据双方现行法律为此提供便利。

（二）中方欢迎尚未列为中国公民组团出境旅游目的地的阿拉伯国家提出申请，并予以积极研究。

（三）中方欢迎阿拉伯国家继续加强在中国市场的旅游推介。

（四）鼓励中国各旅行社进一步在亚洲市场推介阿拉伯旅游产品。

（五）中方欢迎在 2010 年 6 月第一周上海世博会期间举办突尼斯旅游周。

第九条 人力资源开发合作

（一）双方对近年来人力资源开发领域的合作表示满意，愿继续加强人力资源开发合作。

（二）中方将于 2010 年至 2012 年三年内，在同各阿拉伯国家外交部协调的基础上，在双方商定的领域内，每年为阿拉伯国家培训 1000 名各类人才。

第十条 文化合作和文明对话

双方高度评价 2006 年和 2008 年分别在中国和叙利亚成功举办的阿拉伯艺术节和中国艺术节活动，并达成以下共识：

（一）继续完善中阿互办艺术节机制，每两年分别在中国和阿拉伯国家轮流举办阿拉伯艺术节和中国艺术节，由中国文化部、阿拉伯国家联盟秘书处和阿拉伯国家文化部门合作实施。双方一致同意共同倾力办好 2010 年即将在北京和上海举办的第二届阿拉伯艺术节。

（二）继续发展和增进双边和多边文化交流与合作，举办展览、文艺演出、文化日和文化周等文化活动，促进双方人民的相互了解和友谊。双方鼓励中国文化部、阿拉伯国家文化部以及文化机构之间开展交流与合作。

（三）中方将实施“阿拉伯国家文化人力资源培训计划”，每期有计划地邀请阿盟各成员国文化艺术管理领域的 1—2 人来华参加文化领域的研修班。

（四）呼吁中阿艺术家开展互访，支持双方艺术家参加对方举办的国际性艺术展览和比赛，促进中阿艺术领域的交流与合作。

（五）研究组织中阿文化机构负责人互访，实地考察了解中国和阿拉伯国家在文化建设方面的成果，与对方同行交流切磋，增进相互交流。

（六）鼓励各自民间文化机构、文化艺术领域的公司通过市场机制参与中阿文化交流，推介各自文化产品，深化双方的文化交流与合作。

（七）研究中国对阿拉伯文化的影响和阿拉伯人对中国文化的影响，突出表现中阿文明的相互影响，重视在对方开设文化中心。

（八）在中阿文化机构间建立对口友好关系。

（九）双方积极评价 2009 年 5 月在突尼斯共和国首都突尼斯市召开的第三届中阿关系暨中阿文明对话研讨会取得的成果。双方同意努力创造条件落实研讨会最终报告中提及的有关活动和计划，并由双方有关主管官员组成的工作小组积极落实以下建议：

（1）鼓励用各自语言介绍、翻译、出版对方的优秀文学作品和其他书籍。

（2）继续制定利用先进信息技术将传统文化典籍电子化的行动计划。

（3）继续推动在互联网上建立中—阿电子图书馆，提供有关双方各方面的信息。

（4）继续推动双方文化组织和机构（作家、出版家协会和图书馆等）开展合作。

（5）继续在考古发掘、研究和交流方面开展合作，交流在文化遗产保护和修复、博物馆管理、馆展艺术和博物馆文化活动等方面的经验，开展文物专家、博物馆馆长及文物修复专家之间的互访，交换文物资料、印刷品和纪录片，相互参加对方组织的

文物方面的学术会议，交流在非物质文化遗产保护技术方面的经验，继续推动双方在《1970 年 UNESCO 公约》框架下商签有关文化遗产保护的双边协定。

(6) 积极筹办好将于 2011 年在阿拉伯联合酋长国举行的第四届中阿关系暨中阿文明对话研讨会。

(7) 双方建议建立联合后续机制，在每届部长级会议后定期召开会议，按照论坛行动执行计划要求，主持制定文化项目和活动的执行计划。

第十一条 教育合作

双方积极评价 2008 年 11 月在中国扬州召开的“中阿（10+1）高教合作研讨会”和 2009 年 11 月在苏丹喀土穆召开的首届中阿高教与科研合作研讨会取得的成果，并强调：

（一）继续完善中阿轮流举办高教科研合作研讨会机制，充分利用各自教育经验和资源，加强教育交流和合作，鼓励中阿教育机构，特别是高等院校建立联系，开展联合科研，促进人员往来和学术交流。

（二）积极落实已签订的教育合作协定，逐步增加政府奖学金名额，扩大研究生比例，拓展专业领域。

（三）大力推广中国的阿拉伯语教学和阿拉伯国家的汉语教学，增加双方汉语和阿语教学中心和院校的数量。

（四）加强在技术院校和职业培训中心领域的合作与经验交流，鼓励双方该领域官员互访，支持职业技术教育领域的前沿计划和项目。

第十二条 科技合作

双方强调：

（一）继续促进和加强中阿政府科技部门、科研机构、大学、科技型企业间的科技合作与交流。

（二）中方将根据不同阿拉伯国家的特点和需求，选择双方共同感兴趣的领域，开

展人员交流、联合研究、示范推广、人才培养、技术转让等多种形式的合作。

（三）中方愿邀请阿拉伯发展中国家科技人员参与中国科技部每年举办的“对发展中国家技术培训班”。

（四）继续深化现有双边政府间科技合作机制，指导和规范双边科技合作与交流。致力于建立双方科技合作机制，落实机制成果。

第十三条 医疗卫生合作

双方强调：

（一）加强双方在医学和医疗培训方面的合作与交流。

（二）促进双方在新发传染病疫情信息通报和防控经验方面的相互交流。

（三）促进在传统医学领域的医疗、教育、科研、生产和传统医药人才培养等方面的合作；加强双方在医疗管理和临床技术方面的合作与交流。

（四）加强在社会保障体系方面的合作。

第十四条 新闻出版合作

双方对 2010 年 5 月在巴林举办的第二届中阿新闻合作论坛成果表示满意，并强调：

（一）根据需要不定期召开媒体圆桌会议或研讨会，时间及地点由双方协商确定。

（二）积极推动双方新闻机构之间在新闻、出版领域的合作，鼓励双方大众传媒领域人员通过互访、参加有关国际展览和会议的方式加强交流，为对方派驻记者采写新闻报道和开展工作提供协助和便利。

（三）鼓励双方定期交换音像和文字新闻素材和节目，互派代表团参加对方举办的各种媒体展览和研讨会。

（四）欢迎中国中央电视台阿拉伯语频道开播，将积极推动该频道在阿拉伯地区落地播出。强调应加强广播、电视台在工程技术、职业技能和语言能力方面的合作，包括中方向阿方提供翻译成阿拉伯语的中国影视剧以及介绍中国电影和电影史的文化节目；组织双方平面和视听媒体技术负责人之间进行面对面交流；便利双方新闻团交流互访，制作介绍对方文明、文化和发展等各方面情况的节目；便利双方有关新闻媒体交换文化历史等方面的文献档案和照片。

（五）研究每年举办一次媒体展览会，论坛成员国音像制品公司交流经验，推介其产品。组建一个联合委员会，负责展会的组织工作。举办技术人员和从业人员培训班，具体培训内容由双方有关新闻机构商定。研究关于开办阿拉伯国家中文频道的建议。

（六）双方赞赏 2009 年 5 月于突尼斯举办的第三届中阿关系暨中阿文明对话研讨会期间举办的“阿拉伯著作中文译著展”，强调将共同启动并实施“中阿典籍互译出版工程”。

（七）鼓励和支持各自出版机构参加在对方举办的国际书展活动。

第十五条 立法机构和民间合作

（一）双方肯定立法机构和民间组织交往对促进中阿友好所发挥的作用，愿意进一步加强双方立法机构和民间组织间多层次和多形式的交流与合作，推动中阿友好关系的全面发展。

（二）双方肯定中国阿拉伯友好协会、阿拉伯国家对华友好协会联合会及阿拉伯各国友好组织为促进中阿友好发挥的作用。双方愿进一步完善中国阿拉伯友好大会机制，向中阿各友好组织提供更多的支持。积极支持 2010 年在大阿拉伯利比亚人民社会主义民众国举行第三届中阿友好大会，推动中阿民间合作不断深入发展。

（三）双方积极鼓励开展青年、妇女、民间组织间及其他与发展中阿合作有关的机构间的友好往来与合作。

第十六条 其他领域合作

双方将根据论坛行动计划规定以及论坛部长级会议通过的其他文件，积极落实其

他领域合作事宜，并推动建立其他领域的合作机制。

第十七条 生效及有效期

本执行计划自签字之日起生效，有效期两年版。

本执行计划于二〇一〇年五月十四日在中华人民共和国天津市签订，一式两份，每份均用中文和阿拉伯文写成，两种文本同等作准。

中华人民共和国政府代表

阿拉伯国家联盟代表

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- THE STUDY OF OMANI-SINO RELATIONS -

Abdullah Saleh Al Saadi

Beijing, 2012

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1. Introduction

1.1 Focus, purpose and significance of the study

This doctoral dissertation focuses on the relations between Oman and China, both of which are most important and influential states in today's international system and the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. Put it in detail, the doctoral dissertation identifies and explores the relations between Oman and China and the significance of two countries' contact from Han Dynastry to present. Such an analysis is critical to understand historical communication between the two countries, especially China's foreign policy and policy maker in Oman, even in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, to explain and even predict China's behaviour towards the region. Besides, the paper also aims at filling the gap in the study of the relations between Oman and China while most of the current works on the relations between Oman and China deals with this area as part of the bigger picture of China's relations with either the Arab world or the Middle East with no other works giving comprehensive study of the issues of Oman and China until now. Thus this dissertation is the first attempt at exploring China's political, economic, and social interactions with Oman in a multi-level and comprehensive way. This doctoral dissertation aims to overcome the shortcomings pertaining to the study of the relations between Oman and China of this

area. Instead, it focuses on studying China's relations with Oman. Abidi's study^①, for example, focuses on China's relations with Iran, leaving only a part of his study to the discussion of China's relations with other Gulf countries. Other studies such as Yitzhak Shichor's^②, John Calabrese's^③, and Lillian Craig Harris's^④ study on China's foreign relations with the countries of the region in the context of China's foreign relation with the rest of the Middle East. Issue such as China's relations with Egypt and China's policy on the Palestine question are treated, along with China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, as the key issues in shaping China's foreign policy towards the countries of the Gulf and Arabian peninsula region.

This doctoral dissertation, however, is an attempt to provide the first comprehensive study of China's relations with Oman from past to present.

1.2 The theoretical implication and policy significance of the dissertation

Why study the relations between Oman and China?

On the one hand, from the theoretical implication, the dissertation will apply international theory (realistic theory, Constructivism), historic theory (transculturalism and communication theory) to probe the relations between Oman

^① A.H.H.Abidi, *China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf*, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982.

^② Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's Foreign policy 1949-1977*, Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1979.

^③ John Calabrese, *China's Changing Relations with the Middle East*, New York: Pinter, 1991.

^④ Lillian Craig Harris, *China Considers the Middle East*, New York: I.B.Tauris, 1993.

and China.

On the other hand, the dissertation also has a policy significance. Because both Oman and China are very important countries in world history and play a significant role on the world stage. It can be helpful to keep good relations between Oman and China that making a thorough inquiry of this question.

China's economic and strategic weight, at both the global and regional level, forms one of the most prominent elements in today's international politics. China's importance reflects two significant factors: the first is the sustained growth of the Chinese economy since 1979 and its implications for China's long-term economic and strategic power; the second is the increasing political muscle and military capability of China and its continued transfer of advanced military technology to many parts of the world.

Since 1979, China has embarked upon one of the most successful economic modernization programmes in the world. A programme that earned China a 9.3 percent average annual growth rate of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1979 and 1993, and 11.8 percent in 1994 and 9.8 percent in 1996. Such growth was one of the highest in the world, particularly because the rest of the world experienced an average growth rate of just 2.6 percent for the same period. China's GDP increased 3.76-fold in just 15 years.^① The World Bank has estimated that China's economic output will reach \$10 trillion by the middle of the twenty-first century. Today, China's dynamic economy attracts more foreign investments than any other country in the

^① Fei-Ling Wang 'To incorporate China: A Policy for a new era', *The Global and Mail* 21(1)(Winter).68, 1998:68

world, except the United States. The implications of the strong Chinese economy are said to be important for regional security. Gary Klintworth^① argues that the strong Chinese economy gives China a lucrative interest in the preservation of regional stability, which may account for Beijing's contribution to resolving Cambodia's civil war.^② Stuart Harris^③ indicates that the world wants a strong Chinese economy to prevent the dangers of internal instability and to deepen its participation in the world economy, potentially making China a more responsible international actor and a lucrative economic partner with its neighbours. Harris, however, argues that a strong economy could also provide China with the basis for immense political power, which Beijing may use to force its own interests upon its neighbours.^④ In either case, China's regional and global significance will be enhanced as the Chinese economy continues to grow in an impressive manner.

However, it is not only economic modernization but also China's increasing military capabilities and its continuing political and military cooperation with many countries in the world that have created an important role for China in today's international system. China is both a nuclear power and a power possessing some of the world's most advanced military technologies and owning military dominance over

^① Gary Klintworth, 'China's evolving relationship with APEC,' *International Journal* 50(3)(Summer), 488, 1995.

^② Gary Klintworth, 'China's evolving relationship with APEC,' *International Journal* 50(3)(Summer), 488, 1995, p.488.

^③ Stuart Harris, 'The economic aspects of security in the Asia-Pacific region', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18(3)(September), 37, 1995.

^④ Stuart Harris, 'The economic aspects of security in the Asia-Pacific region', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18(3)(September), 37, 1995, p.37.

many of its Asian neighbours. It is working to enhance and increase its military capabilities by developing a modern tactical airforce and much more accurate ballistic and cruise missiles. Such an increase in China's military capabilities has been coupled with a rise in China's military technology exports to many parts of the world including the Middle East. China has emerged as one of the world's major suppliers of military hardware. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, China has become the sixth leading suppliers of major conventional weapons in the 1990s. The value of China's military exports was around US\$4357 million between 1992 and 1996. China sees its military cooperation with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran etc. (some of the Middle Eastern countries that China has provided with military technology), as both a source of hard currency and an opportunity for Beijing policy to score some political and strategic points.

China's geography, population, and political weight in the international arena have also contributed to increasing China's role in the international system. China is a vast country of 9.6 million square kilometres, next only to Russia and Canada in size. Its land borders total 22800 kilometres and bound fifteen different countries. Across the sea to the east and the south-east are South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia. China is the world's most populous nation, where over 1.4 billion people, 23 percent of the world's population are living. It is predicted that China's population will reach 1.63 billion by the year 2030.^①

Oman also has a profound cultural history and is one of the great nations in Gulf

^① L.R.Brown, *Who Will Feed China?* New York: W.W.Norton, 1995.

and Arabian Peninsula region as well as the whole world. From ancient times it has maintained strong ties with other civilizations, which is an important station on the old East-West Silk Routs, and a flourishing Indian Ocean commercial and Maritime centre right up until the end of the 19th century. Throughout the history, Oman enjoyed the cordial relation with several major world powers and through its pivotal role in promoting links with other peoples and civilizations has been an active player in the Gulf, the Arab region and the wider world.

When Oman embarked upon its modern Renaissance in 1970, history had equipped it with all the essential background and elements for a prosperous future. Its leadership had a knowledge and understanding of the world around it, a people who were willing and able to shape their destiny by their own hand, and a vital geographical location that ensured it was able to make a significant and enduring impact on the international scene.

Over the ages, Oman, a country as old as history itself, has made significant contributions to human civilization. It has been an influential maritime and political power, enjoying relations with countries as far-flung as China, the United States, Britain and France; its ambassadors were received with respect in the capitals of those countries centuries ago.

The common thread running through the different eras of Oman's history, and linking its modern Renaissance with its prosperity in former times, is the ability of its modern Renaissance with its prosperity in former times, and also the ability of its leadership to establish national unity and cohesiveness and build a robust economy

based on security and stability in addition to competent, sophisticated political administration.

Historical studies have revealed extensive ties between Oman and the civilizations of the Ancient East including China, India and Mesopotamia, as well as the Eastern Mediterranean, the Nile Valley and North Africa.

Like other nations and peoples with distinctive histories and civilizations, Oman has passed through a succession of different historical periods. By the Middle Ages, the country had established itself as a prosperous seafaring nation sending dhows from its great port at Sohar to trade with merchants in far-flung destinations. However, this success attracted unwelcome attention from the outside world. This “attention” coincided with a period of tribal turbulence in Oman when, from 1154 for a period of more than four and a half centuries, the Bani Nabhan ruled the central area of the country intermittently.

Over the past two hundred and fifty years, the Al Busaid state founded by Imam Ahmed bin Said in 1744, of which Sultan Qaboos bin Said is a descendant, has succeeded in making Oman the powerful and influential state we know today. However, the path to prosperity has not always run smoothly. There have been some periods of weakness, isolation and internal conflict which, for various domestic, regional and international reasons, led the country to turn in on itself and become cut off from the outside world. Thankfully, this situation came to an end in 1970 when the foundation stones of contemporary 21st century Oman was laid.

Oman enjoys good relations with over 140 countries around the globe and is a

member of over 105 regional and international organisations. Oman also plays an active role on the world stage.

Oman and China are both of importance in the world history and international system. Therefore the study of the relation between Oman and China and two countries' historical interactions and present intercourses is doomed to be great significance. So, this doctoral dissertation's emphasizes the relations between Oman and China and its influence on each other and the impact of the relations between Oman and China on international system and international relations.

1.3 Literature survey home and abroad

1.3.1 Literature survey abroad

So far there is not a wide range of literature examing and analysing different aspects of the relations between Oman and China home and abroad. The literature on China's relations with the Oman tends to study the relations of the Middle East countries and China, the origin and evolution of China's foreign policy towards these countries in the context of China's relations with the superpowers. This rivalry between China and the two superpowers constitutes the basis background for the literature studying on China's relations with the countries of the Middle East. So far, there are not literature about the relations between Oman and China past and present.

Yitzhak Shichor^①, who is an executive director of the Harry S. Truman Research

^① See Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge

Institute, and a lecturer of the department of East Asian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is the first scholar to study in depth China's relations with the countries of the Middle East (including Oman).

His study discusses the evolution of China's foreign policy towards the Middle East in its first thirty-eight years' development. Shichor's basic assumption is that the Middle East had always been important to China "as a part of the general historical development of the world which affects and involved China's interests." Shichor asserts that China's policy towards the Middle East had been a reflection of China's own perception of its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union and both superpowers' relations with each other. His division of his work to five subjects illustrates that China's policy towards the Middle East from 1949 to 1977 reflected China's relations with both the great powers. He argues in his first chapter that the origin of communist China's Middle East policy can be found in the early 1940s, long before the Bandung Conference or the establishment of the PRC.

In his view, Chinese communist leaders realized in the early 1940s the strategic importance of the Middle East to the country's future. They believed that the domination of the Middle East by a hostile power, like Germany, would lead to the collapse of the British presence there, which would clear the way for the new dominant power to seek domination in Asia and therefore China. However, China remained isolated politically from the region. Despite Israel's recognition of the PRC in the early 1950s, diplomatic relations were not established between them.

University press, 1979.

Shichor contributes the absence of diplomatic relations between China and Israel at that time to the Israeli government's refusal to foster diplomatic relations with China. He, however, does not give a clear explanations as to why the new-established communist regime in China. His only explanation is directed towards the following Israeli official response: "the government had decided in principle to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, but nothing should be done in this direction until the situation in the Far East becomes clear".^①

China's relation with the Arab countries in the mid-1950s began to draw more positive results, however. Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, economic and cultural relations were China's first tactic towards fostering relations with countries of the Middle East. This was coupled with China's playing an important indirect role in producing the first major arms deal between Moscow and Cairo in 1955.^② In May 1956, Egypt became the first Middle Eastern country to establish diplomatic relations with China. Cairo's decision was said to be directed by Nasser's belief that China could play the role of an independent source of arms. Syria and Yemen followed suit in July and August 1956 respectively. Shichor sees China's policy towards the Middle East in the late 1950s as being directed towards the struggle against Western imperialism and to undermine its presence in the region. China's foreign policy became more militant. But, as China's ideological rhetoric found little sympathy in

^① See Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979, p.23.

^② See Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979, pp.41-42.

the Arab World, China turned to support the “people’s war” in the most revolutionary areas of the Middle East.^①

But, as China’s relations with the Soviet Union began to seriously deteriorate in the 1960s, China used the Middle East to wage its struggle against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. Shichor says that China in the first half of the 1960s did almost everything it could to please the Arab government in order to get rid of the American and the Soviet influence there. China, however, did not succeed. From 1966 onwards, China’s foreign policy became more oriented towards national liberation movements that were still committed to the struggle against imperialism and, by implication, against Soviet revisionism as well. According to Shichor, China’s perception of the Middle East changed in the 1970s as its perception of its relations with Washington and Moscow changed. China became more pragmatic in its relations with the countries of the Middle East, supporting most of their policies and abolishing its revolutionary propaganda.^②

Like Shichor, John Calabrese^③ has produced an insightful book on China-Middle East relations. His *China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East* has mapped the changes and continuities in the first forty years of China’s relations with the Middle East (including Oman). Calabrese sees China’s Middle East policy as reflecting the changes and shifts in Chinese foreign policy as a whole. Calabrese’s

^① Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China’s foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979, p.79.

^② Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China’s foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979, pp.145-188.

^③ John Calabrese, *China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East*, New York: pinter, 1991.

discussion echoes Shichor's central thesis that China's Middle East policy can best be understood as a reaction to global events that were dominately by the superpowers, rather than to indigenous conflicts in the region. The book provides analysis of China's changing perceptions of, and relations with Egypt, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Israel, and the PLO. Calabrese explores these relations in a chronological narrative format, describing China's foreign policy towards the Middle East in seven different development phase.

Phase I is China's leaning to one side policy of 1950-1957. China's policy toward the region in this phase, according to Calabrese, was determined by China's hostility towards the United States and its strategic alignment with the Soviet Union. Therefore, China adopted a "tactically flexible approach" in its relations with the countries of the Middle East (including Oman) in this phase. The most notable feature of this approach was the adoption of a more flexible and pragmatic tone, instead of showing a more ideological rigidity, during the Bandung meetings.^①

In Phase 2, one becomes aware of the cost of militancy in China's Middle East policy from 1958 to 1965. Calabrese argues that China's dispute with the Soviet Union over the later 'weak' responses to Western intervention in the Middle East, namely in Lebanon and Jordan, during that period generated divergence between Beijing's and Moscow's policies in the region. While relations with Egypt stumbled upon difficulties, China moved to foster closer ties with the new-established regime of Qasim in Iraq. But relations did not last long and China once again found itself

^① John Calabrese, *China's Changing Relations with the Middle East*, New York: pinter, 1991, pp.7-14.

isolated, except in its relations with the Palestinians, by advocating struggle against imperialism in the region. Calabrese concludes that China during this period did not achieve its goal of reducing Western predominance in the region.

In phase 3 (1966-1968), China's foreign policy toward the region changes from advocating a united front to the liberation and revolutionary movements of the region, mainly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Dhofari rebels. He concludes that China was successful in building credit among them that could pay future dividends in the event to their victory; but, on the other hand, China failed to achieve a lasting influence in its relations with the PLO, and it further worsened its relations with the governments of the region.

In Phase 4 (1969-1971), he finds that China's perception of the Soviet threat to the region prompted China to begin adopting a more pragmatic foreign policy in its relations with the countries of the Middle East.

In Phase 5 (1972-1977), the new pragmatic foreign policy reaches its peak. During this period, China classified the Soviet Union as China's primary enemy. China believed that the balance between Washington and Moscow was in Moscow's favour. Therefore, China pushed for closer ties with Washington and the governments of the region.

In Phase 6 (1978-1981), modernization became the central objective of Chinese foreign policy and international stability became the essential prerequisite for its successful pursuit. For its oil and markets, the Middle East was part of China's modernization efforts.

In the last phase (1982-1989), Calabrese indicates that China's foreign policy in the Middle East was shaped by its general aim of carving an independent foreign policy, which meant paying close attention to the superpower rivalry without close alignment with them. China's main aim in the region in this phase was to compete with the Soviet Union for market and political influence. China's foreign policy concentrated its efforts on promoting and protecting its political and economic relations with the countries of the region. Calabrese's work is very useful for it provides a clear analysis of China-Middle East relations in the first forty years of interactions.

Calabrese's study, however, lacks details about many aspects of China's foreign policy towards the Middle East. Take, for example, the Front Liberation National of Algeria (FLNA), China supported the FLNA in its struggle for liberation from France. It also, unlike Moscow, recognized the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria in September 1958, and criticized Moscow's support for the French position to achieve a ceasefire in Algeria. By 1960, China provided the Algerians with credit estimated at US\$10 million for the purchase of military equipment and other supplies (Ogunsanwo 1974:52-3). It also provided Algeria with economic assistance worth US\$26.9 million, ranging from donations, loans, and small and large-scale industrial and social construction projects between 1956 and 1977 (Bartke 1989:37). All of this demonstrates that Algeria was an important part of China's foreign policy towards the region. Yet, both Shichor's and Calabrese's works do not discuss in any detail the objectives and implications of China's involvement in Algeria.

On the other hand, Calabrese's last phase could also be used to explain China's relations with the Middle East in the post-Cold War era. China's policy towards the region in the post-Cold War era is driven not by China's rivalry with Washington and Moscow but by China's efforts to increase its economic contacts with the Middle East and to establish political influence there. The Middle East presents China with a potential market for Chinese civilian and military goods. It is also a place where China could cooperate with a country like Israel in developing some advanced military technologies.

Hashim S. H. Behbehani's *China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975* (1981)^① presents three case-based analyses of China's foreign policy towards the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM), Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), and Kuwait. Like Shichor and Calabrese, Behbehani's work illustrates the changes that took place in China's policy towards the Arab world during the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s. These changes were perceived to have been dictated by China's perception of the world, as a whole and its national interest at each stage, and not specifically by the conditions present in the case studies.

His study is the only work that discusses in great detail the evolution and development of China's support for the Palestinian and other revolutionary movements in the Gulf, mainly in Oman, and the different variables involved in the development of China's relations with Kuwait.

Based on these three cases, Behbehani argues that the changes that occurred in

^① Hashim S. H. Behbehani's *China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955—1975*, London: KIP, 1981,

China's policy towards the Arab world in the period from 1955 to 1977 was a result of China's desire to fill a gap and achieve a leadership status in the Third World. Throughout the 1950s, China's foreign policy towards the Arab world followed the Soviet Union's policies in the region. In the 1960s, China began to compete with the Soviet Union for influence in the Third World. China's remedy for the Third World countries was to use armed struggle, which China itself followed in order to achieve independence. The PRM and PFLO provide a great opportunity for China to achieve its political and strategic goals in the region.

According to Behbehani (1980), China provided the two movements with military aid and encouraged a "people's war". But China's changing policy in the early 1970s contributed to the withdrawal of support from the PFLO and directly led to the weakening of the movement. He emphasizes that the changes in China-PFLO relations were not due to the latter's failure on the ground.

The PFLO consistently adhered to Chinese political and ideological lines, but China changed its policy toward gaining a foothold in the Gulf by dealing with existing regimes, which contributed to the abandonment of its support to the PFLO in favour of establishing relations with Iran and Kuwait.

On the other side, China supported the PRM and provided military assistance to Fatah. Yet, Behbehani argues that the changes in China's policy in the 1970s did not lead to the decline in China's support for Fatah. He explains the decline in Chinese interest in the light of improved Soviet-Fatah relations in the 1970s. He makes the point that changes in China's policy towards both the PFLO and Fatah, and the effort

towards improving relations with Kuwait, were brought about by changes in China's foreign policy towards the two superpowers, most specifically by adoption of its anti-Soviet policy.

Lillian Craig Harris' *China Considers the Middle East*^① discusses both traditional and modern Chinese relations with the Middle East, paying particular attention to the historical origins of that relationship. According to Harris, the historical contacts between China and the Middle East extend back two thousand years. China used the Middle East as both a barrier and bridge between it and Europe. Both sides enjoyed commercial benefits from the trade relations that were conducted through the Silk Road. The road also enhanced China's cultural relations with the Middle East. But, Harris argues that the breaching of the barrier between China and Europe by the Mongols, which had led to the European incursion, yielded a decline in China's relations with the Middle East. In the republic era (1912-1949), China's relations with the Middle East were very limited. Trade relations reached their lowest level due to termination of the role that was played by the Silk Road. But, Islam provided the only significant medium of exchange with the Middle East. Harris then turns to discuss China's foreign relations with the Middle East in the post-1949 era.

According to Harris, China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to China's foreign policy interest in the Middle East. Harris argues that Bandung was the opportunity for China to rebuild bridges with the Middle East. It achieved some political gains, but on the whole failed to achieve its goal of

^① Lillian Craig Harris, *China Considers the Middle East*, New York: L.B.Tauris, 1993.

presenting itself as a revolutionary model to the government of the region. Instead, it moved towards supporting armed struggles in Algeria, South Yemen, Eritrea, Dhofar, and Palestine. The continuing deterioration in Chinese-Soviet relations in the 1970s brought China closer to the government of the Middle East than at any of other time previously. China used Islam and trade relations to foster closer ties with the countries of the Middle East. Harris (1993) argues that, in the 1980s, the Middle East had emerged as a major component in China's economic modernization. According to Harris, China's concerns in the post-Cold War era centred on the growing instability in both the Middle East and Central Asia. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait put at risk China's valued economic relations in the region. China, therefore, adopted new foreign policy tactics in order to rebuild closer relations in the region. Strengthening ties with Iran and Pakistan, selling arms to the region, and establishing ties with Israel are some of the new Chinese tactics.

Harris (1993:266) concludes that "China had won out over the Soviets in the Middle East" in the post-Cold War era. She sees China's place in the Middle East and Central Asia to have boosted by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This argument, however, remained unclear. The disintegration of the Soviet Union did elevate China's role in Central Asia. China's efforts to establish ties with the new Central Asian states following the fall of the Soviet empire could be traced to China's hope to fill the power vacuum there. Yet, the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not enhance China's role in the Middle East. For one, Russian military cooperation with the countries of the Middle East and its arms sales in the 1990s were much higher than

those of China. Even Moscow's involvement in the Middle East peace process is more noticeable than Beijing's. Thus, it is not clear how the disintegration of the Soviet Union affected China's position in the Middle East.

Abidi's *China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf*^① is the only work that focuses its attention on the relations between China and the countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. Although much of Abidi's work focuses on Chinese-Iranian relations, China's relation with the other countries of the Gulf are also discussed. Abidi's study identifies the historical, international, and domestic forces that brought China and Iran into a logical partnership.

The work includes informative chapters on Iran's recognition of China in the early 1970s and the relations before and during the Iranian revolution as well as the way the Chinese sought to maintain relations with the Islamic republic. Though not comprehensively, China's relations with Iraq, the Yemens, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain have also been discussed. His justification for his focus on Iran stems from his understanding that Iran claimed more attention from China than any other littoral state of the Gulf. In addition to that, Iran's special position in the Gulf, because of its size, geo-strategic location, resources, and regime orientation, marked its importance in China's foreign policy.

According to Abidi, the 1960s presented China with the first real opportunity to assess its policy in the region. Iran began to reassess its attitude towards China, and Kuwait gained independence. Yet, no breakthrough in the relations between China and

^① A.H.H,Abidi, *China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf*, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982.

the countries of the region emerged in the 1960s. This was mainly due to China's support for the revolutionary movements in the region. But the changes in China's perceptions of the superpowers in the late 1960s and early 1970s led China to foster political, economic, and social relations with Kuwait, Iran, and Oman. In the name of preserving stability in the region and preventing the Soviets from advancing there, China offered recognition unilaterally to Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.

All the above works on Chinese foreign policy towards the Middle East tend to study such relations in terms of the relations between China and the two superpowers. Yet the work edited by P. R. Kumaraswamy^① (1999) discussed China's relations with some of the countries of the Middle East in terms of China's quest for influence rather than challenging the two superpowers. Kumaraswamy's chapter in the book argues that China's recognition of Israel in 1992 was viewed by the Chinese leadership as a stepping stone to Western technology. He also argues that China is hoping that its defence cooperation with both Israel and its adversaries will give it the necessary political influence to play an active role in Middle East politics in the future. Meanwhile, William H. Haddad and Mary Foeldi-Hardy further this argument by indication that China's relations with the Palestinians in the 1990s took a new turn from its old supportive policy of the Palestinians. China's interest in becoming a business partner to all the parties in the Middle East including Israel forced a readjustment in China's calculations about its relations with both the Palestinians and Israel. As a consequence, China has adopted a more neutral position, rather than

^① P. R. Kumaraswamy, *China and the Middle East: the quest for influence*, Sage Publications, 1999.

supporting or leaning towards one side or the other (Haddad and Foeldi-Hardy). John Calabrese's article on China's relations with Iraq briefly reviews the evolution of China-Iraq relations. It concludes that China's policy towards Iraq reflects its overall foreign policy objectives. While rivalry with the two superpowers may have characterized China's policy towards Iraq in the first thirty years of interaction, China's policy towards Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s was a reflection of its modernization programme (Calabrese 1999:52-67).

It is clear from the above that there is a growing body of literature on China's foreign policy towards the Middle East. Yet, there is no detailed study and analysis of the dynamics of relations between Oman and China. With the exception of Abidi, all the others have only made fleeting references to China's relations with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, and then only in the context of the overall discussion of China's Middle Eastern foreign policy. This study hopes to improve the analytical picture somewhat.

1.3.2 Literature survey in China

There are not too many academic achievements on the relationship between Oman and China in China. Some of the relevant achievements are:

The Chapter 12, "The Relationship between the five countries in the Gulf and China" of the *Volume for the Five Countries in the Gulf*^①, which is part of *General*

^① Zhong Zhicheng: *Middle East Five volume General History of the Gulf*, Commercial Press, 2007 edition.

History of the Middle East edited by Professor Peng Shuzhi in the Middle East Studies of the Northwest University, mentions the contact between Oman and China since the Western Han Dynasty, the "Spice Road" on the sea, the outline of their contacts since the Ming and Qing Tang, and the great contributions Oman made to the intercourse between China and the Arabian world. It considers Oman as an important country in the southeast coastal areas of the Arabian Peninsula and one of the countries that knew most about China. Due to its location, Oman was the distributing centre for the goods in the business between the east and the west and an inevitably essential passage for the vessels traveling between the East and the West. It also describes the political, economic and cultural exchanges between Oman and China. The author believes that there were some obstacles in bilateral relations before Oman established diplomatic relations with China. In 1960s, the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman" which received support of some Arab countries, was founded in Dhofar for the armed struggle for anti-imperialist and anti-feudal aims. For international political considerations, China gave it support to some extent. Therefore, policies hostile to China were taken by Omani government. In October, 1971, after China returned to the United Nations, due to China's diplomatic response to the changing international situation, especially when the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman" put forward the "left idea" the liberation of the Gulf, China decided to stop support for the Front in 1972. In 1973, leaders of Oman sounded out to establish diplomatic relations with China through a third country. At that time, with the domestic situation, the government of Oman turned to Iran for help suppress "the

Popular Front for Liberation of Oman", and this caused discontent of Arab countries. Based on the consideration of the overall situation, China held that it was a premature time to establish diplomatic relations with Oman. Later the situation improved in Oman, and Iran announced a withdrawal from Oman, therefore, relations between Oman and Arab countries got better. In May, 1978, the two sides formally established diplomatic relations.

Based on the behavioral sciences and levels of analysis, the doctoral dissertation *Participating in the Middle East Affairs: Theories and Practices of China's Actors*^① written by Wang Meng, who graduated from the Northwest University, emphasizes integrity of history and reality, theory and practice, part and whole, case and synthesis study, universalism and particularity. The author focuses the paper's attention on four respects: firstly, in accordance with the opinion of constructivism, political structure is bringing actors and actors are building political structure; secondly, on the aspect of selecting subjects, China in the 20th century is treated as a whole when it has been participating in the Middle East affairs; thirdly, on the aspect of selecting objects, the paper regards the Islamic country in West Asia, North Africa and Pakistan as a whole, and Greater Middle East in order to provide the advantage of making policies; fourthly, on the paper's structure, all the China's actors participating in the Middle East affairs are analyzed through its functional mode and practices.

The first part of the dissertation mainly discusses the struggle and cooperation on resuming the PRC's legal status in the UN between the People's Republic of China

^① Wang Meng, *Participating in the Middle East Affairs: Theories and Practices of China's Actors*, doctoral dissertation, Northwest University, 2006.

and the Middle East countries. Based itself on former groundwork, the superiorities and limitations of Sino-Middle East Relation multi-lateral diplomacy was summarized as follows: the structural and topical attributes of political supports between China and the Arab countries; the economic relations of Sino-Arab countries from structural contradiction to mutual complementary; the duality of Sino-Arab cultural and religious relations. At the same time, this complex situation was anatomized by dynamics, relevancy, the mechanism of decision-making and implementing tactic.

The second part sub-divides China's actors participating in the Middle East affairs into 9 kinds: state, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs, NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), parties, individual, nations, international political movements, religion and religious organizations. The purpose of this part is to judge the actors' next reaction in similar situation by exploring their success and failure of participating in the Middle East affairs. The emphasis of third part is made up of two cases. The challenge and chance of China's foreign policy after Iraq war is analyzed through Darfur crisis. China and Iran have shared many similarities in social transition, geopolitical development and modernizational impetus during the centenary period from 1905 to 2005, so the case study of Sino-Iran relation tries to draw the outline of China's development of participating in the Middle East affairs.

In the end, the dissertation draws four conclusions. First, participating in the Middle East affairs is a course from quantitative change to qualitative change, with inheritance between different periods, which can't be brushed aside or artificially

dissevered. Second, participating in the Middle East affairs is a course of mutual reacting, whose depth and extent was determined by the interest combination of subjects and objects. Third, as more and more China's actors have been participating in the Middle East affairs, they have been gradually growing up a complex restrictive system between them. Finally, the clashes among different civilizations don't necessarily arise the international relations to conflict or compete, while the relations among them are coexistence in their communications.

Oman is an important country in the Gulf, but academic research relevant to it is few. *Guide to the World States: Oman*^① is a comprehensive book with systematic and informative introduction to the basic national conditions Oman, such as the geography, history, politics, economy, culture, education, social life, and diplomacy. Chapter 7 of the book devotes to relations between Oman and China, and consists of three parts: first, the long history of relations between Oman and China, and it introduces the exchanges between Oman and China during the Han, Tang, Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties (it also noted that trades between Oman and China came into its climax from the the mid-10th century to the first half of the 12th century); second, the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Oman and China; third, the exchanges in multi-levels between Oman and China, and the basic elements of bilateral political, economic and cultural exchanges from 1978 to the present time.

Zhang Junyan's contacts between China and Arab in the Medieval Times - On the

^① Tongfei and Hanzhibin ed, *Guide to the World States: Oman*, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010.

Relationship Between Oman and China^① is one of the early studies on the relationship between Oman and China. This paper mentions the friendly exchanges between Chinese and Arab people from the 2th century B.C. to 17th century A.D., that is, the Han Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty in China. Owing to the limited information that the author knew about the Arab world, it is mainly based on the Chinese materials to make some introduction to the Arab world. The article is arranged into five periods: the first period, the friendly exchanges between Oman and China before the 7th century A.D., mainly before the Tang Dynasty; the second period, the friendly exchanges in 7th to 9th century A.D., including the wars between Tang Empire, some information about the Arabians who did business in China, the spread of Islam into China and of the paper technology to the West, and other exchanges; the third period, the friendly exchanges in 10th to 13th century A.D., including the development of China's shipbuilding and marine technology, the exchanges and the Arabian merchants in the Song and Liao Dynasties; the fourth period, the friendly exchanges in the late 13th century to the 14th century, including the scientific and cultural exchanges and the reasons why large amount of Arabians went to China in the heyday of the traffic between the two in Yuan Dynasty; the fifth period, the friendly exchanges in 15th to 17th century A.D., including the fact that the Ming emperor Zhu Yuanzhang actively developed trades with other countries, so transportations overseas both on the land and sea were advanced and the international exchanges were booming.

^① ZhangJunYan, 1981, *Contacts Between China and Arab in the Medieval Times - On the Relationship Between China and Oman*, Journal of Beijing University, Vol. 3,.

In *Friendly Exchanges Between Oman and China in the History*^①, the author Shen Fuwei believes that the history of the exchanges between Oman and China can be divided into four stages. The first stage is the time before Song Dynasty, and in this part, the author describes the exchanges between the two, including the fact that dates was introduced to China from Oman through the sea, and then planted in the south of China, which witnessed the intercourses of economy and gardening between the two, and that the intercourse was further promoted by the arriving of Chinese sailing boats in the Gulf. The second stage is the Song Dynasty, the author believes that in the mid-10th century, the Northern Song Dynasty unified China, and the government energetically encouraged the overseas trade, so the Chinese sailing boats sailed through the Indian Ocean. From the 11th century, foreign trades intended to get much more prosperous, and till the first half of the 12th century, the friendly intercourses came to their climax. At that time Sohar and Guangzhou traded and navigated with each other directly. In addition, Chinese sailing boats could constantly arrived in Dhofar. In the third stage, after the establishment of the Yuan Dynasty in 1260, maritime traffic between Yuan Empire and Ilhan got improvement, and trades between Oman and China also gained development. In the fourth stage, till the late Middle Ages, China had launched a large-scale trades and diplomatic activities through the Indian Ocean in the Yongle Period (1403-1424 A.D.) after the ban on the maritime trades of the Ming Dynasty. The maritime activities was famous because of Zheng

^① Shen Fuwei, 1981, *Friendly Exchanges Between China and Oman in the History*, *World History*, Vol.2.

He's seven voyages to the west seas with his "Treasure Fleet", shocking the Indian Ocean, which launched the fourth climax of the friendly exchanges between Oman and China.

One of the latest academic achievements is Huang Peizhao's *Relations between Oman and China*^①. Both of Oman and China have long histories from the ancient times, and the two have kept their friendly relations of ancient origins and long-term development for thousands of years. This article lays more stress on the present than on the past, and generally sorts out the relations between the two in political, economic, cultural, and other fields. Firstly, the author explicates the intercourses between Oman and China in ancient times, including the Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties. In the second part, flourishing of the development in political, economic, and cultural intercourses of the two is described. The last part involves the problems existing in the relations of the two. One aspect of them is problems in the history: the relationship between China, Omani Islam Imam State and "Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman" respectively. The other aspect is current problems: the relationship between Oman and Taiwan.

1.4 Methodological approach

1.4.1 Historical documentation

It is important for a social scientist to use historical evidence to illuminate the

^① Huang Peizhao, 2000, *Relations Between China and Oman*, *Arab World*, Vol. 2.

present. Without going into the vast literature on the meaning of Oman and China history, The research worker may not be able to see all the significant possibilities in the relation between Oman and China at the time of the fieldwork. Furthermore, some historical facts on communication between Oman and China may not be apparent in the present society, as likely, if the facts are important, they will have been in a local history which may not be easy to reach.

When I was visiting Middle East Studies Institute of Shang Hai International Studies University which was Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities, the need of historical approach became clear. There are a lot of research projects the Institute had at the time, when I ask whether there is the project on about the history of Oman-China relations, the answer was “No”. Both Oman and China have long history communication between them with rich contents, so it is very necessary to narrate the diplomacy history of two countries.

A general characteristic of the literature on Oman and China is first that it is small in quantity, and second that in the literature focusing on the history and present of Oman or China. For various social and political reason, the official statistics of Oman or China should be taken with a grain of salt.

1.4.2 Text analysis

The study relies more on the Foreign monographs (articles) and Chinese ancient works, for example, English monograph as followings:

Fei-Ling Wang ‘To incorporate China: A Policy for a new era’, *The Global and Mail* 21(1)(Winter).68, 1998;

Gary Klintworth, ‘China’s evolving relationship with APEC’, *International Journal* 50(3)(Summer), 488, 1995;

Gary Klintworth, ‘China’s evolving relationship with APEC’, *International Journal* 50(3)(Summer), 488, 1995, p.488;

Stuart Harris, ‘The economic aspects of security in the Asia-Pacific region’, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18(3)(September), 37, 1995;

Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China’s foreign policy, 1949-1977*, Cambridge University press, 1979;

John Calabrese, *China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East*, New York: pinter, 1991;

Hashim S. H. Behbehani’s *China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955—1975*, London: KIP, 1981;

Lillian Craig Harris, *China Considers the Middle East*, New York: L.B.Tauris, 1993;

A.H.H,Abidi, *China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf*, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982;

P. R. Kumaraswamy, *China and the Middle East: the quest for influence*, Sage Publications, 1999. etc.

Chinese monographs (articles) as following:

Huang Peizhao, 2000, *Relations Between China and Oman*, Arab World, Vol. 2;

Shen Fuwei, 1981, *Friendly Exchanges Between China and Oman in the History*, World History, Vol.2.

Zhang Junyan, 1981, Contacts Between China and Arab in the Medieval Times - On the Relationship Between China and Oman, Journal of Beijing University, Vol. 3, .

Tongfei and Hanzhibin ed, Guide to the World States: Oman, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2010.

Wang Meng, Participating in the Middle East Affairs: Theories and Practices of China's Actors, doctoral dissertation, Northwest University, 2006.

Zhong Zhicheng: Middle East Five volume General History of the Gulf, Commercial Press, 2007 edition.

However, it is undeniable that there are more difficulties to interpret in a culture, value different from one's own. Although the present research project, a cross-cultural survey, is inescapably loaded with Chinese or Omani people's values, the nature of the issue under focus (the communications between two countries) may help to avoid ideological prejudice. Acknowledging that objectivity cannot be attained- and in fact is not desirable in the extreme - I have tried as far as possible to be explicit about the upon which the conclusions have drawn.

1.4.3 Survey Research

In order to finish the dissertation in high quality, I spent the first three months in China Library collecting Chinese official statistical material, reading reports, articles and discussing the political changes with colleagues. In the second period I also prepared my field work and travelled all over Oman and kept approximately 100

originals books on Oman-Sino relations.

1.5 Chapter plan

This doctoral dissertation is divided into four parts.

we have just discussed Part I, which included Focus and purpose of the study:

The theoretical implication and policy significance of the dissertation; Literature survey home and abroad; Methodological approach. This doctoral dissertation focuses on the relations between Oman and China, both of which are most important and influential states in today's international system and the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. Besides the paper also aims at filling the gap in the study of the relations between Oman and China while most of the current works on the relations between Oman and China deals with this area as part of the bigger picture of China's relations with either the Arab world or the Middle East with no other works giving comprehensive study of the issues of Oman and China until now. This doctoral dissertation aims to overcome the shortcomings pertaining to the study of the relations between Oman and China of this area.

Part II surveys the relations between Oman-Sino before the People's Republic of China. Both Oman and China have long histories from the ancient times, and the intercourse between two countries have never discontinued for thousands of years. This chapter consists of four parts, which are the period before the Tang dynasty, the Tang dynasty, Song and Yuan dynasties and Ming and Qing dynasties. This Chapter

expounds the intercourse between Oman and China before the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

In the third part, we shall discuss the comprehensive interaction between Oman-Sino since the founding of the People's Republic of China in political, economic and cultural field. During its first decade as an independent state, the PRC was politically isolated from most of the government of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula region, including Oman. China's interest in Oman during 1950s and 1960s was a reflection of direction of its foreign policy at that time. When China was in close alignment with the Soviet Union, the Chinese government regarded Oman as a "puppet" of the West. This prevented China from establishing relations or pursuing connections with Oman. However, this began to change toward the end of the 1950s. As China's alliance with the Soviet Union began to break down, the Gulf and Peninsula region started to assume a new significance in China's foreign policy. The Chinese began to view the Gulf and Peninsula region as a potential theatre to wage a revolutionary campaign against Western imperialism and as an arena of Sino-Soviet rivalry.

We shall then draw these themes together in a final concluding chapter including influencing factors (geopolitical, international system, religious culture and social ideology, etc.) of Oman-Sino relations, the future of Oman-Sino relations. That different variables such as geopolitics, history, bureaucracy, intellectuals, and media play a key role in forming China's relations with Oman. In order to survey the literature about the impact of these variables on Oman-Sino relations, we focus on the

impact of the following main domestic components on Oman-Sino relations:

geopolitics, regional order, history and tradition, ideology and leadership.

2 The communication between Oman and China before the foundation of the People's Republic of China

Both Oman and China have long histories from the ancient times, and the intercourse between two countries have never discontinued for thousands of years. This chapter consists of four parts, which are the period before the Tang dynasty, the Tang dynasty, Song and Yuan dynasties and Ming and Qing dynasties. This Chapter expounds the intercourse between Oman and China before the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

2.1 The period before the Tang Dynasty

From the ancient time, the Arabian Peninsula is the transfer station between the East and the West, and it is also the bridge for the communication of the African countries and Asian countries. Oman is located in the southeast corner of Arabian peninsula, and it is the distributing centre for the goods in the business between the East and the West. At the same time, it is the inevitably essential passage for the vessels traveling between the East and the West. Muscat, the capital city of Oman, was a bay of great importance for the maritime traffic between Oman and other Gulf states.

The Sohar harbour in Oman, situated on the shore of the Batinah, the north of Muscat, is the gateway to the Indian Ocean. The bays there are splendid with rich products. It was once one of the biggest harbours in Asia and the fourth famous city in Islamic world from the 4th century to the 10th century. Until to 15th century, trade on the sea here was still booming. Every 10th-15th in July in Islamic calender, there was a great bazaar held here, and businessmen from many Arabian countries and countries on the east shore of Africa came here for their business. Great amount of ivories, spices, and the specialties of the Arabian countries would be sold to China and the East from Sohar harbor. Sohar was a primary harbor for the friendly relations between ancient Arabian countries and China. Yagoot Hamayw, an Arabian geologist, considered Sohar as “the gateway to China” in his work *Dictionary for Names of Places*.^①

The history background of the historical communication of Oman and China is the communication between Arabian area and China. As one of the actors of the Arabian world in politics, economy, and culture, Oman completely participated in the communication process with China.

In the ancient times, Chinese people who inhabited on the land of the East Asia had much touch and communication with their neighbors around them. However, it was Zhang Qian, who lived in the west Han Dynasty, that explored the traffic between China and the Middle Asia directly, which was definitely recorded in the historical reference. In 138 B.C., Zhang Qian was commissioned by Emperor Wudi of Han

^① J, C, Wilkinson, *Sohar (Sohar) in the Early Islamic Period: The Written Evidence*, South Asian Archaeology, 1977.

Dynasty to visit the West Region.^① He visited Farghana (大宛), Yuezhi (大月氏), Bactria (大夏), Sogdiana (康居), and didn't returned until 126 B.C.. In 115 B.C., he was commissioned to visit the West Regions again. This time he got to Wusun (乌孙), and let his assistants to visit the countries in the West Asia respectively, including the one which developed to Oman now. Most of his assistants came back with the envoys of these country to give tributes to the Han Dynasty, and this was the beginning of the associations between the governments of the Han Dynasty and the Arabian countries. Zhang Qian's visits to Arabian countries were not easy and of enormous feat. At that time, on one hand, he had to overcome the mistrust and suspicion of the bristly tribes and countries in the West Region to the Han Dynasty; on the other hand, he also had to overcome the geographical perilousness of traveling over the Pamirs which is called "the Roof of the world". According to his contemporary famous Chinese historian Si Maqian praised, Zhang Qian explored the route to the West Regions.^②

Back with Zhang Qian from his two visits to the Western Regions was the large number of the information relevant to the Middle Asia and the West Asia. He and his accompanies probably learned about the West Asia from Anxi People (安息人), and called it "Tajik" (条枝国), which is from the pronunciation of the Persian "Tajik". *Historical Records* (finished in about in 91 B.C.) and *Chronicles of the Han Dynasty*

^① the Western Regions (a Han Dynasty term for the area west of Yumenguan, including what is now Xinjiang and parts of Central Asia).

^② *Historical Records, Biography of Zhang Qian*,

(finished in about in 84 A.D.) have the information of Tajik, and this is the first formal record about the West Asian countries in Chinese historical books.

Since then, the Han Dynasty sent increasing number of envoys to the West Asian countries. In one year there were more than ten times, and at least there were five or six times. The envoys took eight or nine years to and from if it was far from China, and if it was near, it took two or three years. These were still delegates of great scales at that time. Actually these envoys did some business during their visits. They took specialties of China, such as silk, with them when they left China. After they passed through Hexi Corridor and traveled over Pamirs, they went to the Middle Asia and the Arabian Peninsula with Chinese specialties, and then they sold them to Europe. Thus, the way they took when the envoys came back got the name “the Silk Road”. We can say that this is the first record in Chinese history books about the communication between China and the West Asia. In the period of Wang Mang’ usurping during the West Han Hynasty (9-23 A.D.), this road was once interrupted. In the East Han Dynasty, another famous explorer Ban Chao (31-102 A.D.) got through the traffic to the Western Regions again. Owing to Ban Chao and Gan Ying's visits to the West Region, when they returned with much information about the Arabian Peninsula, the name "Oman" appeared in Chinese book. In *Chronicles of the Later Han Dynasty* (后汉书), it is recorded that go westward for about three thousand four hundred miles and you will arrive in Oman; go on for about three thousand six hundred miles it is Binns kingdom (宾斯国), then get across the river on the south of Binns Kingdom and turn southwest to Yuluoguo (于罗国), after nine hundred and sixty miles, then

you arrive at boundary of Parthia (安息国), then go southward by ship you will get Daqin (大秦). This is the earliest record of Oman in Chinese ancient books.^①

Chinese people took the lead in getting through the overland traffic from the East Asia to the West Asia in the Han Dynasty, and then it was the Arabians who hewed out the ship route from the Red Sea and the Gulf, going by the India Peninsula and the the Malay peninsula to the south of China at about that time. The shipbuilding technology and navigation technology of ancient Oman was very famous. Sohar was once called "the gateway to China" by the Arabian geologists. This obviously reveals the fact that people of Oman contributed a lot to connect the the East and the West through the sea.

In Volume 88, *the History of Late-Han Dynasty*^② refers to the Land of Anxi in “the Sect of West Region”. Here, it clearly records the geographic location of Oman, which is the earliest in the recorded history. It says that going west for 3400 li (1700 km) from the Land of Anxi (today’s Iran), one could reach the Land of Oman, namely today’s Oman; going west for 3600 li (1800 km), one could get to the land of Sabin, near Bagdad of Iraq today. The original document is as follows:

“Going West for 3400 li (1700 km) from the Land of Anxi, one could reach the Land of Aman; going west for 3600 li (1800 km), one could get to the Land of Sabin.”

^① *The Chronicles of the later Han Dynasty, Biography of the West Regions*. Vol.118.

^② *The History of Late Han Dynasty* is a classic of block-printed edition, finished in 28th year of Jiajing Reign, Ming Dynasty(1549), written by Fan Ye (in Nanchao Song Dynasty), noted by Li Xian (in Tang Dynasty and recorded by Sima Biao).

According to the Chinese history books, Chinese merchant ships had arrived in the Gulf in latest about the 5th century A.D., namely in the Liu Song Period of the Northern and Southern Dynasties.^① In the sixth century, in his *Golden Prairie*, the famous Arabian historian Masud said, China's merchants often visited the Gulf. At that time, Chinese boats could directly reach Oman, Bahrain, Basra, etc., and ships from those cities can directly reach China.^② It is obvious that the maritime traffic between China and Arabian areas was expedited.

2.2 In the Tang Dynasties

The communications between China and the Arabian world, beginning from the Tang Dynasty, developed a lot in the Song and Yuan Dynasties due to the fact that there was the powerful Tang Empire in the east, and at the same time, the Islam, founded by Prophet Mohammed, helped uniting the Arabian world and setting up the Arab empire.

From the ancient times, the Indian Ocean has been the cradle of the maritime traffic. In the 5th century A.D., China's ocean-going vessels had ever got to the Gulf. In the Tang Dynasty, as "the Spices Road" opened up, the trades through the sea between China and Arab countries became increasingly frequent. At that time, Chinese ocean-going vessels were high up to two or three layers, which could directly

^① Biography of the South China, *History of Song Dynasty*

^② Na Zhong. 1979. The friendly relations between China and the Arabian World in the medieval, *History Teaching*, Vol .1.

sail to the Gulf. Many Arabian merchants did businesses in India and China by Chinese ships. In order to develop the overseas trade, the Tang Dynasty first set up superintendencies of Merchant Shipping in Guangzhou. More Arabian merchants, including Omani merchants, came to China to do business and settle here. Large number of ships loaded with Chinese and Omani sailed on the vast blue sea. What a spectacular scene it was! The Arabian world was called Tadjik in the Tang Dynasty, which is from the pronunciation of the Persian words "Tajik" or "Tazi". Before the Islam was spread, Prophet Mohammed had been to places such as Palestine and Syria, so he knew something about China. However, the first envoys of Tadjik were sent to China in 651 A.D., when it was under the rule of Ottoman, the third Calif. From then on, more envoys were sent. According to the material of the Tang Dynasty, Tadjik envoys sent to China were 39 times, which was one time in less than four years in average during 651 A.D. to 798 A.D..

The coastal area of the Arabian Peninsula is one of "the ancient birthplaces of the world civilization". Before thousands of years, peoples in this area, including the Omani, had already mastered the irrigation technology, learned to irrigate with the ground water, and built complex irrigation systems. In plateau areas and grassland areas of Oman, the nomadic livestock farming had developed at very early times. Handicraft industry and business of Oman were flourishing. Since the ancient times, Omani people were famous in shipbuilding and navigation in the world. British historian Vere Gordon Childe wrote: "The southern coastal areas of the Arabian world, especially the areas around Oman, are the birthplace of the navigators who do

business with Ethiopia, Sindh and the Gulf. The Arabian Sea is named after these navigators. As early as 4000 B.C., these maritime trade centers had already flourished. Five thousand years ago, the Sumerians living in Iraq called Oman "Maghan country". In Sumerian "Maghan" means "ship". It reveals that residents in Oman lived on shipbuilding and sailing. Oman had built many large ports on its coasts, with shipyard and wharf, the largest of which are Sohar, Muscat, Sour etc.. Oman's wooden junks possess superb seaworthiness performance: fast, agile, light with special technology of shipbuilding. People of Oman had great contribution to the development of navigation passes on the Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the maritime traffic between the East and the West.

In 750 A.D. Abu Abbas overthrew the Umayyads Dynasty with the help of the rebellion of the Arabians and then established the Abbasids. In order to vie Chach (which is Tashkent now) with the Tang Empire, the viceroy of Khorasan and his soldiers defeated the army of the Tang Empire which was under the leadership of the military governor Gao Xianzhi in Henluosi (恒逻斯) in 751 A.D.. In 752 A.D., a year after the Henluosi (恒逻斯) war, the first recorded envoys of the Abbasids were sent to China, and others were sent continually after that. Sometimes they even went to China several times in a single year. Therefore, no wonder the Abbasids had ever sent his army to China to help Tang Suzong quelling the riot in 757 A.D. when the "An Shih Rebellion" happened in China. It is said that when he established his new capital, Baghdad, in 762 A.D., the second caliph of the the Abbasids Mansur said: "We are lucky enough to have the Tigris River to get touch with the faraway lands, like

China."^① His words strongly prove that the friendly intercourse between the two were frequent.

It was this frequent friendly intercourse that further enriched the Chinese people's geographical knowledge about the Arabian areas. A famous geologist in the Tang Dynasty Jia Dan detailedly recorded Chinese traffic conditions outwards, which describes the situation from Guangzhou to Oman. At that time, Persians occupied Sohar regions in Oman, and the Persian governor garrisoned Sohar nearby. Persians named Sohar "Mazun". According to Jia Dan, going northwest for eleven days from Mazun, you can get to the estuary of the Euphrates, after passing by Basra, then take land route toward northwest for a thousand miles to reach the capital of the Khalif, Baghdad. According to the materials found in Oman, the route for commerce from Aden to Baghdad, indeed, passed through Oman, and Sohar. Jia Dan's records basically accord with geographical conditions of the Arabian Peninsula.^②

Guangzhou, Quanzhou, Yangzhou, etc. were important ports for oversea trade of the Tang Empire. In 760 A.D. an military official Liu Zhan rebelled, the government of the Tang Empire sent army to Yangzhou to quell. During this quelling, thousands of Arabians and Persians lost their life. It shows that Arabian and Persian merchants living in Yangzhou must be abundant. Guangzhou was a gateway to China by the sea, so Arabian merchants here were much more. There is a piece of precious material, named *Chain of History (Silsilah al - Tawarikh)*. It was written, in 851 A.D., about what he had seen and experienced by an Arabian merchant, Suleiman, who did

^① Joseph Needham. *Science and Civiisation in China*. vol.1.

^② *New History of the Tang Dynasty, Records of the Geography*

business in China in the ninth century, after his travelling to China and India, and later an Arabian historian, Abu Sayid Hasan supplemented this material (the supplement were finished in about 916 A.D.). In this supplement, it is said that Chinese government levied the capitation taxes on the foreigners in Guangzhou at that time, so it can be certainly sure that there were 120,000 Muslims, Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians in Guangzhou at that time, and that was indeed a large number.

Besides Yangzhou and Guangzhou, Arabians also lived in Quanzhou. Now outside the East Gate of Quanzhou, on the Lingshan Mountain there are the graves of muslims, Sanxian and Sixian, who came to China to do missionary works in the Tang Dynasty. The Tang Empire and the Arabian world communicated with each other not only through the sea, but also through the land a lot. The fact that Tajik commissioned its army (probably the army garrisoned in the Middle Asia) to help the Tang Empire quelling "the An Shih Rebellion" bears witness to it. In addition, the previously mentioned Hassan, recorded in his work that a man was seen carrying a bag of musk, to leave from Samarkand, after passing by many Chinese cities, and finally get to Guangzhou. According to this, we can see the prosperity of the land traffic between the two at that time.

As for the Gulf, Oman was not only one of the important distributing centre, but also a process-required hub that the ships passing. Suleiman mentioned Muscat of Oman repeatedly in his itinerary, and Hasan considered Oman as an essential port for the trade to China. Hasan mentioned that due to the Huang Chao's Rebellion, the

business in Guangzhou was deeply influenced, and thus many of the people of Oman who had lived on the business with China bankrupted everywhere then.

As large quantities of Islamic Arabians surged into China, many of them settled here long-term, and they even married and had their children, which brought the wide spread of the Islam to China. When the second Khalifa Omar was in reign (634-644 A.D.), Islam began to expand beyond the Arabian Peninsula. In 636 A.D. the Arabians defeated the Byzantine army and occupied Damascus. In 638, they entered Jerusalem, in 640 A.D. Syria, Palestinian etc., and then in 642 A.D. conquered the Sassanids and Egypt and occupied Alexander, consequently they monopolized the land route to China. In China, the Muslim Arabians' arrival appeared earlier than the religious need of these merchants, and then the Islamic missionaries arrived in China, too. Therefore, the possibility of large amount of Muslim merchants' commercial activities in China should be no earlier than 642 A.D..

In the middle of the 8th century A.D. a famous navigator of Oman, Abu Obide Xinya Tuoluo Qasim, sailed across the Indian Ocean along "the Spices Road", and came to visit Guangzhou in the middle of the eighth century. His visit was kept in written records, and he became the first recorded navigator from Oman to China.

In the middle of 9th century, the Arabian navigator Suleiman wrote a book named *The Itinerary of Suleimanto the Orient* after he returned home from China and India where he did business for many years. The book recorded the route sailing east from Oman to China, namely, starting from the Gulf , passing by the Arabian Sea and India, and from India Malabar coast, going through the Malacca Strait, the Bay of

Bengal, South China sea, then arriving in Guangzhou. This record basically conforms to that in a book of Jia Dan named *Gu Jin Qun Guo Xian Dao Si Yi Shu* (《古今群国县道四夷述》). This famous maritime route for trade was as important as the "Silk Road", and was called the "Spices Road".

The information about the maritime route in Suleiman's book provides proof to the researches of the maritime route between the East and the West. There are many vivid descriptions of the situations of the Arabians in China at that time. According to this, we know that early in the Tang Dynasty, in Guangzhou there were living areas specifically for Arabians, with a government-appointed Arabian Muslim leader to manage the litigation and religious activities. There is still a Huaisheng Temple in Guangzhou now, which is said to be one of the earliest mosques built in China. Although there is not yet conclusive evidence whether it was built in the Tang Dynasty, according to the records of Suleiman, there had been mosques in Guangzhou in the 9th century anyway.

Along with the frequent exchanges between China and Arabian world, there would be a large number of cultural and technological communication. One of the most significant facts was Chinese paper-making technology spread westward. In the Song Dynasty China's ocean-going sailing industry got a huge development. At that time China was very active in sailing on the Indian Ocean. The traces of Chinese vessels could not only be seen at the Gulf, but also in the Red Sea and even on the East African coast. During the inspection of the maritime traffic between China and the Arab world in the Tang and Song era, there is a noteworthy fact that before the Sui

and Tang dynasties, Chinese monks often traveled overseas by foreign vessels, and then in the Tang and Song dynasties, and especially the Song dynasty, foreign businessmen came to China mostly by Chinese boats. According to the French scholar Paul Pelliot's research, in 762 A.D., Du Huan was in a Chinese vessel when he returned home from the Gulf to Guangzhou. Rules for the trades of ship transportations in the Yuan Dynasty were made mostly following that of the Song Dynasty, so it could be known from the regulations of the Yuan Dynasty that foreigners had been allowed to get aboard on Chinese vessels in the Song Dynasty. From this we can see the large amount of foreigners who took Chinese ships then because that was the same time when China's shipbuilding technology and navigation technology were getting great progresses.

2.3 The Song Dynasty

In the 10th century, the confrontation between the Song and Liao regimes existed in China. The two both had communications with Tajik mainly through land transportation and sea transportation respectively. According to Chinese historical records, in 924 A.D., Tajik once sent envoys to the Liao Dynasty. In 1021 A.D., the Liao Dynasty even consented to the request of the king of the Tajik, and married a princess to a royal prince of Tajik, son of the king of a Central Asian country which converted to Islam. In 966 A.D., a monk traveled to the West Regions with an official letter to the Tajik from the Song Empire. From the first year of the Kai Bao (968

A.D.), Tajik had continued to send envoys to the Song. According to the existing historical statistics, in the 284 years from 924 A.D to 1207 A.D., there were roughly 43 batches of recorded envoys between the two countries, that is, one batches in every six years.

In the latter half of this period, the entire Islamic world faced the threat of the Crusades, and the Abbasids had been replaced by the Seljuk Turks to dominate the Mesopotamia, and the Anatolia was in a long period of war, so the envoys from these areas to China were from the Arabian world, such as Jeddah, Maghera, Sohar, and even East Africa, Kenya and other countries, while the envoys from Tajik were mostly sent by caliph.

It was in this period that China's porcelain technology was spreaded to the Arab world and then to Europe. Chinese porcelain (as well as silk, medicine, etc.) was sailed oversea in large quantities. In recent decades, from the Gulf of Basra and other places, to the Gulf of Aden, East African coast, a lot of the Song Dynasty coins and porcelain fragments are found. This gives proof to the fact that Chinese vessels were active in this route then.

In the Song Dynasty, China's ocean-going merchant ships also opened up a new "Spice Road", which was from Guangzhou (or Quanzhou), proceeding across the Indian Ocean, without passing by India, straight from the Sumatra to Dhofar regions. By taking this route, not only the distance was shortened, but the monsoons on the Indian Ocean could be taken full advantage of. In winter, when the northeast monsoon prevailed, sailed straight to Dhofar regions by the west route. In the summer of the

next year, when the southwest monsoon prevailed, returned to Quanzhou or Guangzhou. In this way, the time could be shortened more than one third. The opening of new routes further strengthened the trade and friendly exchanges with Oman .

While returning, Chinese junks carried ivories, rhino horn, glass and pearls, agate and other exotic and goods from Maghera, Oman, but the Arab spice were always in bulks. Perfume was prevalent among the upper classes of China, and the consumption of spices was indeed in a great number. Therefore, the Song government made spices a government monopoly. According to the foreign trade statistics, in the 10th year of Song Shenzong Xininyears (1077 A.D.), the frankincense collected in one place in Guangzhou was up to 174,336 Kg. Therefore, this "Spice Road", from the Arab to China could be as essential as "Silk Road" in the Han Dynasty. The sea routes at that time, no matter the traditional one to the Gulf (passing by Sohar) or the new route across the Indian Ocean (to Dhofar), passed through Oman. In medieval times Oman's Dhofar regions were rich of and famous for frankincense. A record of Song, said: "Frankincense, or land incense, is from the mountains and the valleys of the Dhofar regions in the Arabian world." Therefore, this "Spice Road" is closely linked with Oman, and until now we can still see the fragments of porcelain, and complete porcelains of the Ming and Qing era in the museum of Muscat.

The friendly relations between Oman and China can also find some available evidences from some of our literature works.

Zhao Rushi, the officer of Quanzhou Maritime Affairs, edited a book named *The*

Records Of Various Countries in 1225 which documented the “Wenman” (瓮蛮国, that is, Oman). The records in this book about Oman's geographic location, customs, specialty, trade and monetary situation basically correspond with that in the Arabian historical books. The mentioned “Wu Ba Guo”(勿拔国) in Zhao Rushi's book, might be Marbat in today's Dhofar. The book also referred to the “Nu Fa Guo”(奴发国), which many Chinese and foreign scholars consider to be Dhofar.

In the Song Dynasty, China's navigation and shipbuilding industries became more advanced, and maritime traffic abroad was extremely popular. At that time, Guangzhou, Quanzhou, Mingzhou(Ningbo), Wenzhou, Xiuzhou(Jiaxing), Jiangyin, Mizhou(Zhucheng) and other places set up Maritime Affairs, to continually encourage foreign businessmen to do business in China. The maritime trade and closer friendly exchanges between Oman and China got much more. Oman merchants gave Chinese ivories, rhinoceros horn, pearls, precious stones and various spices, herbs they shipped from overseas, and got Chinese silk, porcelain, tea, gold, silver and coins in return. On the "Spice Road", there was a prosperous picture of clusters of sailing vessels, flocks of merchants, piles of goods.

In the Song Dynasty, merchants from Oman and other places of the Arabian world who settled in Guangzhou, Quanzhou and other places in China were increasing. At the same time, merchants from Sohar, Oman, were also very powerful in Guangzhou.

In the Song Dynasty, most of the Foreign Businessmen lived in Guangzhou and Quanzhou, and large percent of them were the Arabian businessmen who were always

the richest. After the Southern Song Dynasty, due to the social and economic destruction in Anatolia caused by the wars, many of the Arabs moved eastward, and even resided in China permanently. At that time in Guangzhou and Quanzhou, there were areas for foreign businessmen to live in, known as “Fanfang” (蕃坊), with a leader in each of them who managed their own affairs and attracted foreign businessmen to trade in China. The leader was chosen by the Song government from these foreigners only if he was highly respected.

There was a noteworthy Arabian businessman from Sohar in Guangzhou whose name was Xinya Tuoluo. He was once the leader of the “Fanfang” (蕃坊) in Guangzhou, and the Song government specially gave him the honor "The Gui De General". Interestingly, the King's decree, drafted by the famous writer and statesman of the Song Dynasty, Su Shi (1037-1101 A.D.), mentioned that the reasons why Xinya Tuoluo was given the honor was that Xinya Tuoluo had personally seen the emperor with some presents in Kaifeng, the capital of the Northern Song Dynasty, and had contributed to attracting Arabian traders, so he was called "Gui De General", in hope that he would make more efforts. Now the original words of the decree can still be found in Su Shi's collected works.

According to *History of the Song*^①, Xinya Tuoluo^② had ever told the Song government that he was willing to donate money to help repair the city wall of

^① The History of Song Dynasty, written by Tuo Tuo(Yuan Dynasty)etc., was carved by Ming Nanjing and revised by Ming Qingdi.

^② Xinya Tuoluo is a merchant of Sohar, Oman. The land of Muskat, according to academic appraisal, is Maskat or Mezoen on the east Coast of Oman.

Guangzhou. Although his proposal was not accepted, this shows how rich he was. In the fifth year of Xining (1072 A.D.), he was prepared to return home from Guangzhou, Song Shenzong, the emperor, gave him "a white horse with a set of saddle and bun" in particular. A foreign businessman was surprisingly bestowed the honor of general, and was given presents by the emperor when he returned home, this indeed a privilege. This also provides evidences to the fact that the Omani people made outstanding contributions to the friendly exchanges between Oman and China.

In his book *Golden Grasslands and Gem Mining*, Masudi (who traveled to Guangzhou), an Arab historian and geographer, also recorded: in the sixth century, the Chinese merchant ships regularly visited the Gulf, and could directly reach Oman, Bahrain, Basra and other places and vice versa. Sohar was also one of the major freight stations on the sea route from the countries on the East coast of Africa to China. According to *Biography of Ceng Shan Guo* (层檀国, now Zanzibar) in the *History of the Song*, with the tailwind on the sea, it would take 160 days from *Ceng Shan Guo* (层檀) to Guangzhou, China, passing by Sohar. In the third chapter of his work, Masudi also kept some records: "in order to get ivories, Zanzibar killed plenty of elephants. The ivories are transported to Oman, then to China and India."

2.4 The Yuan Dynasty

The Mongolian nomads rose in East Asia in the beginning of the 13th century and Temujin was chosen as the Genghis Khan by the Mongolian tribes in 1206. After

he unified Mongolia and gained most of the land in northern Jin Kingdom, he led his army to move westward and conquered the West Liao Kingdom and Huacizimu in Central Asia. Later during the reign of Ogodei, Mungo and Kublai Khan, the Mongols established the Golden Horde (1240-1480 A.D.) in Sarai along the Volga River, Ilkhanate (1258-1388 A.D.) in Iran, Afghanistan, Mesopotamia, and the southwest part of the Central Asia, the gedai Khanate on the west of Mongolia and the Chagatai Khanate in Central Asia and Xinjiang. In 1279 A.D. Kublai Khan overthrew the Southern Song Dynasty and established the Great Yuan Empire.

Of course, the expansion had brought great sufferings to the conquered people in this region, but on the other hand, it contributed a lot to the promotion of the traffic between the East and the West. Mongols paid much attention to the establishment of the post system in various places, and to the protection of the traffic between the East and the West. During the more than one thousand years since the Han Dynasty till then, the traffics both on the sea and the land were always blocked due to the political turbulence. However, till this period, since the Asia and the majority of the East Europe, areas from the Shanhai Pass to Budapest, were in the control of the Mongols, and the traffic was uninterrupted any more and reached its peak.

Since the establishment of the Abbasid Dynasty in the 8th century, the political situation of the Arab Empire was relatively stable. Because of its location just acted as transport hub between the East and the West. The Arabians did large amount of translation of the Greek classical works on the one hand, and on the other hand they made many new contributions to the formation of the new Arabian culture by

absorbing Eastern inventions, combining them with the characteristics of their own and doing their researches. At that time the Arabians reached high attainments in mathematics, astronomy, earth science, medicine and other fields. The establishment of the Mongolian Empire further created a favorable environment for the scientific and cultural exchanges between China and the Arabian world, and thus the exchanges came to a climax.

For example, the application of powder was spreaded into the Arab in this period. Back in the Tang Dynasty, the nitrate invented in China had already been spreaded to the Arabian area, and the Arabians called the nitrate the "Baruch de", meaning "Chinese snow". However, they only know how to use it in making glass, medical treatment and alchemy. Until 1225-1248, gunpowder was introduced by the Arabian traders via India. As the firearms for wars introduced to the Arabian areas, it was because of the war between the Mongols and the Arabians until 1258 that hulagu khan conquered Baghdad.

As mentioned above, since the Tang Dynasty, there were Arabians (including the Omani people) settling in China, marrying with Chinese women and having children for generations. This situation had a rapid development in the Yuan Dynasty. We know that the expansion of the Mongolian empire, was first westward and then Southward. After it conquered the Central Asia and the West Asia, large number of local young men were forced to join the army to attack the Southern Song Dynasty. These people from the Western Regions were generally called "Huihui" in Yuan dynasty, including Central Asians, Persians, and of course, many Arabians. After the

founding of the Yuan Empire, they were not sent back, but settled in the cantonment and reclaimed. It was impossible for these young men to bring their families with them to the East, so after settled in China, they married local women, mostly Han women, and set up their own families, and got assimilated by Chinese.

Among the people coming east to Yuan from the Western Region were intellectuals and the upper classes people. They converted to the Mongolian army and moved to China with their family or whole clan. In addition, some merchants voluntarily stayed in China, too. They resided in China for a long time and were also gradually assimilated. According to the sequence of their conquering, rulers of the Yuan Dynasty divided the community residents into four classes: the first one, the Mongols; second, Semu (色目人, including the Hui people); the third, the Han people (referring to indigenous Liao, Jin ruled region residents); forth, the Nan Ren(南人, the residents of Southern Song territory). According to the four classes, the residents' political status and social status were quite different, therefore, Semuren(色目人) often got more important and decent jobs to do. According to statistics, in Yuan Dynasty, Semuren (色目人) who worked as Zaixiang and Pingzhang (平章政事, conductor of public affairs in the central government) were as much as 32, and as for the officers in charge of the local administration at all levels were much more than that.

One well-known figure is Xianyang Wang Sai Siding (咸阳王赛典赤赡思丁, 1211-1279 A.D.). According to *History of the Yuan Dynasty*, he, a nobleman, was one of the descendants of the Prophet (Mohammed). When he was in China, he had ever

been the head of political affairs of Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan. Especially in his tenure in Yunnan, he actively built water conservancy projects, reclaimed about twenty acres of farmland in six years, promoted education vigorously, and improved the transportation between Sichuan and Yunnan. In this way, he contributed a lot to the development of the culture and production of Yunnan and the strengthening of the communications between Yunnan and the Mainland. In addition, many of his descendants also served as high-rank officials of the Yuan Dynasty.

A number of famous Arabian scholars also emerged in Yuan Dynasty, such as the brother of the mentioned PuShouGeng who a famous poet at the end of the Song and the beginning of the Yuan. Another scholar Shansi (1277-1351 A.D.), an Arabian whose family had settled in China for three generations, had been a senior official of the Yuan government. After his death, he was bestowed the honor of Marquis. He was erudite, and proficient in history. What's more, he finished many writings in his life, including *Biology of the Person From the West Region* and *Maps of the West Countries*, but unfortunately, they were both lost. The only one available now is found in *The Yongle Canon* named *He Fang Tong Yi* (《河防通议》), of two volumes.

After a long residence of the Arabians and other peoples from the West Regions in China, their intermarriage with Chinese women and bearing their own children, they gradually formed a new nation of China - the Hui people. By the Ming Dynasty, the Hui people became a member of the multi-ethnic Chinese nation.

2.5 The Ming and Qing Dynasties

In the early days of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), the government laid stress on the contacts with foreign countries. The aim of sailing was later achieved by the fleet under the leadership of Zheng He, an eunuch of the Yongle Emperor (1403-1424 A.D.).

Zheng He was a Hui people from Yunnan, and both of his father and grandfather had been to Mecca for the pilgrimage to obtain the title of Hajj. From this we can know that it was by no accident that Zheng He could undertake the important task of the seven voyages to the Indian Ocean. From his virgin voyage in the third year of he Yongle (1405 A.D.) till his last returning in the eighth year of Xuande(in 1433), Zheng He went overseas for seven times and stayed at sea for nearly three decades. During this he had been to the Indochina Peninsula, the Malay Peninsula, Malaysia, the Indian subcontinent, the Arabian Peninsula, the coastal countries of the East Africa, totaling more than thirty countries, including Oman's Dhofar, Aden, Mecca and other countries, which located on the Arabian Peninsula. His deeds wrote a glorious page in the history of China's maritime industry.

According to *History of the Ming: Biographies of Foreign Countries*, Dhofar sent envoys to the Ming Empire in 19th years of Yongle (1421 A.D.), and the Yongle Emperor ordered Zheng He to bring gifts and the credentials to Dhofar in return. This could be the sixth time for Zheng He to visit to the Western (the 19th to 20th years of Yongle, in 1421-1422 A.D.). Dhofar also sent envoys to the Ming Dynasty in return and arrived in Beijing in twenty first year of Yongle (1423 A.D.). In the fifth year of

Xuande (1425 A.D.) Zheng He's seventh voyage led him to Dhofar again. This time the king of Dhofar commissioned his envoys to go back with Zheng He to Ming to arrived in Beijing in the eighth year of Xuande (1433 A.D.). It passed three years before these envoys set off home. These are the official records in the history books of the friendly exchange of envoys between Oman and China.

During his missions, Zheng He had Ma Huan, Fei Xin and Gong Zhen with him, who knew Arabian. In this way, he obtained more first-hand materials of the Arabian peninsula by going to these places personally without language barriers. These data recorded what they saw and heard during their mission which could indeed valuable. Most of the records of these countries in *History of Ming Dynasty* came from the material Zheng He received in his mission which describes the exact situation of Dhofar. Generally speaking, the Arabian Peninsula is a dry place with very little rain, but the Dhofar region is just directly affected by the southwest monsoon, so rainfall here is abundant in summer, and this is suitable for farming, with vegetables and fruit trees green everywhere. Residents here still have the habit of incense now, and we can also see the various glazed clay incense burner unique to Dhofar in the Muscat museum. *History of Ming Dynasty* also keeps the record that when Zheng He and other Chinese envoys got to Oman, the king asked his people to take out frankincense, myrrh and other spices to trade with the Chinese guests. He also sent envoys to China to pay visit in return with frankincense and ostrich.

Conclusion

As summaried above, we can see in the long period of 1500 years from the Han Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty, the friendly relations between Oman and China was always in constant development. However, after the period of Wanli in Ming Dynasty, the friendly exchanges in maritime trade between Oman and China and other Arab countries gradually reduced, and was even completely cut off. One of the important reasons was the expansion of Western colonial aggression and piracy. In the 15th century to the 16th century, the Spain and Portuguese colonial empires rose. In 1468, the ships of Portuguese colonist sailed eastward around the Cape of Good Hope and broke into the coast of Oman in 1507. In 1508, the head of the Portuguese colonial army destroyed the harbour cities as Muscat, Sohar, etc.. He snatched a lot of wealth and swept thousands of residents into slavery. The Portuguese colonists established a number of fortified and fortresses along the coast of Oman to brutally rule the people of Oman. Then, they got further into Iraq and the coastal areas of India. They quelled the revolt of the native states all over, occupied Oman, Iraq, Iran and coastal areas of India, and continued to expand to the Southeast Asia. Due to their aggressive expansion and piracy, the economy withered all around, the trade declined and the trade routes were cut off. Thus, after the mid-sixteenth century, Chinese merchant ships almost disappeared in the west of the Malacca Strait, and China could not be interlinked with the Arabian countries. One important reason was the armed aggression and expansion and piracy of Portuguese colonialists.

3. Neo-realism and the foreign policy of Oman and the People's Republic of China

3.1 Analytical framework

The relations between Oman and the People's Republic of China's policies and its importance have led to a quantitative explosion of literature studying the different aspects of its relations. Yet there is still no single coherent theory in international relation that can explain and predict all aspects of the relations between Oman and the People's Republic of China. Therefore, different theoretical approaches have been applied to explain and predict the relations between Oman and the People's Republic of China, but none is able to give a consistent explanation that can be applied to the conduct of the relations between Oman and the People's Republic of China and at any given time. Many theoretical frameworks have successfully been applied to explain and predict the relations between Oman and the People's Republic of China regarding specific issues and situation, but they remain mostly one-sided explanatory approaches. They tend to explain the relations between Oman and the People's Republic of China by looking either at the external factor or internal factor in determining their foreign behaviour to one independent variable, and tend to some degree ignore the other variables.

Generally speaking, the lack of 'grand' theory in the field of the relations

between Oman and the People's Republic of China can be, on one hand, seen as a result of a disciplinary shortage in the field of social science, which is described as being 'coloured by hidden normative and policy preference, an absence of conceptual clarity, and the repeated intrusion of policy makers concerns and slogans into intellectual discourse'^①. On the other hand, the absence of a broad theory of the relations between Oman and the People's Republic of China can also be blamed on China's foreign behaviour and practices. Samuel S. Kim argues that ambiguity in China's foreign behaviour provides a major obstacle to theorizing about China's foreign behaviour theory requires 'the actor's behavioural consistency over time.'^②

Against this backdrop, this section seeks to address the theoretical approaches of Neo-realism and world system theory to the relations between Oman and the People's Republic of China in order to gain an understanding of different points of view. Our aim is to find a more useful theoretical approach to serve as a conceptual map that can help us make sense of the foreign policy between Oman and the People's Republic of China.

The classical realist theory of international politics dominated the study of international relations the first twenty-year period after the end of the World War II. During that period, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two major

^① S.S.Kim, 'China's international organizational behaviour' in T.W.Robinson and D.Shambaugh(eds) *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p.402.

^② S.S.Kim, 'China's international organizational behaviour' in T.W.Robinson and D.Shambaugh(eds) *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p.402.

superpowers in the world and dominated world affairs; the Cold War determined the relationship between them. The birth of the bipolar international order and the Cold War, therefore, required a new way of thinking and dealing with international relations. The result was the realist theory of international politics, which shifted western thinking on international relations away from Utopianism towards a resurgent realism, and from idealism to the elements of power. Nevertheless, another school of thought on international relations emerged in the 1970s, after the oil crisis of 1973. Its focus was on cooperation and interdependence in international relations, its scholars define what they call 'the regimes'-namely, international and regional organizations-as the not only a revival interest in realism and interdependence but also the emergence of a broadly-based neo-realism approach to the study of international relations. During and immediately after the World War II, the tradition of power politics was regenerated and reinvigorated in United States. John Herz, George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans Morgenthau articulate what Morgenthau called 'political realism' in contrast to the Utopianism or idealism in international politics. The works of E.H.Carr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Raymond Aron, Henry Kissinger, and Hedley Bull exemplify the realist tradition. They build their work on the philosophical outlooks of the work of Thucydides (400 BC), Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). This kind of philosophy is not only based on the realm of 'what is' rather than 'what ought to be', but also on the realm of 'what can be'.^①The measures of human beings, according to this

^① Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses*, New York: The Modern Library, 1950, suggested many strategies for the prince to adopt in order to enhance his sovereignty and

philosophy, are their ability to expend their language of power and interests rather than of ideals and norms.

The realist theory of international relations finds that the international system is based on the following assumptions:

States are the key actor in international relations;

States are unitary and rational actors^①;

Domestic politics can be clearly separated from foreign policy;

International politics is a struggle for power in an anarchical international system;

Power is only defined in terms of military capability;

There are gradations of capabilities among states;^②

Among the array of world issues, national security tops the list for states as a ‘high politics’ issue. ^③

Having said this, realists rely heavily on the concept of power, rationality, and the balance of power. They characterize international politics as a struggle for power and state as individuals who ‘think and act in terms of interest defined as power’. ^④ Therefore, their focus on interest and power is central to their

maintain or regain the state’s strength and independence.

^① Daugherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, New York: Harper Collins, 1990, p.81.

^② Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, 2nd edn. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1993, p.81.

^③ Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, 2nd edn. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1993, p.7,36.

^④ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for power and peace*, New York: Alfred A

understanding of how nation states deal and interact with each other. Morgenthau sees power not only as an instrument for the attainment of other ends in a competitive international system, but also as an end in itself. Due to the nature of human beings, realists assume that there is no essential harmony of interests among states. Instead, they argue that states often have conflicting national objectives, some of which may lead to war. Power to them is defined ultimately in military terms as recourse to force in War.

Realists suggest that government act rationally, that they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and the benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light of both those preferences and their perceptions of the nature of reality. They recognize the problem of lack of information, but they assume that decision makers will try to achieves their best possible decision.^① Furthermore, most principles should not be applied to specific political action. For example, Machiavelli regarded that justifies, the use of immoral means to achieve a states' national ends.^② Realist concepts of the balance of power refer to a situation of equilibrium as well as to any situation in which a power struggle takes place. ^③ Its aim is to maintain stability of the system by preventing the emergence of any dominate state.^④ Stability, then, depends on the preservation of a

Knopf, 1967, p.5.

^① Viotti and Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, 2nd edn. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1993, pp.35-36.

^② Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses*, New York: The Morden Library, 1950

^③ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for power and peace*, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1967, pp.161-163.

^④ Daugherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive*

power balance.

The neo-realist approach to international politics introduces and defines some Key concepts of the classical realist theory differently in order to integrate the classical theory into contemporary politics. Neo-realism identifies with the writings of Kenneth Waltz, particularly his book *Theory of International Politics*(1979). The writings of Robert Gilpin, George Modelski, Charles Kindleberger, and John Mearsheimer also contribute to the development of the neo-realist school of international relations. Waltz's aim in writing his book was 'to examine theories of international politics ' and 'construct a theory that remedies the defeats of present theories'.^① Thus, he discusses what theories are, what they are not, and how they are made. Theories, to Waltz, are collections or sets of law pertaining to a particular behaviour. They are different from laws in a way that theories are statement that explain laws. Waltz argues that 'this meaning does not accord with usage in much of traditional political theory , which is concerned more with philosophic interpretation than with theoretical explanation. He emphasizes that 'in order to get beyond the facts of observation.....we must grapple with the problem of explanation'.^②Everyone can predict the sunrise and the sunset, as he explained, on the basis of empirical findings without benefit of theories explaining why the phenomana occurs. To form theory requires first simplifications that 'lay bare the essential elements in play and indicate the necessary relations of cause and interdependency or suggest where to look for

Survey, New York: Harper Collins, 1990, p.31.

^① K.N.Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MA:Addision-Wesley, 1979, p.1.

^② Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MalAddision-Wesley, 1979, p.6.

them' simplification requires a set of common assumptions to make explanation possible.^①

Waltz emphasises that a good theory of international politics must be systematic, since the way in which relationships among states are organized strongly affects governments' behaviours towards one another. A system, to him, consists of a set of interacting units exhibiting behavioural regularities and reaching identity over time. Thus, he rejects the 'reductionist' theories, and challenges the ideas of Morgenthau and Kissinger in believing that the preservation of peace and the maintenance of international stability depends on the attitudes and the internal characteristics of states. He also rejects Kissinger's argument of war and instability as a result of revolutionary states in the international system, and argues that Kissinger regards some states as war-like states. Waltz writes:

In order to turn a system approach into a theory, one has to move from the usual vague identification of systemic forces and effects to their more precise specification, to say what units the system comprise, to indicate the comparative weight of systemic and sub-systemic causes. And to show forces and effects change from one system to another.^②

Thus, as he argues, we need to go beyond the description of the international system to identify structure. To Waltz, 'system theories explain how the organization

^① Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, p.10.

^② Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, p.40-41.

of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units with it.’ They tell us about the forces the units are subjected to. ‘From them we can infer some things about the expected behaviour and fate of unit’.^① Since a state determines its interests and strategies on the basis of calculations about its own position in the system. According to Waltz, we need first to understand the context of the action, before we can understand the action itself. Since the structure of international system shapes the political relations that take place between its members (state or unit), it is important to know what Waltz means by ‘structure’.^② Waltz defines structure as the way in which the parts are arranged and ordered: ‘Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them.’ Waltz defines structure in three ways:

- 1 by the ordering principles(hierarchical and anarchical) in which it is organized;
- 2 by specification of functions of formally differentiated parts; and
- 3 by the distribution of capabilities among the units themselves.^③

Waltz argues that, since we live in an international system that is ordered by the principle of anarchy, we need not be concerned with the functions performed by the units, because they are not functionally alike. There is no difference between units on the basis of their functions. Therefore, the key changes that we are to look for in international politics are changes in the distribution of capabilities between the

^① Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MalAddision-Wesley, 1979, p.72.

^② Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MalAddision-Wesley, 1979, p.81.

^③ Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MalAddision-Wesley, 1979, p.88-101.

system's unit. As Waltz indicates:

The structure of a system changes with the changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units...and changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcome their interactions will produce.^①

The most significant capabilities are those of the most powerful states. Small and large states differ from each other not by differences in the attributes and functions of the units but only by distinctions among them according to their capabilities.

Neo-realism accepts the basic assumption of realism about the state being the main international actor in world politics and the assumption that states are mainly concerned about their survival. However, cooperation is not something that is impossible to achieve in the anarchical international society. States cooperate with each other in order to increase or upgrade their own capabilities.^② Neo-realism explains a state's international organization behaviour by arguing that states are using international organizations to maximize their global status and increase their access to multilateral aid, information, and technology while minimizing sovereignty-restricting conditionalities.^③

Waltz developed his theory of balance of power by using his understanding of

^① Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p.97.

^② S.D.Krasner, *Structural Conflict: the Third World against Global Liberalism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985

^③ S.S.Kim, China's international organizational behaviour, in T.W.Robinson and D.Shambaugh(eds) *Contemporary China in the Post-Cold War Era*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994, p.29.

international structure. To Waltz, a good theory will not only point to the importance of power and the balance of power, as Morgenthau assumed, but will account for the recurrent formation of balance power in world politics, and can tell us how changing power configurations affect patterns of alignment and conflict in world politics.^①

From the anarchic nature of the international system and the assumption that states are ‘unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination,’^② Waltz infers that balance of power must necessarily emerge. And, as states compete with each other in a competitive international system, ‘they will imitate each other and become socialised to their system.’^③ As a result of the absence of a universal authority capable of prohibiting the use of force, ‘the balance of power among states becomes a balance of all the capabilities, including physical force that states choose to use in pursuing their goal.’^④

According to Waltz, a system of two (bipolar) superpowers is more stable than a system of many (multipolar). Waltz sees the problem of miscalculation, by some or all of the great powers in the system of many, may threaten the stability of the system. He found that both the United States and the Soviet Union depended militarily mainly on themselves, and balanced each other by their own capabilities, which is more reliable and precise than the external balancing and the capabilities of allies. Thus, he rejects the classical realists’ view of bipolar system as an unstable system.

^① Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, pp.102-128.

^② Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, p.118.

^③ Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, p.128.

^④ Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, p.206.

Neo-realism argues that statesman will try to use all the means available to them in order to achieve their national ends.^① These means fall into categories:

1 Internal efforts: move to increase economic capability, military strength, and develop clever strategies.

2 External efforts: move to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposition one.

Neo-realism accepts all the assumptions made by the classical realists including the concept of power. However, the concept of power in neo-realism is not defined only in terms of military power. Instead, neo-realism defines power according to a wide range of capabilities. Waltz states:

The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations can be sectorized and separately weighted. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.^②

Therefore, the measurement of a state's power in the international system is not only restricted to its military capability, as the classical realist would argue, but also to its performance in several different capabilities. Such combined capabilities constitute

^① Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, p.118.

^② Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, p.131.

a state's power in the international system. To neo-realism, combined capabilities is an important factor in providing the means of maintaining a state's autonomy in the face of force that others yield, permitting wider ranges of actions, and allowing wider margins of safety in dealing with the less powerful states.^① To illustrate this argument, Waltz later indicates that the lack of combined capabilities has led to the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the possibilities of newcomers to play the leading role in today's international system. Waltz argues that in order for a state to rise to great power status, either through challenging a leading state or attempting to reverse a state's decline. Therefore, states should use all their capabilities 'to serve their interests'.^②

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union In the neo-realist account threaten the bipolar status of the international system. Neo-realist have repeatedly emphasized since the end of the Cold War that the main actors in the international system would work through realignment and enhancement of their own capabilities to prevent the emergence of a unipolar system dominated by one state.^③ According to this analysis, the shift from bipolarity towards unipolarity would mean the end of the anarchical system and the emergence of a hierarchical one.

Like many other theories in international politics, neo-realism has received plenty of criticism. Christine Sylvester has argued that, like many other international theories, neo-realism ignores women's roles in world politics. She emphasizes that

^① Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, p.194.

^② Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Reading, MacAddison-Wesley, 1979, p.131.

^③ C. Brown, *Understanding international relations*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997, p.108.

neo-realism tends to argue that statecraft should remain 'man craft' because men have ascribed to women qualities such as irrationality, intuition, and temptation. Richard Ashley argues that neo-realism is a static and conservative theory that portrays the structure of the international system as though there is only one structure, and its existence is independent of states rather than constructed by them. To him, neo-realism denies history as a process. 'All movement is confined within a closed field whose limits are defined by the pre-giving structure.' It denies men and women the practice of making their world. He said:

Nowhere in neo-realist categories do we find room for the idea that men and women who are the subjects of theory can themselves theorise about their lives; are in fact engaged in a continuing struggle to shape and redefine their understanding of themselves, their circumstances, their agencies of collective action, and the very categories of social existence; do indeed orient their practices in light of their understanding; and, thanks to all of this, do give form and motion to the open-ended process by which the material conditions of their practices are made, reproduced, and transformed. Neo-realist structuralism cannot allow this to be so.^①

Robert Cox describes neo-realism as being a problem-solving theory that 'take the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action.' Its aim,

^① R.K.Ashley, 'The poverty of neorealism,' in R.O.Keohane(ed). *Neorealism and its Crisis*, New York: Colombia University press, 1986, p.291.

according to Cox, 'is to make these relationships and institutions works smoothly by dealing effectively with the particular source of trouble.' According to this analysis, neo-realism does not question the institutions as a whole, but seeks to 'solve the problems arising in various parts of a whole complex in order to smooth the functioning of the whole'^① Therefore, neo-realism to Cox is a theory that accepts the prevailing order and does not account for change in world order. John Ruggie has argued against neo-realism and claimed that it cannot explain change and it must incorporate other variables - such as 'dynamic density' - to do this.

World system theory is another approach that focuses its attention on the impact of outside factor on a state's foreign policy and the relations between Oman and the PRC. The world system theory of international relations goes back to the work of Karl Marx and Lenin. It was, however, developed by immanuel Wallerstein. The core of Wallerstein's analysis is the world system, which he defines as 'a unit with a single division of labour and multiple culture system'. He argues that the world system is 'the appropriate unit of analysis for the study of social behaviours' wehther it is poverty in Africa, Ethnic conflict in the Balkans, a state's foreign policy, or family life. According to him, the capitalist world economy constitutes the appropriate unit of analysis in the modern world. It is divided into core, periphery, and semi-periphery, which are linked together by unequal exchange and characterized by unequal development. Thus, a state's foreign policy is shared and guided by the world system

^① R.W.Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory' in R.O.Keohane(ed). Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Colombia University press, 1986, p.209.

and not by any other factor.^①

3.2 Neo-realism and the foreign policy of Oman and the People's Republic of China

Neo-realism, as we see above, would argue that a state's foreign policy in the international system is not nearly as complicated as observers make it sound, that all foreign policy behaviour can be explained and even determined by the structure of the international system. According to this school, a state's national interests in an anarchical system can be defined as securing its survival by increasing its power. Therefore, balance of power becomes an important principle in guiding the relations between states. To neo-realists, the balance of power is not so much imposed by statement on events, as the classical realists would argue, as it is imposed by events on statesmen.^② The relations between Oman and the PRC seems to function within the neo-realist's assumption of national interest(survival) and deploy every effort to increase its economic, military, and political capabilities in the international system. Since its establishment, PRC has give the issue of security high priority among all of its short-, mediun-, and long-range objectives in its foreign. The PRC has demonstrated its willingness to use military force to and involve military conflict against any external threat to China's territorial security. During the Cold War, the

^① Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth - Century paradigms*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

^② Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, p.209.

PRC leadership and Omani Sultan saw power merely as military terms as the most dominant force in the international system and the relations among nations. The result was an increase in the PRC and Oman's influence capabilities in international system by allying itself either with the Soviet Union to balance the power of the United States or with the United States to balance the power of the Soviet Union. But, towards the twilight of the 1970s, the Chinese leadership started to shift its understanding of the concept of power balance towards the neo-realist's concept of capabilities. The proximity to the neo-realist's concept of power by Chinese government is evidence in China's Four Modernizations programme: the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology.

The structure of the international system has affected Oman and the PRC's concept of balance of power. In the bipolar international system, they were forced to balance its power with those of the two major superpowers by allying itself with either power. With the change in the structure of the international system after the end of the Cold War, both countries began to cooperate in every aspects. Oman and The PRC's foreign policy is based on a clearly-defined set of principles that encourage the building of bridges with other nations and, wherever possible, the opening up of opportunities for increased cooperation. The two nations have sought to play a constructive and influential role in the international arena, applying principle which from the basis of international law and legitimacy, such as respect for sovereignty noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, a commitment to good neighbourly relations and the resolution of all differences and disputed by peaceful

means. By fostering security stability and confidence at home and with its neighbours, Oman and the PRC's foreign policy have evolved to become an instrument for promoting economic and social development.

the PRC was obligated to upgrade its capabilities or yield new one in order to prevent the transformation of the international system to a system dominated by a hostile country. This was evident in its efforts to increase its cooperation with developed countries and Russia in order to create a common consent against the domination of the United States in world affairs, and in its efforts to work against the establishment of any form of strategic military alignment between a 'hostile' state and the countries of South and South-East Asia. As a result, China has made every effort to speed up its Four Modernizations programme by getting involved in more economic and technological cooperation with developing countries and military cooperation with Russia and some other countries like Israel. The Four Modernizations programme is an effort to modernize China's economic and military capabilities. The Chinese government believe that, in order for China to compete with the main actors in the international system, it should, first of all, abandon much of its old rhetoric and, second, adopt new policies that can achieve a leading role for China in world affair. Thus, China adopted the 'open up to the outside' policy, which has aimed at achieving a strong economy through cooperation and accepting foreign investment. Its involvement in international economic norms in the post- Cold War era reflects neo-realist thinking. Denny Roy and Thomas J. Christensen argue that China's cooperation in international and regional organizations is not governed by its

commitment to the principle political and economic integration between nations, but by the fact that China saw no other means of readdressing its economic weakness.^① Therefore, by adopting the ‘open up to the outside’ policy, the Chinese government has aimed to achieving a short-term and a long-term objective. The Chinese government’s short-term objective was based on its willingness to achieve political stability inside China by creating more job opportunities for the Chinese. Its long-term objective, however, has been to achieve superpower in general and Asian affair in particular.

Firstly, Oman enjoys a special relationship with its fellow Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC) member states (Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait), with which it shares strong traditional ties. The AGCC supreme council’s advisory body is based in Muscat and the country enjoys the trust and respect of other member states. Oman, as a staunch and an active champion of Gulf identity and citizenship, welcomes the increased cooperation between the AGCC member states, and enjoys excellent relations with its neighbour. There were a number of exchange visits between Oman and the AGCC state, the Republic of Yemen and the Islamic Republic of Iran, during which views were exchanged on a range of bilateral, regional, Gulf and other issues. Oman opened a Consulate in Saudi city of Jeddah in 2006 to reinforce the close and growing relationship between Oman and the Kingdom.

Secondly, Oman supports joint Arab action through the Arab League and

^① Denny Roy, *China’s Foreign Relations*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, p.229; Thomas J.Christensen, “China’s Realpolitik,” *Foreign Affair*, 75(5)(September/October), pp,37-51.

initiatives to improve the League's performance and make it more effective. At the same time it attaches great importance to developing its own relations with other Arab states, whether bilateral or collectively, and joint committees between Oman and various other Arab countries which play an important part in promoting this agenda. In working for peace and stability in the Arab region, Oman strongly backs the Palestinian people's efforts to gain their legitimate rights and gives wholehearted support to their efforts in the regional and international arenas. It condemns Israel's repressive practices, which increase tension in the occupied territories, and calls for the implementation of international resolutions and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas visited Muscat in December 2004 and Khalid Mashaal, head of the Hamas movement's political office, visited in April 2006. With regard to the developments in Iraq, Oman supports the current political process there, which aims to achieve the stability necessary to achieve national unity and territorial integrity. Oman supports all efforts to rebuild the country and bring its people relief suffering. Oman hosted a range of activities, including Arab economic, cultural, tourism, scientific and art forum as part of its "Muscat-Arab Culture Capital 2006" programme, where Muscat was able to showcase some of the country's more dazzling cultural treasures.

Thirdly, Oman maintains contacts and dialogue with other states and peoples for the sake of continued mutual understanding and cooperation to keep world-wide relations. It supports all sincere efforts to develop closer relations or resolve differences through dialogue and within the context of international law and

legitimacy, believing that the establishment of peace and stability can best be achieved through tolerance and recognition of common interests. This is an inspiration behind Oman's active role in the United Nations and international organisations such as UNESCO, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which Oman joined some years ago. Oman can also be seen in its extensive diplomatic relations with countries around the world. Oman was unanimously elected by UNESCO's executive council to chair the 33rd session of the organisation's General conference in Paris, which is attended by 191 member states in October 2005. When Sultan Qaboos gave a statement to the conference, Oman was also represented at the United Nations world summit in september 2005 where in a prepared speech, the government in Muscat reaffirmed its rejection of terrorism and confirmed its belief that the time had come to: "implement an international strategy for the prevention of terrorism, based on cooperation and exchange of information between states." It was, the speech noted, essential to "differentiate between the legitimate right of self-defence and resistance to aggression, and outright acts of terror." Oman also emphasized the importance of upgrading the UN's organisations and institutions to make them more effective in serving member states and in responding to the changing international situation. This process, it stressed, should be "continuous and all-embracing".

Fouthly, the economic dimensions of Omani foreign policy show the outstanding achievements. Oman enjoys cordial relations with numerous countries around the world, whose long history of trade links with other peoples, from China in the east to

the United States in the west, it as relevant today as it was centuries ago. For Oman, these links have long been a determining factor in forming internal policies as well as executing its role in the region and international arenas. Oman enthusiastically supports the Greater Arab Free Trade Organisation, its growing relations and cooperation with the Islamic republic of Iran, and its continuing efforts to promote greater cooperation among member states of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARCI), as well as with the United States; negotiations on a free trade agreement between Oman and the US have now been completed, will open up to further opportunities for the Omani economy. Such development have attracted an increasing flow of investment from the region and beyond, which, in turn, has funded several major industrial projects including schemes at Sohar industrial zones in Sur, Salalah and Nizwa. Some of these projects are already up and running, helping to generate greater prosperity for Omani citizens.

Fifthly, Oman has also established relations with Asia, East and Central African. Oman's relations with Asia and East and Central Africa go back a long way. The Indian Ocean was Oman's gateway to these regions centuries ago, when business between the ingenious populations and visiting Omani traders was brisk and lucrative. Today, those friendly relations have been renewed and, responding to the demands of globalization, continued to blossom, serving mutual economic interests. Oman played a major role in setting up the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC) in 1997 and actively supported measures to promote economic cooperation between member states, particularly in trade, tourism, the sciences,

marine transport and fisheries. The association's Fisheries Support Unit was established in Muscat in 2005. Oman joined the "Asian Cooperation Dialogue" in 2003 and signed a declaration on a new partnership strategy between Asian and African states on 22th April 2005. Diplomatic relations were established between Oman and the Laos People's Democratic Republic on 9th March 2005, and the diplomatic representation with the Republic of Afghanistan was raised to embassy level on 25th March of the same year. Several exchange visits took place between Oman and Asian states during 2005, including visits to Oman by Pakistan's Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in March, Thailand's Prime Minister Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra in April, and the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, Elmar Mammadyarov in the same month. The South Korean Prime Minister, Lee Hac-chan, visited in November. In March 2006 Pranab Mukherjee, India's Defence Minister had the honour of an Audience with his Majesty. Oman's relations with Eastern and Central Africa, which date back hundreds of years, continue to flourish; Oman enjoys extensive ties with numerous countries in that region, including Tanzania, South Africa, Mauritius, Senegal, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia and others. These ties enable Oman to play a positive role in African affairs and to help open new horizons for even closer future relationships.

Conclusion

From above discussion, we find that the study of Oman and China's relations, is based on two assumptions, the first is that theorizing the relations between Oman and the PRC is not something can simply be explained by a single theoretical approach

or model. Many aspects of Oman and China's relations can be looked at differently through differently theoretical perspectives. The second assumption is neo-realism is the most used framework for the purpose of this work. Based on all the previous assumptions, I find that the relations between Oman and China is largely consistent with the neo-realist theoretical approach of international relations. The PRC's drive towards increasing its economic, political, and military capabilities are the most dominant factor in shaping China's foreign policy towards Oman, vice versa. In order for the author to carry this argument forward, I will first survey the relations between Oman and the PRC so as to capture a clearer understanding of two nations' relations. This subject will be addressed in the next chapter.

4.The Comprehensive Interaction between Omani-Sino Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China

4.1 People's Republic of China early involvement with Oman

During its first decade as an independent state, the PRC was politically isolated from most of the government of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula region, including Oman. China's interest in Oman during 1950s and 1960s was a reflection of direction of its foreign policy at that time. When China was in close alignment with the Soviet Union, the Chinese government regarded Oman as a "puppet" of the West. This prevented China from establishing relations or pursuing connections with Oman.

However this began to change toward the end of the 1950s, things started to change after the Bandung Conference. Starting in the mid-1950s, China's relations with both superpowers start to take a new direction. It was the change in the Soviet Union's foreign policy that triggered the change in China's policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union, which in turn resulted in a change in China's foreign policy. As China's alliance with the Soviet Union began to break down, the Gulf and Peninsula region started to assume a new significance in China's foreign policy. The Chinese began to view the Gulf and Peninsula region as a potential theatre to wage a

revolutionary campaign against Western imperialism and as an arena of Sino-Soviet rivalry.^①

The new analysis in China's foreign policy toward the two superpowers prompted the Chinese government to extend relations to the Omani nationalist movement. The Chinese supported Imam Ghalib Bin Ali's movement against the Sultan of Oman, whom the Chinese had always associated with British and US imperialism. They even offered Ghalib Bin Ali military aid.^② Many meetings between Chinese officials and the Omani movement's and the Omani movement's leaders took place in Cairo and Aden; several delegations for the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), and later the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), visited Beijing. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, China provided political, economic, and military support to the revolutionary movement in Oman. By 1970, the PFLOAG was believed to be almost completely dependent on China for political, military, and ideological support. This support had led the Chinese to enjoy an ideological and political influence within the movement, which was evident in regional and international perceptions of the movement as a Maoist movement.^③ This influence was also manifested in the movement's leader's statements against colonialism. Muhammed Ahmad Ghasani, a responsible member of the executive

^① J.Calabrese, "From flyswatters to Silkworms: The evolution of China's role in west Asia", *Asian Survey* 30(September), 1990, pp.862-876

^② H.S.Behbehani ed, *China and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: A Report*, London:KPI, 1981, p.165.

^③ H.S.Behbehani ed, *China and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: A Report*, London:KPI, 1981, p.178.

committee of the general command of the movement stated:

In accordance with the experience of the Chinese revolution under the leadership of the great leader Chairman Mao, our People's Front has formulated a line of self-reliance, depending on the broad masses of poor people to carry out a protracted people's war, and using the countryside to encircle the cities and seize the cities ultimately, thus developing the revolution to the whole of the Arabian Gulf to defeat and drive out the British colonialists....The colonialist can no longer succeed stamping out the flame of the "9th June"[1965] revolution, because we have the weapon of Mao Zedong's thought. The great truth that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" has taken deep root in the hearts of our people. We the people of the Arabian Gulf don't believe in the fallacies of "parliamentary road" and "peaceful transition". Our unshakeable belief is: the counter-revolutionary violence of colonialism can be liquidated only with the revolutionary violence of the people; the independence of motherland can be achieved only through the barrel of a gun; and the liberation of the people can be obtained only through battles of bloodshed.

(BBC.SWB,FE/3402,12,June 1970: A4/2-3)

Speaking about the movement's friendly relationship with China, Ghasani praised China's support for the armed revolution and said:

This support will give an impetus to the development on a still larger scale of our armed revolution in the crucial year of 1970.

(BBC,SWB,FE/3402, 12 June 1970; A4/5)

As a result this Chinese connection with the opposition movement in Oman, in April 1972 the Sultan of Oman, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id al-Sa'id, declared that, despite the establishment of formal relation between China and Kuwait and Iran, his country would have nothing to do with China.^① Therefore, relations between Oman and China, prior to establishment of diplomatic relations, were limited to indirect trade consisting mainly of imports of Chinese goods. Thus, China's early involvement with Oman and its support for the revolutionary movement in that country originated at a time when the Chinese government advocated a certain international militancy aimed at discrediting the Soviet Union and countering the United States. Due to this Chinese connection with the Omani revolutionary movement, Oman-China diplomatic relations did not exist until 1978.

4.2 The establishment of diplomatic relations

Several years after the end of the Dhofar War, Oman and China established diplomatic relation on May 25th, 1978. A joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Oman and the PRC was signed in London and issued in

^① A.H.H.Abidi,*China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf*, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982, p.252.

May 1978. It said:

The government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the Sultanate of Oman have decided to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level on May 25, 1978, and to exchange ambassadors. The government of the People's Republic of China firmly supports the government of Oman in its just cause of safeguarding national independence and developing the national economy. The government of Oman recognises the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people. The two governments have agreed to develop friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

(FBIS-CHI-78-103, 26 May 1978: A73)

Although the communique recognized Beijing as the sole legitimate representative of all China, a Taiwanese trade mission was allowed to remain in the Omani capital of Muscat.^① Welcoming the new ties with the Omani government, an editorial in *People's Daily* underlined the strategic and political significance of Oman by stating:

^① FBIS-CHI-78-123, 26 June 1978, p. A26.

Oman situated in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula occupies a position of strategic importance as it is the threshold linking the Gulf with the Indian Ocean. It suffered historically from aggression and oppression by imperialism and colonialism, and its people have waged heroic struggle against imperialism and colonialism in order to achieve independence. Today, the Omani government is dedicating its effort to the struggle in defence of national independence and for the development of the national economy. Following foreign affairs the principles of neutrality and non-alignment, Oman advocates unity and co-operation among the countries in the Gulf and Red Sea and opposes big power contention there. All this earns the firm support of the Chinese government and people.

And, in a statement directed toward easing the other Gulf and peninsula countries' fear of China, the editorial went on to emphasize that:

The Chinese government always maintains that all countries, whether big or small, should be equal. The people of each country have the right to choose their own road in accordance with their own aspirations. It is our hope to establish and develop friendly relations with all other countries on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Oman and China has opened excellent prospects for friendly

cooperation in many fields between our two countries and it will be conducive to the further development of our friendly ties with the Arab countries and people.

(FBIS-CHI-78-105,May 1978:A30)

There were several decisive factors that played major roles in the two governments' decision to establish diplomatic relations. To the Chinese government, the establishment of formal relations with Oman was driven mainly by the following factors:

1. From 1970, China's foreign policy witnessed yet another change as its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union enter a new phase. This time, the increasing Soviet penetration around the world and on their frontiers reinforced the shift in China's foreign policy from challenging both powers toward favouring one against the other. China feared Soviet's penetration in South Yemen, Iraq, India, and Zaire and it presumed that Soviet's penetration in these countries, under its southward policy, was aimed at dominating the Gulf and Peninsula region. Moscow itself criticized the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two because it perceived it as an effort to form an anti-Soviet alliance in the region.^①

2. As Chinese grew more and more suspicious of the Soviet penetration in the Third World, their relations with the United States assumed more significance. Both Beijing and Washington were very much concerned about the increasing Soviet influence around the world in the 1970s. The Soviets had already invade

^① J.A.Kechichian, *China and the Soviet Union, 1949-1984*, London: Longman Group, 1995, p.190.

Czechoslovakia, announced the Brezhnev Doctrine, escalated their border arms clashes with China, and later invaded Afghanistan-a neighbour of China. As a result, this led to major changes in China's foreign policy, in general, first, China reached some important agreements with the United States on furthering bilateral relations, which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two sides in the late 1970s. Second, China's perception of the threat to world stability changed from perceiving both superpowers as the principle threat to perceiving only the Soviet Union as the principle threat to world stability and the primary enemy of world security. This new shift in China's foreign policy left its mark on China's foreign policy toward the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, including Oman.

3. China was not willing to harm its established political relations with Kuwait and Iran. China, which supported the revolutionary group in Oman, did not want to appear against Iran's policy in Oman, where Iran was supporting the sultan against their revolutionaries. So, by establishing diplomatic relations with the government of Oman, China would be able to improve its relations with Iran and halt the Kuwaiti government's fear of the revolutionary movement in the region.

4. China hoped that establishment of formal relations with Oman would open the doors for the other remaining Gulf and Peninsula states to establish relations with China and eliminate their ties with the authorities of Taiwan.

5. The most significant change in China's foreign policy toward the region in the 1970s was the termination of its support for revolutionary group in the region. Most notable of them all was the termination of its support for the Dhofari rebels' ambition

to export their revolutionary ideas throughout the region and challenge the legitimacy of ruling families of Oman. The Chinese government feared that the Soviet Union was attempting to fill the power vacuum left by the British withdrawal from the region. Therefore, it felt the need to halt its revolutionary rhetoric in the region in favour of accumulating better political, economic, and social relations with the ruling regimes of the region. This change was mainly directed toward preventing the Soviet Union from succeeding in filling the power vacuum.

To the Omani government, the establishment of diplomatic relations with China was driven by the following factors:

1. The Omani government shared China's fear of Soviet's penetration in and around the region and wanted, therefore, to improve its relations with China as a counterpoise to the Soviet, particularly after China's relation with the United States, Oman's close ally, had already improved, Sultan Qaboos said:

The Soviet Union is pushing forward a scheduled and fixed policy of expansionism in this region. This policy is no way different from the savage acts of the old colonialists during their time. This has been obvious for some time, undoubtedly, the Soviet Union has two intentions: ultimately gaining control of the Middle East, in particular, the oil region; and second, carry out expansion towards the Indian Ocean in order to control the African countries and then the entire Far East.

(Interview with Xinhua in JPRC-76-746-China Report, 3 November 1980: 16)

2. The Omani government hoped that, by establishing a formal relationship with China, it would be able to completely stop China, the primary source of political,

ideological, and military support to the Omani rebel, from continuing its commitment to support the revolutionary movement in Oman.

Shortly after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, bilateral relations have developed steadily, friendly cooperation in various fields enhanced, growing areas of cooperation expanded. Qais Abd al-Munim al-Zawawi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Oman, visited China in June 1978. During his Visit, he met with CCP's Chairman Hua Guofeng, who expresses the view that Oman could be directly threatened by Soviet ambitions to control the oil route. The Chinese leader encouraged Oman to work with the Gulf and Peninsula Region countries, to put aside their differences, and strengthen their unity in order to prevent Soviet intervention in the region. A similar argument was made earlier by the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua. In a banquet given in honour of the Omani guest, Huang said:

The distinguished guest comes from the coast of the Gulf and the Red Sea, an area of strategic importance with rich strategic resource. The two superpowers are fiercely intensifying their contention in this area in order to seize petroleum resource and control navigation channels and strategic positions. Bloated with wild ambition, the superpower flaunting the signboard of "socialism" is making trouble everywhere and stepping up all-round expansion in an attempt to place the area under its control.

(FBIS-CHI-78-121, 22 June 1978: A22-A23)

China's first Ambassador to Oman, Yuan Lilin, arrived in Muscat in April 1979, and Oman appointed Ibrahim Hamud al-Subayhi as Envoy to the PRC.

4.3 The relations between Oman and China in the 1980s

China's relation with Oman in the 1980s continued to reflect China's overall foreign policy in the region. China's fear of the Soviet Union, particularly after the latter's invasion of Afghanistan, led the Chinese government to welcome the conclusion of an agreement between Oman and the United States to provide military facilities to the Americans in the event of a crisis in the region and, in return, the United States would help re-equip Oman's armed forces. It also welcomed the signing of the Oman-Britain agreement to provide Oman with more arms, including jet fighters, missiles, and minesweepers.

These Omani defence measures were viewed by the Chinese government as Omani efforts to safeguard the security of the Gulf region against Soviet penetration in and around the region:

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its southward thrust to the Persian Gulf have underlined the need for Oman to strengthen its defence and diplomatic efforts to safeguard its security and that of the region.

The Chinese applauded the Omani government's stand on Soviet's penetration in the region:

Oman has taken a clear-cut stand against hegemonism. It has openly denounced Moscow's aggression and expansion, maintaining that the Soviet strategic southward drive gravely threatens Oman and other Gulf states as well as the rest of the world.

(*Beijing Review*, NO.29,21 July 1980:10)

China, which had began in the early 1980s to stress the importance of improving relations among the Gulf and Peninsula Region countries as a step toward preventing Soviet intervention, welcomed Oman's decision to normalize relations with South Yemen in October 1982. The Chinese viewed this development as a positive step toward strengthening the unity among the Gulf and Peninsula region countries.^①

During the 1980s, political relations between the two countries developed rapidly. Both sides saw a great significance in each other's political role in the Gulf's affairs. With regard to the Soviets from achieving their goals in the region. Another reason was the Iran-Iraq War and China's good relation with both belligerents. Oman saw China as having a great deal of influence in the region because it was the only great power that enjoyed close relations with both Tehran and Baghdad during their war; and large quantities of Chinese weapons were deployed on the battlefield.

As a result, several official visits took place between the two governments.

^① *Beijing Review*, NO.49,6 December 1982, p.14.

The Chinese Vice-Premier Chi Pengfei visited Oman in October 1980.

H.H. Sayyid Fahr Bin Taimur Al-Said, Omani Deputy Prime Minister for Defence and Security visited China in November 1982. Among many of the issues that he discussed with Chinese officials was Oman's concern that China was providing Iran and Iraq with Scud and Silkworm missiles, capable of destroying fixed petroleum facilities or supertankers moving through the Strait of Hormuz. H.H. Sayyid Fahr Bin Taimur Al-Said promised to seek GCC support in fostering formal relations with China, in exchange for China's promise to halt any missile transfers to either Iran or Iraq.^①

Wu Xueqian, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister, visited Oman in October 1983 to formally invite Sultan Qaboos to visit China. The visit never occurred.

However, H.H. Sayyid Thuwaini Bin Shihab Al Said, special representative of the Sultan, toured China in July 1984 where he was received by high-ranking Chinese officials eager to foster closer bilateral relations.

In November, a Chinese justice delegation headed by Minister of Justice Zou Yu visited Oman.

In December, a Chinese military delegation headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, General He Zhengwen, visited Oman. He Zhengwen met with several high-ranking Omani military officials including the Omani Assistant of the Chief of Staff, Major General Hassan bin Ihsan bin Nasib, Commander of the Sultan's Group

^① J.A.Kechichian, *Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign policy*, Santa Monica, CA:Rand Publications, 1995, p.192.

Forces, Major General Nasib bin Hamad al-Rawahi, Director of Operation at the Sultan's Air Force Staff, Colonel Muhammad bin Mubarak al-Amiri, Commander of the Training Battalion of the Sultan's armed forces, Colonel al-Zubaydi from the Sultan's navy. This was the first meeting of its kind between military officials of both countries. Joseph Kechichian argues that these meetings did not lead to a shift in Oman's sourcing of weapons supplies from the west to China. However, according to Kechichian, the meetings allowed Omani officers to familiarize themselves with what was available in China and to broaden their knowledge. However, it allowed Muscat to better assess China's position in the Iran-Iraq war, given that China provided large quantities of its weapons to both countries.^①

Chinese Vice-Premier Yao Yilin visited Oman in November 1985 and attended the Fifteenth National Day celebration of Oman.

On July 14, 1986, acting Prime Minister of the State Council WanLi met with H.E. Yusuf bin Abdallah al-Alawi, Omani Minister for Foreign Affairs who headed a delegation to Beijing.

Omani Minister of Social Affairs and Labour, H.E. Mustahil bin Ahmad al-Maashni visited China in March-April 1987. H.E. Sayyied Haitham bin-Tariq Al-Said, Undersecretary for Political Affairs at Omani Foreign Ministry, visited China in September 1988. Haitham's visit to Beijing was to express Oman's formal appreciation for Beijing's positive role in bringing the Iran-Iraq war to an end.

At the invitation of Sultan Qaboos, President of the People's Republic of China

^① J.A.Kechichian, *Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign policy*, Santa Monica, CA:Rand Publications, 1995, p.194.

Yang Shangkun paid an official friendly visit to Oman from December 26 to 28 1989. He was received with a highly-visible public welcome with thousands of Omanis lining city streets waving Chinese and Omani flags. Yang was received by Sultan Qaboos who thanked China for its support of Security Council Resolution 598. Sultan Qaboos during the talks said that although the two countries varies in beliefs and social system, but the relationa between two countries had huge potential and wide prospect on improving economic cooperation, strengthening the major international and coordinating regional issues and communicating relevant experience etc.. China appreciates the Oman's foreign policy and emphasized that Oman and China shared opinions in international affairs. The president Yang Shangkun highly praised Sultan Qaboos's positive efforts in handling complicated and sensitive areas affairs such as maintaining the safety of the gulf and Hormuz Strait, promoting Iran-Iraq negotiation and mediating gulf countries improving relations with Iran.

Throughout all these meetings, the Chinese praised Oman's foreign policy and emphasized that Oman and China shared identical views on a wide range of international issues. Although China had officially invited Sultan Qaboos to visit China several times, the Sultan, who did not reject the invitations, did not visit China in the 1980s.

The two countries signed an agreement in 1981 on cooperation in such cultural fields as the exchange of visit by artists and folklore troupes. The Omani Traditional Vessel *Sohar* arrived in Guangzhou in the same year.

In May 1980, a delegation of the Omani Minstry of Religious Trusts and Islamic

Affairs, led by H.E. Walid ibn Zahir al-Hinnawi, visited China. A few months later, a Chinese Islamic delegation led by Shen Xiaai, vice-president of the Chinese Islamic Association, reciprocated the visit. Prior to these visits, Haj Mohamed Ali Zhang Jie, vice-president of the Chinese Islamic Association, led a delegation of Chinese Muslims to Oman in November 1979 to participate in the celebration of Oman's National Day. In June 1980, an Omani information delegation including representatives from the Omani Publishing House an-Nahda magazine, *al-Watan al-Arabi* newspaper, paid a visit to China.

An Omani youth delegation visited China in June 1982 and the two countries signed an accord on youth visits, exchange, and cooperation.

A civil aviation agreement was signed by the two governments in Muscat in May 1983. A sport exchange agreement was signed in January 1985.

Since 1950s, the non-government exchange between Oman and China remain very active. Economically, Chinese exports to Oman dominated trade relations between the two countries in May 1978. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in May 1978, the economic and technical cooperation between the two countries has developed to some extent. China provides labor services to Oman, including medical, sports, catering, fishery, farming and processing industry etc.. In 1979, Chinese Embassy in Oman established business representative office. China's exports to Oman jumped from US\$5.85 million in 1976 to US\$9.06 million in 1983. In October 1980, Omani industry and commerce minister visited China and two governments signed trade agreement. In the early 1980s, China had direct export to

Oman over 1000 million U.S. dollars. Chinese goods exporting to Oman are textile, machinery equipment, cereals, oils and foodstuffs, light industrial products, garments and hardware. Trade volume between the two countries is constantly increasing. The value of China exporting to Oman is 585 million dollars in 1976, 906 million U.S. dollars in 1983, and 10 millions in 1986.

However, China's trade relations with Oman, despite the increase in trade volume in the 1980s to approximately six times that of the 1970s, represented only 3 per cent of China's total trade relations with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region countries. But from 1986 to 1992, due to the influence of the world oil prices tumbled, Oman income decreased with import volume declining. At the same time, because of Omani narrow market, many Chinese commodity exported Oman through the United Arab Emirates, so China's goods direct exporting to Oman decreased year by year. This does not imply that China was not interested economically in Oman. Instead, one could argue that Oman had very little economic benefits to offer China in the 1980s. China had sufficient energy to pursue its economic modernization programme and was not in need of Omani oil. On the other hand, Oman's long trade relations with Japan and the West made the Omani market less dependent on Chinese products.

Omani government attached importance to cultural cooperation with Chinese government. Oman often cherished memory of the Brilliant achievements of their ancestor voyaged to China, and regarded it as a symbol of Oman and China's friendly communication. Along the legendary sea route that Xibada opened up 1200 years ago across Indian Ocean, through the straits of Malacca, Omani two-mast antique

wooden Yacht "Sohar" named by sultan Qaboos setting sail from Muscat seaport following by Omani national heritage and cultural ministry and Omani government Cultural delegation on November 1980 completed the 6000 miles thrilling voyage which took a period of more than 7 mouths. On July 1, 1981, it arrived Guangzhou in China and was warmly welcomed by all the people in Guangzhou. Oman and China dispatching their government cultural delegation took part in the ceremony of "Sohar"'s setting sail from Muscat and arriving in Guangzhou China, and friendly visited each other. On July 3, 1981, "Sohar" boat crew visited Huai-Sheng Mosque and they were warmly welcomed by Guangzhou Islamic brothers. Guangzhou Huai-Sheng Mosque, set up by a famous Arab Islamic missionary Wange more than 1000 years ago, is Sino-Arab friendship crystallization.

On August 15th 1981, Huangzhen, the director of Chinese foreign culture committee signed the agreements with Oman's ambassador in Beijing in terms of culture, sanitation and news cooperation which mainly aim to hold cultural art exhibition one another, exchange artists, art troupe, archaeological experiences and visits of experts in education, mutually provide scholarships, establish the relationship and cooperation between educational institutions and faculties of two countries, strengthen the relationship of sporting institution by the exchange of personnel, experiences and information and encourage the cooperation in the field of press and technology etc..

In 1983, China's Minister of Culture Zhu Muzhi visited Oman, thereafter with frequent exchanges at the level of deputy ministry or bureau of the two countries. In

October 1993, Gao Yunjia, an Assistant Minister of Culture paid a visit to Oman bringing the delivery of programme in cultural exchanges of two countries from 1994 to 1996, based on which the 1997-1999 execution plan was signed.

Two countries have also achieved success in culture, education, news, sports, religion, archaeology fields, and so on.

In 1981, the two countries signed a cultural cooperation agreement which formulates the visits mechanism for artist and folk troupe from two countries.

In May 1980, Omani religious and the Islamic affairs delegation visited China. A few months later, Chinese Islamic association delegation visited Oman in return.

In June 1982, Omani youth delegation visited China reaching a visit, communication and cooperation agreement for young people.

In July 1984, Oman health minister along with Sultan's special representative, came to China and had talks with Guo Ziheng, Vice-Minister of Health. He raised the requirements to send experts to aid Oman in medicinal plant resources investigation and acupuncturist and anaesthetist to work.

4.4 The relations between Oman and China in the 1990s

Omani's government politically strengthened its relation with Chinese government.

On October 19, 1993, Chinese Vice Prime Minister Zhou Jiahua met with Omani Minister of Oil and Mining at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

On September 30, 1994, Chinese Vice President Rong Yiren met with Chairman of Omani National Consultative Conference at the Great Hall of the people in Beijing.

On September 13, 1996, Prime Minister of the State Council Li Peng met with Foreign Minister of Oman at Zhongnanhai in Beijing.

On May 18, 1999, Sultan Qaboos met with the chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's political Consultative Conference Li Ruihuan who paying an official friendly visit to Oman in Muscat.

In December and May 1999, two delegations with high-level ranking, namely Premier Li Peng leading NPC delegation (December) and President Li Ruihuan leading CPPCC delegation (May) respectively paid visit to Oman. During the visit, Chinese leaders and Omani leaders retrospected common diplomatic relations from the start until today, expressed satisfaction with current bilateral relations, drew blueprint in the future and frankly exchanged views in further strengthening the relationship between the two countries. President Li Ruihuan made a pleasant meeting with Sultan Qaboos. Both two visits gained fruitful achievements in promoting two countries' friendly relations of cooperation further among the senior leaders.

Oman and China made remarkable results in economic field in 1990s.

The two governments signed trade agreements in 1980. During the People's Republic of China Yang Shangkun paid an official friendly visit to Oman from December 26 to 28 ,1989, China established trade relations with Oman. In December 1989, the two countries set up a bilateral joint trade commission and held six meetings by the year 2000. In October 1992, Minister of Industry and Commerce, led

a delegation to China and jointly hosted the first meeting of Oman-China mixed joint committee with Ji Lanqing, Minister of Trade and Economic Cooperation. In July 1993, Li Lanqing Deputy Prime Minister visited Oman holding the second round of committee. In the same year China became oil importers, while Oman became one of China's important oil supply. In March 1995, the two governments signed *the protocol of encouraging and protecting investment*. Since 1995, China has increasingly imported crude oil. Therefore the two countries signed a contract from 20,000 barrels of oil a day in 1995 increasing to 100,000 barrels of oil a day in 1996, which naturally made Oman China's third-largest oil exporter in 1997. In June 1997, Omani Minister of Industry and Commerce visited China with the special representative of Sultan Qaboos who presided over the third session of Oman-China mixed joint committee with Wu Yi, Chinese Minister of Trade and Economic Cooperation. In 1997, the Chinese government started to import Oman's liquefied petroleum gas and constructed the receiving terminal of natural gas along the coast.

In addition to its strategic importance, Oman assumed a new significance to China in the 1990s. China, particularly since 1993, began to turn to Oman and other Gulf states to secure long-term energy supplies in order to obviate the sharp increases in its energy consumption resulting from its rapid economic growth. China, therefore, started to pay more attention to developing its economic relations with Oman. In June 1993, Qiu Zhongjiang, vice-president visited Muscat in 1993 and expressed his company's willingness to have CNP employees trained by Omani workers.

Thus, oil was high on the agenda. As China became a net importer of oil in 1993,

it began to import large amounts of Omani crude oil. Since then, China became one of the Major recipients of Oman's crude oil. After China first started to import Oman's crude oil in large quantities in 1993, it immediately assumed a leading position. China was in third place behind Japan and South Korea. Its imports of Oman's crude oil continued to increase every year after 1995, which allowed China to become the third leading recipient of crude oil from Oman in 1997. China ranked only behind Japan who remained Oman's top crude oil customer by 1997 and Thailand who assumed second place.

In 1995, China signed a contract with the Omani government to increase its purchases of Oman's crude oil from less than 20,000 bbl/day in 1995 to 100,000 bbl/day in 1996.^① In the first four months of 1998, China imported 40.5 million barrels of oil from Oman and dropped to fourth place behind Japan, Thailand, and South Korea, respectively.

The suitability of Oman's crude oil to China's existing refining technology and ability means Oman has become a very successful trading partner with China. This is significant because, if China wants to be a major importer of crude oil from other major exporters of oil in the Gulf and Peninsula region. Therefore, as China's economic growth continues to mount in the next century, China's imports of Oman's crude oil are expected to increase as long as Oman continues its production of oil.

In 1997, the Chinese government began to import Oman's liquefied natural gas(LNG). It was also in the process of selecting three coastal locations for the

^① *Middle East Economic Digest*, Vol.37.No 23, 11 June 1993, p.29.

construction of LNG-receiving terminals. At least one of these was reportedly to be in Guangdong province, whose municipal government signed a letter of intent with Oman LNG in 1994.^① In May 1999, the Chinese government also offered its willingness to conduct a joint study with Oman in the protection, exploration, and use of water resources.

China's trade with Oman also increased from being only 3 percent of China's total trade with Gulf and peninsula region countries in the 1980s to 15 percent in the first six years of the 1990s. The Chinese imports constituted over 95 percent of total trade with Oman in the first six years of the 1990s. Oman became the principal exporter to China from the Gulf and Arabian peninsula region. The Chinese market's total value with Oman was US\$3256 million, approximately US\$1000 million ahead of Saudi Arabia, which was in second place. In 1997, the trade sum of two countries amounted to 13.62455 billion dollars with the increase of 65.8 percent than compared with last year, ranking No.3 in commerce between China and West Asia and North Africa, among which the amount of imports of Oman from China's imports is 5019.2 million dollars, accounting for 0.99% of Omani total imports with the growth of almost 30% than that of 1996.

In 1998, due to the drop of oil prices and Chinese reduction of imported crude oil, the trade volume declined by 45.3% with the value of about 7.5 billion dollars. But in 1998, Chinese exports to Oman ascended to about 3,9420 thousand dollars, the best level in history. In 1999, both sides drew up the agreement of avoiding double

^① *Middle East Economic Survey*, Vol.41.No 13, 30 March 1998, p.A8.

taxation, expecting to sign officially after completing legal formalities.

In 1999, the trade volume between the two countries tumbled to 6.6 billion dollars.^① In 2004, it reached 43.9 billion dollars, with 42.8 million dollars export from Oman to China and 1.1 billion dollars of import.

This sharp increase in China's imports from Oman is due to its increasing crude oil imports from Oman. Realizing the importance of Oman, Chinese President Jiang Zemin met H.E. Thuwayni bin Shihab Al Said, a special representative of Sultan Qaboos, and emphasized China's willingness to forge a long-term, stable, and comprehensive cooperative relationship with Oman for the new century, on the existing basis of bilateral links. The Chinese President praised Oman's efforts in promoting unity among Arab states and working toward peace and stability in the Gulf region.

Table 3.1 Oman's exports of crude oil by country(region) (1992-1994)

	1992		1993		1994	
	(%)	(million bbl)	(%)	(million bbl)	(%)	(million bbl)
Japan	40.4	102.0	33.6	89.9	42.1	113.9
USA	0.6	1.5	4.1	10.9	5.9	16.0
France	0.4	0.9	0.3	0.7		
S.Korea	28.0	70.8	25.7	68.7	17.1	46.3

^① Huang Peizhao, China-Oman relations, *Arab World, the second volume of 2000*, p.14.

Singapore	4.6	11.6	6.2	16.5	2.3	6.1
Thailand	5.3	13.5	6.5	17.5	9.9	26.8
Philippines					1.0	2.6
Taiwan,China	7.9	20.0	7.9	21.0	7.1	19.2
Australia			0.2	0.6	1.4	3.9
China's mainland			10.4	27.9	9.8	26.5
Other	12.8	32.2	4.9	13.2	3.4	9.1
Total	100.0	252.5	100.0	267.4	100.0	270.4

Source: Oman Ministry of Development, Statistical Yearbook 1994 (Oman: Information and Documentation Centre, 1995), p.189; *Statistical Yearbook* 1995, p.193; and *Statistical Yearbook* 1997, p.173.

Table 3.2 Oman's exports of crude oil by country(region) (1995-1997)

	1995		1996		1997	
	(%)	(million bbl)	(%)	(million bbl)	(%)	(million bbl)
Japan	34.7	99.4	30.4	90.5	28.2	85.9
USA	2.5	7.2	4.6	13.6	0.5	1.5
France			0.6	1.8		

S.Korea	18.8	53.8	19.2	57.0	16.5	50.3
Singapore	3.0	8.7	2.6	7.8	0.2	0.5
Thailand	13.5	38.8	18.3	54.4	23.5	71.6
Philippines	2.2	6.3	3.7	11.1	4.8	14.5
Taiwan,China	5.8	16.7	3.0	9.0	2.0	6.2
Australia	1.0	2.9	1.3	3.9	0.9	2.7
China's mainland	11.4	32.8	14.2	42.4	22.7	69.2
Other	7.0	20.0	2.0	6.1	0.8	2.3
Total	100.0	286.6	100.0	297.6	100.0	304.7

Source: Oman Ministry of Development, Statistical Yearbook 1994 (Oman: Information and Documentation Centre, 1995), p.189; *Statistical Yearbook* 1995, p.193; and *Statistical Yearbook* 1997, p.173.

1980-1999 Oman-China trade statistics are as follows: (the unit: million dollars)

Year	Total sum	Export	Import
1980	1276	1276	
1989	13902	790	13112
1990	12034	571	11463

1991	51243	640	50603
1992	45509	818	44691
1993	57210	1103	56107
1994	43103	1766	41337
1995	49640	1488	48152
1996	82336	1214	81122
1997	136246	1696	134550
1998	74588	3942	70646
1999	66245	2708	63537

Source: Huang PeiZhao: "Oman and China relations", *"The Arab world 2, 2000)*, p. 14.

During the 1990s, Oman and China strengthen their communication in culture and public health field.

On July 1991, Omani National Heritage and Culture Secretary, visited Guangzhou in China to participate in the anniversary celebration of "Sohar" – antiqued wooden ship and presided over "Oman Cultural Week" activities. In November, He Jingzhi, China's acting Minister of Culture, visited Oman and took charge of "Chinese Culture Week" activities.

In December 1995, the monument of the ancient ship Sohar funded by Oman

was built in Guangzhou, South China's Guangdong Province.

In October 1993, Omani Vice Minister of Health visited China and made an investigation into Chinese traditional medicine, plastic surgery, burns, medicinal plants, orthopedics, nursing work, etc.. Both sides signed the execution plan of sanitation cooperation from 1993 to 1995. In October 1997, the Health Ministers of two countries signed 1997-1999 health cooperation execution plan.

In September 1999, at the invitation of Zhang Wenkang, H.E. Ali Bin Moussa, Omani Health Minister, visited China, the two ministers holding a formal talks and exchanging views on sanitation cooperation of two countries. H.E. Ali Bin Moussa proposed traditional Chinese physicians and nursing staff to Oman and the enhancement of mutual cooperation in the field of medical research. Currently in Oman there are a few Chinese doctors, nurses and other medical personnel.

In recent years, Chinese traditional medicine have entered Omani medicine market with great favour of patients such as Wuji Baifeng pills (乌鸡白凤丸), Guilingji (龟灵集), Bezoar hypertension relieving tablets (牛黄降压片), Huatuo cream (华佗膏), Tianwang cardiotonic bolus (天王补心丹), unfettered pills (逍遥丸), borneol (冰片散), Maweilong, Ginseng Royal jelly, grinding incense hemorrhoids inspection etc.. At present Chinese patent medicine made by Chinese pharmaceutical factories has occupied the pharmaceutical market in Oman, which marks the overall and unceasing development in the field of medical hygiene between Oman and China.

4.5 The relations between Oman and China from 2000 to present

In January 2000, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ji Peiding visited Oman, met with Omani Foreign Affairs Minister, and handed him the letter of Chinese President Jiang Zeming to Sultan Qaboos.

In October, Sun Guangxiang, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, led Chinese government trade delegations to visit Oman. He, along with Omani Minister of Industry and Commerce, jointly hosted the 4th meeting of Oman-China mixed committee of economy and trade with minutes of the meeting signed. On October 31nd, President Jiang Zemin accepted credentials of Omani new Ambassador at the Great Hall of the People. On November 6th, China's new Ambassador in Oman Zhao Xuechang submitted credential letters to Sultan Qaboos.

In April 2001, Zhang Yesui, an Assistant Foreign Minister, led Chinese government delegations to attend the 3rd Council of Ministers Meeting of Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation in Oman's capital Muscat. During the conference, Oman Foreign Affairs Minister met with them. The same month, China's Foreign Minister Shi Guangsheng invited Oman Oil and Gas Minister visit to China. Wu Yi, the State Councilor and Shi Guangsheng interviewed him respectively. In June Oman's Foreign Minister visited China and was met with by Tang Jiaxuan, Chinese Foreign Minister. Yang Wenchang Chinese Vice Foreign Minister held the 13th round political consultations of Oman-China Foreign Ministry.

On September 30th, 2001, Sultan Qaboos presented a model of the imitation of

the ancient ship “Sohar” to Chinese President Jiang Zemin, in celebration of the 52nd National Day of China as well as in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the imitated ship’s visit to China.

In December 2001, Sultan Qaboos donated U.S.\$200, 000 to help the Quanzhou Museum of Overseas History build the Islamic Arab Exhibition Room. It was in September when the ancients ship “Sohar” reached guangzhou owing to its 20th anniversary as well as China 52th National Day that Oman ambassador delivered to Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang the gift of the ship model of “Sohar” sent by Sultan Qaboos to President Jiang Zeming. In October, President Jiang Zemin wrote to Sultan Qaboos to express his thanks.

Chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee Li Peng paid an official friendly visit to Oman from December 1st to 4th, 2001. Chairman Li Peng held talks with Deputy Prime Minister of Cabinet Affairs of Oman, both sides were satisfied with the friendly relation existing between Oman and China Both sides exchanged ideas and obtained a broad consensus on how to further promote and develop the friendly mutual cooperation and issues of common concern. Oman news agency on its December 2nd report said that Chairman Li Peng’s visit is one of Chinese top leaders to Oman which will definitely promote the friendly cooperation existing between Oman and China. Some media believed that strengthen and friendly cooperation will benefit all the people from both countries.

On March 22nd, 2002, at the invitation of Omani government, State Councilor Wu Yi led a Chinese government delegation to leave for Oman and paid a four-day

friendly visit. On March 23rd, Sultan Qaboos met with Chinese state councilor Wu Yi in the southeastern city in Salalah. Sultan Qaboos thought that Oman has been all the way concerned with the development of China, and hopes to further develop in political, economic, trade and other fields of cooperation with China. Wu Yi appreciated Sultan Qaboos' national achievements in construction based on its own power and his diplomatic policy to pursue neutrality, nonaligned and good-neighborly and friendly foreign policy. She actively evaluated Oman-China friendly ties and pointed out Oman remains China's most important source of oil with great bilateral cooperation potentials. What's more, she also stressed that China is willing to strengthen bilateral cooperation, especially the ways of cooperation in the areas of business and oil. Wu Yi attended the signing ceremony of Oman-China for oil cooperation memorandum and two direct oil contracts. Miss Wu also met with Deputy Prime Minister of Oman Cabinet Affairs with exchanging opinions in further development of bilateral relations and some areas of common interest.

On October 22nd, 2003, Sultan Qaboos met with secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Wu Guangzheng in Muscat. Sultan Qaboos said Oman treasures very much the traditional friendship between people from both countries. He expected and believed our two countries will surely achieve more positive result in the fields of energy resources, transportation, economy and trade etc.. Wu Guangzheng said China's new collective leadership attaches great importance to developing friendly relations with Gulf countries including Oman, China is willing to work together with Oman to

further promote the existing friendly cooperation to a higher, wider and deeper level development.

On December 5th, Zeng Qinghong, Chinese Vice President, met with Oman Foreign Affairs Minister H.E. Yusuf Bin Allawi with both parties exchanging views on some international issues.

In June 2004, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in Qingdao met with Foreign Affairs Minister of Oman, who came to attend Asia cooperation dialogue 3rd foreign ministers meeting. Both sides signed Oman-China ministry's memorandum of understanding of foreign strategic consultation. In July, Oman's National Economic and Financial Affairs Minister, visited China by following the united delegation of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

On the evening of September 11th, 2004, Sultan Qaboos met with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. The two sides agreed strengthening bilateral relations is in line with the common interests of the people of both countries, Sino-Oman friendship and cooperation has broad prospects.

In June 2005, Chinese Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan visited Oman and held talks with Oman Deputy Prime Minister with both sides signing the cooperation agreement in energy, communications and other fields. In September, Oman deputy prime minister came to China and met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan.

In February 2006, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Lv Guozeng visited Oman to hold the two countries' first strategic consultation of Ministry. In May, Omani Foreign

Minister, attended the second ministerial meeting of China-Arab cooperation BBS in China. In June, Zhang Dejiang, member of the Political Bureau of CPC, Guangdong provincial party committee secretary, visited Oman.

In April, 2006, the Second Ministerial Meeting of China-Arab Cooperation Forum was held in Beijing. At the same time, China submitted to Oman historical documents of Sino-Oman relations.

On December 8th, 2007, Oman Deputy Prime Minister of Cabinet Affairs met with Simayi Aimaiti, Vice-chairman of Chinese NPC Standing Committee who came to Oman for a visit. On 9th Simayi aimaiti held talks respectively with chairman of Oman National Committee, the president of Omani Consultative Conference. Both sides carried out an in-depth exchange of views on further promoting bilateral relations of the two countries and the communication of legislatures.

In March 2007, Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oman paid a visit to China, with the ministries of the two countries holding a second round of strategic consultation.

On November 12th, 2009, Wang Zhaoguo, member of the CPC Political Bureau and Vice-chairperson of Standing Committee of NPC, met Vice Chairman of Oman National Committee in Muscat, the capital of Oman. With long history of standing Oman-China friendly cooperative relations have developed steadily for 30 years in various levels and areas. In addition, China's National People's Congress and Oman State Council have close communication with each other. China values the friendship with Oman willing to further expand personnel exchanges, deepen the pragmatic

cooperation, strengthen communication and coordination in international and regional affairs and promote bilateral relations constantly to attain new progress.

May 2010, Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oman attended the Fourth “China-Arab Cooperation Forum” Ministerial Conference.

On November 6th, 2010, in response to Oman Consultative Conference’s invitation, Jia Qinglin, President of CPPCC, started an official visit to Oman. On 8th, he held talks with President of Oman Consultative Conference. Both sides had an in-depth exchange of views of their common concern and further advancing Oman-China relationship and reached consensus.

China is willing to continually deepen the relations between the two countries in the following areas:

First, to respect each other’s interests and promote mutually strategic trust.

Second, to deepen practical cooperation, strengthen cooperation in the fields of economy and trade, energy, infrastructure and fishery and expand the new areas of cooperation.

Third, to expand cultural exchanges and enhance people's friendly relationship. To strengthen exchange in such fields as education, culture and art etc. in order to lay the solid foundation for Oman-China long-term friendly relation.

Fourth, to strengthen multilateral cooperation, keep in close touch with each other when concerning global issues as the reform of the security council, international finance system reform, and climate change and regional hotspots in the Middle East. To jointly maintain developing countries rights and interests, the peace

and stability of Middle East gulf area and enhancement of the world's everlasting peace and common prosperity.

Oman highly appreciates China's firmly support for the Arabian people's cause and achievements in political, economic, and social fields. Oman wish to continually expand friendly relations and promote cooperation, thus pushing stability of bilateral relations in the long run.

After the meeting, Jia Qinglin attended the signing ceremony of the two countries in building Zheng He's monument, human resources training and promoting two-way investment and cooperation documents. During the talks, the two sides exchanged views on Oman-China relations, common concerns of international and regional issues. They believed the visit will promote the mutual understanding and friendship between the people of the two countries and the new progress in friendly cooperation.

Since the 21st century, Oman and China's economic exchanges expand, not only in the increased amount but in steady improvement. China's main exports to Oman are large-scale port equipment, textile products and garments, and its main import from the country is crude oil. Oman is one of China's major petroleum sellers and the total value of the petroleum fealing between Oman and China is more than 90 percent of bilateral trade volume between the two countries.

In 2002, the total volume of trade between Oman and China came to US\$1.506 billion, of which China's export was US\$60million, and import US\$1.446 billion.

In 2004, the total volume of trade between Oman and China came to US\$4.39

billion, of which China's import US\$4.28 billion. China importing Omani crude oil came to 16.35 million tons, and Oman has become China's largest oil supplies countries.^①

In 2005, the total volume of trade between Oman and China came to US\$4.33 billion, of which China's export was US\$4.13 million, mainly crude oil; and import US\$0.191billion, mainly mechanical and electrical products, steel and its products, high-tech products, and textile products, etc..

In 2006, the total volume of trade between Oman and China came to US\$6.47 billion, of which China's export was US\$34 million, and import US\$6.13 billion .

By the end of 2000, China totally signed 87 copies of labor contract with contracts awarded 5374 million dollars and completed turnover 3987 million dollars. At the end of 2000, China contracted labor service personnels of 187 in Oman.^②

There are more than 50 Chinese enterprises in Oman which distribute in telecom, construction, service and oil fields so on. These fields will be becoming hot sectors in promoting Oman-China cooperation with expansion to other areas and other regions in Oman. Omani government strongly advocates the cooperation between the private enterprises and the Chinese enterprises. The two countries are bound to have great cooperative potential in oil, gas, minerals, highway construction, communication, computer and program development.

Oman and China also have made good progress in resources development,

^① Hou Shumin & Zhao Wenyan, "A Chinese Oman cooperation and prosperity business summit BBS" in Beijing, China International Times, on September 26, 2005, 5th version

^② International Business Daily, on December 14, 2001, 004 version.

communication, transportation, industrial and municipal construction and other fields of cooperation. China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical, Huawei - a Chinese telecoms giant, GR 18 group and Sinohydro Corporation successively contracted a batch of engineering projects of infrastructure in Oman.

By the end of 2004, Chinese investors in Oman have established five large investment enterprises: namely China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical, Tianjin cement industry design institute (TCDRI), Weihai HuaYue construction development Co., LTD, Ningbo Liaoyuan lamps and lanterns joint stock limited company. Oman and China's bilateral trade is keeping sustainable and strong development with both sides already signing many protocols in various fields such as technology, health, culture, publicity, air transport and other fields of cooperation, an agreement of mutual investment protection and an agreement of avoiding double taxation between the two countries. China petrochemical group and Oman oil ministry have signed an agreement in 2003 to empower Chinese companies in southern areas of Oman the rights of developing oil and dealing with oil trade. In order to strengthen the relationship between the two countries, Oman and China also organized mixed committee at ministerial level, with regular meetings to discuss trades between the two countries, investment, technical aspects and the implement agreement, etc..

In January 2004, China and the League of Arab States jointly established "China-Arab Cooperation Forum", which is a new dialogue and cooperation

mechanism for China and Arab countries including Oman. In June 2004, China-Arab strategic agreement signed in Qingdao of China, was a milestone in the light of the diplomatic history of Oman and China. The activities mentioned above enrich the connotation of comprehensive communication of China and Oman, promote cooperative level, further motivate the cooperation and exchanges of two countries in various areas and boost mutual development.

In response to the Chinese government's invitation, H.E. Sayyid Fahd Bin Mahmoud Al Said, Deputy Prime Minister of Cabinet Affairs of Oman, paid an official visit to China in September 24th to 28th, 2005, accompanied by five ministers of included foreign affairs, industry and commerce, agriculture and fisheries, oil and gas, news, chairman of the chamber of commerce and industry and a few famous business entrepreneurs. During the visit of the delegation in China, Omani embassy on September 27 morning held in Beijing "China- Oman cooperation and prosperity business summit BBS" with the Omani delegation present led by the Minister of Industry and Commerce.

As one of the activities of 2010 expo Oman sponsored, China-Arab trade Forum began in Shanghai on September 27th in 2010, on which Oman's government officials concered, 50 enterprise delegates and more than 250 Chinese business people carried out a spirited discussion on how to seek bilateral trade opportunities in the fast-growing economic environment of Oman. In 2009 the total volume of trade between Oman-China exceeds 1.2 billion (\$80 billion yuan).^①

^① Chen Xiaoxun: Oman welcomed China's metallurgical enterprises to invest, *China Metallurgical News*, on October 12, 2010, A02 version.

In the 21st century, Oman and China have a frequent exchanges in culture and mutual visits among senior leaders with the establishment of official institution in charge of cultural exchanges.

In January 2004, Ye Xiaowen, Commissioner of Chinese State Religion Bureau, visited Oman and met respectively with Omani Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Religious Affairs.

In November 2005, Omani Educational Secretary, attended China the fifth national education high-level meeting of UNESCO. China's Peking University President Xu Zhihong visited Oman. In December, Chen Haosu, president of China's Foreign Friendly Association, visited Oman, promoting the friendly exchanges and cooperation between the people of two countries.

In April 2006, Omani Tourism Minister visited China, and signed "the memorandum of understanding implementation plan on Chinese tour groups to Oman for tourism". In June, Minister of Omani Culture and Heritage came to China to attend Arab arts festival. The youth delegation of Omani IOC visited China. In November, Nasser, president of Sultan Qaboos University, visited China.

On June 28th, 2007 "China-Oman friendship association was founded, which improve all-round development of relations between the two countries, especially in cultural exchanges. In the joint efforts of both sides, Oman-China will uncover a new chapter in economic, political and cultural exchanges. On July 3, 2007 Oman has established "Sultan Qaboos Chair for the Arabic Studies at Beijing University."

5. Influencing Factors and the problem of Omani-Sino Relations

5.1 Influencing Factors of Omani-Sino Relations

That different variables such as geopolitics, history, bureaucracy, intellectuals, and media play a key role in forming China's relations with Oman. In order to survey the literature about the impact of these variables on Omani-Sino Relations, we focus on the impact of the following main domestic components on Omani-Sino relations: geopolitics, regional order, history and tradition, ideology and leadership.

5.1.1 Geopolitics

Geopolitics is a significant perspective to have the understanding of international relations. China has geopolitical, energy, safety and other important strategic interests in Oman in the light of the geopolitical reality of China and the Middle East with the sequence of energy, safety and geography according to the national interests of utility. China's interests in the Middle East determine the relationship with Oman. In the long run, China supports the principles of peace, cooperation and development to maintain the friendly relations with Oman.

Due to the unique geographical position, Oman- known in Middle East region as "the junction of three continents", "crossing of lands" and "the spot with five seas and

three continents" and so on – connects Europe, Asia, Africa, controls five shipping "passages", namely the strait of Gibraltar, Sicily, the Suez Canal, Mandeb Strait and Hormuz Strait, and is the artery for the international land, sea and air transport. Oman has an important significance of geopolitical strategy in world politics in the fact that it is the birthplace of the three world religions with both vitally social and cultural significance and also it was dubbed "the world's oil warehouse" with rich oil deposits. Therefore, Oman is of great importance for China owing to its geopolitically strategic significance which is the fundamental motive for the two sides in contact with each other.

China has two distinct characteristics in geopolitics: on the one hand, China is the typical country of the composite of land and sea; on the other hand China's energy security is grim because of the shortage of resources. China, with a terrestrial power and the sea right, is located in the east of Eurasia, bordered on the west coast of Pacific Ocean. Such a composite country has its favorable conditions in location with relatively boundless land space as well as the convenient exploitation of oceans barriers and ocean passages, but simultaneously the country endowed with the two attributes is challenged with the strategic pressure on safety from land and sea, thus suffering double vulnerability on safety. In reality China faces two strategic pressures from western and eastern directions. In the west, China is contained by the traction of NATO which will result in unprecedentedly complex geopolitical security environment on land; in the east further development of the right of sea is stunted by the U.S.-Japan alliance. What makes the situation worse is the two tractions come to

becoming pincer attack gradually. Great attachment to both sides is China's geopolitical safety features, which draw support from the western line with focus on the Middle East to confront the challenges from the eastern line. Energy is the important guarantee of China's peaceful rise. In "western line" whether Central Asia or the Middle East, both include oil and other strategic resources which the Middle East is in scarcity of. Moreover, since China and the Middle East are closely linked in geography, the Middle East has become an important component according to the China's "big neighboring country strategy".

With the above considerations, the geopolitical support between Oman and China is bound to be an important driving force in pushing China's association with Oman forward.

5.1.2 Regional Order

Regional order exercised a significant influence on China's post-1949 foreign policy. China's traditional world orders are as follows:

- 1 China's world order was hierarchical, not egalitarian.
- 2 China's centrality in the world was a function of its civilization and virtue, particularly the virtue of the Chinese ruler.
- 3 No balance of power existed.
- 4 National power was a reflection of the natural virtue. Power was moral

because it derived from the possession of virtue.

5 International society was the extension of internal society; no boundary existed since there was no nation-state. Boundary was defined in terms of cultural differences.^①

The Chinese saw themselves at the centre of the world and as the source of all civilizations and cultures. They regarded their country as the “Middle Kingdom” or the centre of the world, with the Chinese emperor at the heart of everything as a universal ruler, and the “uncivilized barbarian” nations at the peripheries. They regarded their civilization to be superior to any other nation’s. And their rulers were designated with the mandate of heaven, as the sons of heaven, to govern the land from one dynasty to another. Foreign societies were ranked high or low in the hierarchy depending on how close they were to China culturally. In the Chinese perception of world order, territorial limitations were imprecise and the purpose of interactions between “barbarians” and the Chinese was transformation of the former along the lines of the Chinese model. Barbarians’ foreigners could come to China participate in the benefits of the Chinese civilization and learn from the achievements of the Chinese in spheres of natural and social sciences. Those who wished to come to China and learn to be civilized must accept Chinese culture and recognize the supreme authority of the emperor as mediator between heaven and earth by bringing tributes. The tributary system was established to enable the tributary state to trade

^① Mancall, M.(1963) ‘The Persistence of tradition of China’s foreign policy’. Annals of the Ameircan Academy of Political and Social Sciences 349(Srptember), pp.17-19.

with China and receive permission for their traders' power in China from the emperor. Thus, the tributary system was the means for conducting and establishing foreign relations with China. In order to deal with them, foreigners were required to send tribute missions periodically to the Chinese emperor. Such missions were perceived by the Chinese as recognition by the "barbarians" of the emperor's superiority.

The breakdown of the institutions of China's traditional world order, after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking on 27 August 1842 with the British, took place faster than erosion of the above assumptions on which the order itself was based. It is therefore, as he argues, possible that historically-rooted assumptions concerning the nature of international order, differing from that of both the West and Russia, may be a complicating factor in contemporary China's foreign relations. He specifies the influence of the past on China's foreign policy through the following levels:

- 1 A vivid sense of outrage directed at the Western imperialist powers that contributed to the erosion of China's traditional world order and influence.

- 2 A sense of China's primacy in its relations with its neighbouring countries marked by the signing of border agreements with Pakistan, Nepal, and Burma, which depended on China's goodwill for their validity.

- 3 Adoption of old techniques in contemporary Chinese diplomacy including the exchange of cultural missions, official visits, and using barbarians against barbarians' in its relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union.

China's old diplomatic techniques of receiving gifts has now been substituted by the exchange of dance and musical troops, official delegations, students and scholars,

journalists, and civic leaders. Personalized diplomacy through cultural missions, is central to China's diplomacy as it was under the Ming Emperor. He also sees the influence of the past on China's foreign relations in the continuance of xenophobia in China's foreign relations, which led China to adopt a nationalist foreign policy in its relations with neighbouring Asian countries and the superpowers. China, according to Scalapino^①, is seeking to achieve the following three objectives: first, to define and defend its boundaries; second, to acquire a buffer system that gives it security in depth; and, finally, to exercise some degree of hegemony over the region with which it has primary contact. To him, China was showing a sense of primacy when marking its boundaries with the surrounding countries, gaining rather than making concessions.

In addition to the above arguments regarding the levels of influence that the past has had on China's foreign policy, its traditional assumption of hierarchy in world order has also left its mark. This was evident in China's own classification, in the 1950s, of the international system through its "two camps theory" and in its "three worlds theory" of the 1970s. Such classifications highlighted the hierarchical ranking of states in each theory.

Despite China being forced by powerful Western countries and Japan in the late nineteenth century to abandon its own "well-tried methods and ideology for conducting relations with non-Chinese people", the method remained influential on

^① Scalapino, R.A (1962): 'Traditions and transition' in the Asian policy of communist China's in E.F. Sacaepanik(ed.) *Symposium on Economic and social Problem of the Far East*, Hong Kong University Press. pp.262-277)

many powerful Chinese leaders. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek in the 1920s and 1930s, respectively, maintained that China had to become strong so that it could once again play its traditional role in the world through the moral influence of Chinese culture. Mao's adoption of Marxism-Leninism was based on his beliefs of the possibility of world revolution in which China's example would be crucial. According to Cranmer-Byng, both versions of China's mission in the future coexisted after the establishment of the PRC and were nourished by strong feelings of nationalism and pride in China as an exemplar in "cultural" values. He concluded:

One essential quality, which both versions of this faith in China's special mission have in common, is their "imprinted" belief in the relevance of Chinese cultural values and lifestyle as an inspiration to guide other peoples of the world in the future.^①

Chih-yu Shih (1990) studies the effect of Chinese traditions and cultural norms such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism on China's foreign behaviour. He produces three different styles of leadership: the hierarchical style, the normalcy style, and the rebellion style. The hierarchical style refers to a leadership that seeks coercive incentives to demand mass support for certain moral principles, and emphasizes loyalty and organization. The normalcy style refers to a leadership that tries to 'reconcile national interests and individual citizens' self interest through materials

^① J Cranmer-Byng(1973): 'The Chinese view of their place in the world.' *The China Quarterly* 53(January/March), pp.76-79

incentives', and emphasizes rationality. The rebellion style refers to a leadership that encourages the masses to fight against the status quo. According to him, the adoption of a certain style depends on the leader's personality, personal experiences, and the situation. He finds that, before the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong adopted the hierarchical style, which tends to apply 'asymmetric norms' to diplomacy that advocate Confucianist ideas of control through punishment and reward, superiority and obedience. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping adopted the normalcy style, which tends to apply "symmetric norms" to diplomacy that advocate Confucian brotherhood, friendship, and to maintain them through compromise. After the Cultural Revolution, Mao adopted the rebellion style, which tends to apply the "Yi norms" to diplomacy that advocate "revolutionary brotherhood", and commitment to challenge the "unjust authority"^①. Chih-yu Shih concludes that China's diplomacy "reflects the world view held by Chinese leaders" and that the "norms for inter-personal relationships are applied to understanding and the management of interstate relationships" (Chih-yu Shih 1990:190).

Crespigny (1995) states that the past has left its mark on contemporary Chinese foreign policy in terms of the following:

1 The old issue of Chinese rejection of foreign interference in its internal affairs is being carried out by the Chinese government in its foreign relations today.

2 The hierarchical nature of the traditional Chinese view of internal and international systems and their division of power within each system continues to

^① Chih-yu Shih (1990), *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp.80-190

play a key role in China's present interests in East and South-East Asia. Its policy towards this region is not only influenced by a sense of order but also by expectations of control and guidance, which stems from the old Chinese family hierarchical system in which the father and the elderly assume a superior .

3 Official control by central government is another aspect of the influence of the past on China's contemporary foreign policy, as control has been viewed as an essential ingredient of the effort involved in keeping the country undivided^①.

All the above arguments suggest that history and traditions have played a key role in influencing and shaping China's foreign behaviour.

5.1.3 Ideology

The writings on the role of ideology in China's foreign policy suggest that there are two stages in the development of the role of ideology. The first is the Mao Zedong period from 1949 to 1978, and the second is the post-Mao phase from 1979 to the present time. The role of ideology in China's foreign policy has been perceived in terms of this timescale. Ideology is seen to be the most dominant factor in shaping China's foreign policy during the first stage. Scholars and political analysts base their views of China's foreign policy on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and Mao

^① de Crespigny(1995), "Tradition and Chinese foreign policy" in S.Harrisand G.Klintworth(eds.) *China as a Great power: Myths, Realities, and Challegee in the Asia-Pacific Region*. New York: St. Martin's press, pp.42-43.

Zedong, as the ideological guidance behind foreign policy. Beijing's behaviour towards accepting Moscow's superiority in the 1950s, supporting solidarity in the Third World, advocating a new Third World policy in the 1960s, and shifting its alliance towards favouring closer ties with the United States in the 1970s have all been viewed as the logical result of China's conversion to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. From the 1980s onwards, many scholars and analysts began to view a decline in the role played by ideology in China's foreign policy. They, therefore, see new doctrines such as nationalism, modernization, and national interest as the replacements for the old principles of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought.

Those who argue for the significance of ideology in China's foreign behaviour tend to focus on the influence of Marxism-Leninism and of Mao Zedong thought. Schurmann^① distinguishes between the two forms of ideology in relation to their actions. He defined Marxism-Leninism as the "pure ideology" and Mao's thought as the "practical ideology". To him, "pure ideology" aims at shaping the thinking of the people, rather than producing immediate actions; and "practical ideology" aims at producing action to implement certain policies. In this account, "pure ideology" is a shared ideology among all communist parties of the world, but "practical ideology" is something that varies from one party to another according to the circumstances of each country. According to him, "pure ideology" played a key role in developing "practical ideology" in China. Mao's world outlook was seen as a product of the

^① Schurmann(1968), *Ideology and organization in Communist China*, 2nd edn. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.19-33.

impact of “pure ideology” in China’s foreign policy. Two main themes of Mao’s thought were given substantial attention by analysts for their roles in shaping China’s foreign policy. First is Lenin’s interpretation of imperialism, which had made a great impact on Mao’s perception of the “enemy” in international relations. James Chieh Hsiung stresses that Lenin’s theory of imperialism filled an intellectual vacuum for many Chinese, including Mao himself, who found no explanation within their own traditions regarding exploitation^①. During the Chinese-Soviet alliance in the 1950s, Mao adhered to Lenin’s imperialism, made imperialism the main slogan in China’s propaganda war against the United States and the West, and viewed the world order in terms of two camps: the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the capitalist or imperialist camp headed by the United States. The conflict between these two camps was the basic element that shaped the nature of China’s foreign policy. Therefore, he saw the “lean to one side” policy as the most reliable foreign policy strategy to achieve China’s foreign policy goals in the 1950s:

Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front.

(Mao Zedong 1971:313:-14)

Another important aspect of the impact of Mao’s thought on China’s foreign

^① Hsiung(1970), *Ideology and Practice the evolution of Chinese Communism*, London: Pall Mall Press, pp.36-37.

policy was his thought on contradictions. According to this thought, in order for a society to develop towards the final objective-in China's case, this is Communism- it had to advance through stages. In each stage, there are some "primary" and "secondary" contradictions embodying the struggle to achieve the advancement of society to the next stage. Resolving the contradictions of each stage would be the primary step in the development of societies^①. Such analysis is essential to explain the change in China's foreign policy from one period to another particularly in regard to its relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. The deterioration of China's relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s onwards, and its shifting policies towards the Third World and later on towards the United States could be explained by looking at this analysis. John W. Garver explains Mao's thought on contradiction in political terms. He indicates that, at each stage of China's history, there has been a primary enemy stopping Chinese society from achieving its final objectives: the Japanese were the primary contradiction in the 1930s, the Chinese Nationalists in the 1940s, the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. This means that China has to increase its efforts to solve the primary contradiction in each stage first, before it moves to the next one^②.

Thus, the impact of ideology on China's foreign policy can be explained in the following terms:

1 Ideology had led China to adopt the "lean to one side" policy following the

^① Mao Zedong(1971), "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", in *Selected Reading from the Works of Mao Tzedong*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, pp.91-98.

^② Garver (1993), *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp.44-48.

proclamation of independence in 1949 and guided China's foreign policy to follow the Soviet line in its foreign relations. China, as a result, was isolated from the non-communist countries of the world, and ended up in total confrontation with the United States.

2 Mao's thinking shifted China's foreign policy strategy from ignoring the countries of the Third World in the first half of the 1950s to engaging them in the second half of the 1950s and the 1960s. The announcement of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the main elements of China's foreign relations with the countries of the Third World represented China's willingness to establish friendly relations with those countries in order to weaken the US strategic position mainly in Asia^①.

3 Mao's revolutionary thinking played a key role in the 1960s throughout the Third World. China supported the idea of "people's war", endorsing revolutions in a total of 23 countries in the world in 1965 (van Ness 1970:132-48), and devoted substantial resources for military training, arms supply, and ideological teaching to revolutionaries throughout those countries (van Ness 1970:114-16).

4 Mao's idea of contradiction helped China's foreign policy to adjust the shift in China's alliance from the Soviet Union towards rapprochement with the United States in the 1970s. Moscow, rather than Washington, according to Mao, had become the primary contradiction-principal enemy-to Beijing. China, therefore, had to work first to eliminate the primary enemy even if that required an alignment with the secondary

^① Garver (1993), *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p119.

enemy.

5.1.4 Leadership and political structure

Some argue that leadership has also played a key role in shaping and determining China's foreign policy. David Bachman (1998) agrees with this argument and stresses that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership plays a critical role in conducting China's foreign policy. Mao, according to Bachman^①, was the "undisputed" maker of China's foreign policy. He enjoyed complete authority over China's foreign policy, as foreign policy was his major intellectual and political concern. A. Doak Barnett^② extends this argument and argues that Mao totally dominated foreign policy decisions up to the time of his death and that Deng Xiaoping took the final decisions on many foreign policy issues in the 1980s and 1990s. He indicates that Deng, up the time of his death, remained the ultimate source of authority for making policy decisions in China-on foreign as well as domestic issues-even though he did not occupy the highest formal positions in the party or government. Most major decisions were taken by him and all had to be accepted by him. Barnett, however, distinguishes between Mao's method and Deng's method of foreign policy decision making. Mao's method was based on building a coalition in support of his policy decision-making. Mao's method was individualistic because he

^① Bachman(1998), "Structure and Prosess in the making of Chinese foreign policy," in S.Skim(ed): *China and the World: Chinese Foreign policy faces the New Millenmium*, Boulder, CO:Westview Press, pp.37-41.

^② A. Doak Barnett(1985), *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, Boulder,CO:westview press, p.12.

enjoyed complete authority, while Deng's method was based on building a coalition in support of his policy instead of imposing it on others^①. Such a method is said to be carried out by the Jiang Zemin leadership as well.

Bachman^② also argues that the characteristics of China's political structure- authoritarianism, highly-articulated nature, fragmentation, and bargaining- also shape China's external behaviour. All these characteristics of the political system 'affect foreign policy behaviour via coordination and control problems and competition among Chinese entities' and "enable the state to pursue a largely mercantilist international policy". He stresses this point by giving an example of the missile sales to Saudi Arabia. He indicates that high-ranked officials in the Chinese government and party made the decision to sell weapons, without even consulting the Foreign Ministry. Thus, the authoritarian nature of the system in China allows centralization of the decision-making process around a few high-ranking officials. Harry Harding believes that political reform in the post-Mao era has transformed some of the ideological features of the Chinese political system. He describes the system as a "consultative authoritarian" regime, in which the party may consult with individuals and institutions from inside or outside the government in its determination of national policy. Harding^③ sees it as "a significant departure from the totalitarianism of the

^① A. Doak Barnett(1985), *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, Boulder,CO:westview press, p.16.

^② Bachman,D (1994), "Domestic sources of Chinese Foreign Policy", in S.S.Kim(ed):*China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*,Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p.51.

^③ Harding(1987), *China's Second Revolution:Reform after Mao*. Washington,DC: Brookings Institution, p.200.

recent past, but not a truly pluralistic, or even quasi-democratic, political system.” China, according to this analysis, still does not allow independent parties, autonomous media, and independent social and professional organizations to participate in the formation of national policy. Zhao Quansheng^① demonstrates that the process of foreign policy making in China was transformed in the post-Mao era from its “vertical authoritarianism” during Mao’s leadership to “horizontal authoritarianism” or “collective authoritarianism” in the post-Mao era. The former was a one-man-dominated process based on a vertical command system; the latter involves several players participating in the foreign policy making process. An example of the post-Mao “horizontal” or “collective authoritarianism” is the adoption of the “independent foreign policy” in 1982.

^① Zhao Quansheng(1992): “Domestic factors of Chinese foreign policy: From Vertical to Horizontal authoritarianism”. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 519(January), pp.162-164.

5.1.5 The change of international system

The relations between Oman and China changed simultaneously as the international system changed. Neo-realism as a theoretical framework, worked nicely in explaining interaction between Oman and the PRC. China's foreign policy toward the region in the Cold War era, however, China's efforts to upgrade its economic capability was the determining factor that shaped China's foreign policy toward Oman. As mentioned earlier, neo-realist assume that states' foreign policies are shaped by their drive to increase or at least sustain their economic, political, and military capabilities relative to other regional and international powers. China exactly followed such a pattern. Its current and future requirements of oil forced China to further develop its relations with the countries of the region and be more concerned with the stability and security of the region.

After the collapse of the communist party and the economy in the Soviet Union, the Chinese government became more and more aware of the fact that any threat to the flow of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula oil(including Oman) to China could have widespread political and security consequences. For this reason, China's foreign policy will continue to call for stability in the region.

5.2 The problem of Omani-Sino Relations

5.2.1 Relationships between China and Islamic Emirates of Oman

In early 20th century, Omani tribes in mountainous areas uprose against the Sultan of Muscat and the rule of the UK, and they established the Imamate "Islamic Emirates of Oman". In 1920, the Sultan of Muscat Dynasty signed a "Seeb Treaty" with the Islamic Emirates of Oman, recognizing the independence of the Islamic Emirates of Oman. From then on, Oman was divided into the "Sultanate of Muscat" and the "Islamic Emirates of Oman".

In 1955, supported by the UK, Said Bin Taimur, the sultan of Muscat repealed the "Seeb Treaty", so the rulers of the Islamic Emirates of Oman, launched an armed uprising in the Green Hill (Jebel Akildar) against rule of the UK and the Sultan of Muscat. Their anti-Britain struggles gained the sympathy and support of the Arab world. In August 1957, based on the international struggles against colonialism all over the world, Chinese government addressed a note to the League of Arab States that China was opposed to UK's interference in the internal affairs of Oman.

In February 1959, the Vice Imam of Oman visited China and was met by the leaders of China. China decided to provide Oman cash of \$200,000 and military aid of \$700,000. However, due to transportation problems, the military aid wasn't fulfilled, only the cash was given to Oman. In 1967, sultan of Muscat Said bin Taimur got the Islamic Emirates of Oman, and unified Oman, establishing the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The Imam and his soldiers were defeated and fled to Saudi Arabia. After

that, China cut off its contact with the former Imamate “Islamic Emirates of Oman”.

5.2.2 China and the "Liberation Front of Omani People"

In 1965, people in Dhofar in southern Oman rebelled against the British colonial rule and the rule of the sultan, so armed struggles broke out. Under the leadership of the "Dhofar Liberation Front" (later renamed twice into "Liberation Front of People in Occupied Arab Gulf", hereinafter referred to as LFPOAG, and "Liberation Front of Omani People", hereinafter referred to as LFOP), people in Dhofar won continuously, and once controlled most of the Dhofar region. In order to oppose the imperialist colonial powers, Chinese Institute of Foreign Affairs invited the leader of LFOP, Muhammad Ahmed Ghassani to China and gave him a small amount of cash and weapons. In February 1970, Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) invited a delegation led by Talal Saad Mahmoud, a member of the headquarters of the Executive Committee LFPOAG to China, and Premier Zhou Enlai met the delegation. During their visit in China, an agreement was reached that China would provide weapons, cash, drugs and food aid to them, and China also promised to help LFPOAG train some radio technicians.

In 1970s, the situation underwent great changes due to the Soviet Union's meddling in the Gulf region and its intervention in Oman's internal matters. With the support of the Soviet Union, LFOP evolved into a leftist organization which claimed to "liberate the whole Arab Peninsula and the Gulf region." In view of this, China decided to stop

supporting LFOP in 1972. In December 1973, Omani Government requested Iran to send troops to help squelch LFOP. From then on, LFOP's military plight went from bad to worse, and it got caught in a diplomacy isolation. Till the end of 1975, the 10-year-long armed struggle in Dhofar subsided.

The Islamic Emirates of Oman and LFOP were two influential organizations in a specific period in Omani history, and the development of relations between China and the two was also in a particular historical context and against a specific times background with a small number of aid and a short time. In this regard, the Omani government could fully understand and let it go, so that this wasn't obstacles for the establishment of the diplomatic relations between the two countries. During the negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Oman, the foreign minister of Oman said: "China pursues a Policy of non-interference in others' internal affairs. Although China supported the national liberation movement in Oman, these were things in the past, and now they have been reduced, so Oman is willing to start diplomatic relations with China." In June 1978, when the Foreign Minister of Oman visited China, specially on the issue of Dhofar, Chinese leaders expressed: "China respects the sovereignty of Oman, and Oman should resolved its internal problems by itself." Thus, this problem in bilateral relations was resolved.

5.2.3 Oman and Taiwan keep touch each other

Back in the 1970s, Oman and Taiwan began to get in touch with each other in

business. In April 1977, under the impetus of Saudi Arabia, Oman agreed Taiwan to set up a "Commercial representative office" in the name of "Republic of China".

In 1977 and 1978, during the negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Oman, Song Zhiguang, the Chinese negotiator and ambassador to Britain, described China's principle that there was only one China and Taiwan was an indispensable territory of China, so Oman was hoped to dismiss Taiwan's "Commercial representative office" in Oman. The Omani negotiator and its Foreign Minister emphasized that Oman pursued one-China policy, and Oman-Taiwan relations was not intimate at all. It was Saudi Arabia that promoted the establishment of the small-scale commercial representative office. Oman never accepted any aids or aid programs from Taiwan. He said that Oman would dismiss "Commercial representative office" of Taiwan before the establishment of the two's formal diplomatic relations. On August 5, 1978, more than two months after the establishment of the two's relations, "Commercial representative office" of Taiwan in Oman was dismissed officially.

However, Taiwan never stopped its penetration into Oman, and businesses continued between Taiwan and Oman. In August 1981, Taiwan set up a "Far East Trade Service Center" in Oman. In June 1991, "Far East Trade Service Center" was renamed "The Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Kingdom of Oman". In December that year, Oman set up a "Commercial Agency" in Taiwan in the name of the Omani Committee of Industry and Commerce. As Oman's "Commercial Agency" didn't gain decent economic profits and Taiwan decided to end its funding to Oman

since 1997, Oman declared to close the business office in Taiwan in July 1996.

In the more than 20 years after the establishment of diplomatic relations of China and Oman, Oman basically adhered to principle of one-China, and stressed repeatedly that the mutual institutions established by Oman and Taiwan were only non-governmental, and the two didn't have any official interaction. However, on the other hand, sometimes Oman acquiesced to Taiwan's official movement. In November 1994, Oman raised to open navigation to Taiwan, but later set it aside due to the force from China. In April 1995, "Vice Minister of Economy" of Taiwan visited Oman and planned to invest some factories and build some training centers in Oman, and to train technicians for Oman. In October 1998, the "Economy Undersecretary" of Taiwan was invited to Oman by the Committee of Industry and Commerce Oman.

Oman kept quite intimate relations with Taiwan in economy and trade. In 1995, the two sides had a total trade of about \$ 356 million, including Taiwan's exports of \$1, 900 Million and imports of \$ 337 million. Taiwan's exports were mainly consisted of cotton and linen fabrics, machinery and equipment and the parts of them, and the imports crude oil, mineral products and aquatic products. In 1996 trade between the two amounted to \$2.1177 million, of which Oman imports was \$0.2731 million and exports \$1.8444 million (mostly oil exports). Taiwan was one of the major oil importers of Oman with a crude oil import of 2.186 million barrels in 1998, ranking the sixth in the importing countries and regions of Oman.

5.3 Conclusion

Since the two countries' established diplomatic relations, Oman and China have all the way maintained smooth cooperation and sound development in the fields of politics, economy and culture with the increasing exchange visits of top leaders and other levels of visits group. Both sides cherish the similar and consistent opinion towards major international and regional issues, lavish mutual sympathy, coordination and support in disposing international affairs and highlight mutually beneficial cooperation in economy, trade, culture, public health and other aspects etc., which have great potential. Oman and China associate with each other in various areas including political communication, economic and cultural exchanges.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Summary

The discussion suggests that the relations of Oman and China had existed a certain dynamism and an evolving toward. Both Oman and China are ancient and beautiful countries with deep and profound history and culture. Omani and Chinese people are sincere, simple, open and tolerate which are generally praised by the countries in the world, which is the base of communication between Oman and China before the establishment of the PRC.

During its first decade as an independent state, the PRC was politically isolated from most of the government of the Gulf and Arab Peninsula region, including Oman. When China was in close alignment with the Soviet Union, the Chinese government regarded Oman as a “puppet” of the West. This prevented China from establishing relations or pursuing connections with Oman. However this began to change toward the end of the 1950s. The Chinese began to view the Gulf and Peninsula region as a potential theatre to wage a revolutionary campaign against Western imperialism and as an arena of Sino-Soviet rivalry. Several years after the end of the Dhofar War, Oman and China established diplomatic relation on May 25th, 1978.

Another change in China’s foreign policy took place in 1982. That year witnessed the introduction and implementation of China’s ‘independent foreign policy’. The new Chinese policy came as a result of changes in China’s perception of

its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite improvement in its relations with the Soviet Union, China's fear of Moscow remained high throughout the 1980s. Moscow's presence in Afghanistan and South Yemen and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War elevated China's fear of the Soviet Union in this period. The Chinese government worried that Soviet Union could use the prolonged war in the region to its own advantage by exploiting one side against the other. Since 1980s, the communication between Oman and China can be seen every aspect in politics, economy, culture, etc..

The 1990s introduced some other important changes in China's foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union and also communism in Eastern Europe in general, the end of the cold war, and the United States taking the leading role as the policeman of the world contributed to another shift in China's relations with Oman. It was also mainly China's present and future requirements for oil that directed most of its foreign policy strategy toward the region in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the PRC became a net importer of oil for the first time in its forty-year history. With its increasing pace of economic development, China's net external oil requirements are expected to reach seven million barrels per day by 2015. Much of this oil will have to come from the Gulf and Arabian peninsula region, which holds the world's largest proven oil reserves.^① It was anticipated that 77 percent of China's oil imports in 2000 would come from the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, including Oman. The figure is expected to reach as high as 92 percent in 2005.

^① G.Kemp, "The Persian Gulf remain the stratigic prize", *Survival*,40(4)(winter), 1998-9, pp.135-136.

6.2 Some remark for future relations

Political interaction is the basic means for the linkage agents of international relationships to conduct political communication which plays a very important role in improving political relationship. Such an interaction between Oman and China from the angle of political communication is essentially a sort of dialogue and consultation based on publicity and mutual understanding so as to reach an activity-oriented consensus in public affairs, thus promoting the realization of common values and interests. Since the established diplomatic relations, Oman and China smoothly develop their relationship, consolidate their politically mutual trust and strengthen their interchanges at each level with fruitful pragmatic cooperation fulfilled. This kind of political communication deepens mutual understanding, enhances friendly mutual trust, expands mutual benefit cooperation in various levels, promotes each country's economic construction respectively and simultaneously improves the two countries' influence in the international society.

Since the end of the "cold war", peace and development have become the theme of the current international situation. The economic globalization has become the mainstream of this theme, which refers to the integration of the world economy in viewing the fact that globalization has exerted an impact on each domain of the world, Production, management, investment, finance and other economic behaviors all transcend national sovereignty and territory boundaries and flourish in the

interdependence and fusion of each country's economy. The worldwide economic interaction of human beings is intimate and frequent afoot with previous usurpation, annexation and mutual slaughter behavior outdated and gradually abandoned. In the integration of the world economy, Oman and China's economic behavior bodies - each big company- are both interdependent trading partners as well as rivals in the market competition. Therefore the principle in dealing with economic trade relations is oriented on the whole, the long-term relationship and the mutually beneficial and win-win interests, which definitely results in a double-wins unbreakable foundation with coexistence of competition and cooperation. Such an economic communication between Oman and China not only promotes bilateral political trust, but helps to achieve mutually complementary advantages and the goals of maximizing wins, conjunct wins and mutual wins, which on the one hand is the new development of economic interaction principle in globalization with the involvement of the property of modern time, on the other hand is the basic principle adhered to by all in the new economic situation. Practice has demonstrated that this principle of great realistic importance and guiding significance.

On June 5th 2009 in Chengdu, Oman signed a cooperative framework agreement to support the post-disaster construction of Guangyuan City of China. According to the protocol, Oman donated 32,380 million RMB in renovate the collapsed city, have rebuilt 350 sets of residential quarters, a school and a hospital equipped with supporting facilities, which is the first restoration program Oman has aided after the large-scaled earthquake in Wenchuan of Sichuan Province in China. Both parties hope

the project will be built as a landmark for Gulf States to aid Sichuan post- disaster reconstruction. The two countries are strengthening economic and social cooperation.

As a basic way to realize innovation, Oman and China's cultural exchanges can be traced back to historical communication. The history of the world map indicates that rapidly developed nations or countries are those which can easily facilitate communicative resources, thus resulting in frequent exchanges with other countries; underdeveloped nations or countries are those that have less contact with the outside world because of a variety of reasons or containment. Any nation's cultural innovation and development are closely related with the existing environment and conditions. Nowadays the environment and conditions for Oman-China cultural innovation and development are the general connection and universal association of world in the course of globalization.

At present Sino-Omani relationship is greatly highlighted and comes to a golden stage of development. Oman is willing to further the harmonious relations and economic and trade cooperation with China. The frankincense on the board of ship called “sohar” and the epigraphy of temple called “Qiangui” in Quanzhou all have records about relations between the two countries. Many centuries ago China has been connected with Oman through Silk Roads and Spice Routes. The historical relationship between the two countries paves the strong foundation for the currently bilateral relations. To be Oman’s first economic partner in the world has proved the common desire of two countries to strengthen friendly relations and cooperation in various fields in the light of international and regional changes, which is of great

significance to enhance understanding, strengthen friendship, expand consensus, deepen cooperation and further promote Oman-China friendly cooperation in an all-round, wide-scope and multi-level areas. It is an opportunity for Sino-Omani people to retrospect the times of ancient “Silk Road” and to share the deepest affectionateness which is like the length of Chinese Great wall. The holy fire of Beijing Olympic games lights up every Omani heart for peace and friendship to start the new page of modern “Silk Road”

